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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines conflicts and congruities between memories of past political 
violence, and the implications these have for attempts to enable ‘justice’ and 
‘reconciliation’ in Cambodia. The project takes the establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) as a starting point that seeks to stabilise a 
narrow account of past political violence. The ECCC is important as a point of departure 
because it is the main institutional site through which Cambodia is confronting past 
political violence. Tasked with prosecuting crimes perpetrated by Khmer Rouge between 
1975 and 1979, the ECCC promotes a restricted reading of political violence in 
Cambodia, attempting to silence some pasts whilst calling attention to others.  At the 
same time, the work of the ECCC situates the past as a field of intervention that can 
yield particular ameliorative social and political outcomes: providing a sense of justice, 
establishing the truth of political violence in Cambodia, deterring the future 
perpetration of atrocity, and enabling reconciliation. Memory is integral to these ends as 
the key target of civic renewal. Based on eight months of fieldwork in 2008/9 conducted 
at multiple sites in Cambodia, the project critically reflects on the ECCC’s attempt to 
generate a unified and consensual account of political violence in Cambodia. Three key 
findings are evidenced. Firstly, whilst the ECCC attempts to frame and stabilise a 
preferred account of political violence through a judicial process that reconstructs 
memory through disclosure and concealment, this process itself is contested by the 
subjects it animates (its ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’). Moreover, I argue that the work of 
the ECCC actually catalyses multiple, often conflicted claims over what justice and 
reconciliation mean as socio-political strategies. The ECCC continues to generate 
unintended and unexpected results in the way that it platforms, recues and generates 
demands of the past. Secondly, the research findings evidence diverse and competing 
regimes of memory in Cambodia that call into question the possibilities of the ECCC in 
reconstructing a unified, shared public memory of political violence in Cambodia, and 
providing a sense of justice and reconciliation on that basis. These are frequently 
encountered exactly at the propagation of the ECCC preferred reading of past political 
violence, gesturing to the way that conflicting memory occurs – or is foregrounded – in 
resistance to power. Thirdly, the research findings evidence competing rationales for 
remembering and forgetting political violence in varied ways (for example, material 
priorities, tourism, and attendant commercial interests). Moreover, the thesis 
documents ambivalence among some Cambodians toward memorials and museums and 
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the pasts that they call attention to. In this sense, the project shows how these 
ambivalences are dislocated from and eschew the moral authority of the rationales 
grounding the ECCC’s work (providing a sense of justice and facilitating reconciliation in 
the name of continued memories of political violence). 
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Chapter One 
Remembering political violence in Cambodia  
 
This thesis examines conflicts and congruities between different ‘regimes of memory’ of 
past political violence (Radstone and Hodgkin 2005: 1).1 The project takes the 
establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) as a starting 
point because it seeks to stabilise and anchor a narrow account of past political violence in 
Cambodia. The ECCC is important as a point of departure because it is the main institutional 
site through which Cambodia is confronting past political violence. Tasked with prosecuting 
crimes perpetrated by Khmer Rouge (KR), the ECCC promotes a particular reading of 
political violence in Cambodia, silencing some pasts whilst calling attention to others.  At 
the same time, the work of the ECCC situates the past as a field of intervention that can 
yield particular ameliorative social and political outcomes: providing a sense of justice, 
establishing the truth of political violence in Cambodia, deterring the future perpetration of 
atrocity, and enabling reconciliation. In doing so, the work of the ECCC relies upon the 
construction, dissemination and public acceptance of its account of the past.  
The thesis has three aims. Firstly, it examines the way in which the ECCC generates a claim 
over what is remembered and how it is remembered, the way that this claim shapes and 
furnishes justice and reconciliation, and the ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ it animates and 
                                                          
1 Radstone and Hodgkin use the term ‘regimes of memory’ to emphasise the discursive 
qualities of memory: that memory is constituted through discourse and that memory has 
emerged as an object of discourse (to be known and acted on).  
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licenses. The thesis seeks to mine the tensions and conflicts within these processes. 
Secondly, it offers an engagement with the sites, ‘technologies of memory’, and agents that 
are involved in presenting these claims. Thirdly, the project contrasts localised ‘regimes of 
memory’, examining the role and meaning of museum and memorial sites that may exist in 
conflict (or in congruence) with the regime of memory sanctioned at the ECCC. This part of 
the project focuses on accounts of the past mobilised within two Cambodian communities: 
Siem Reap, in Cambodia’s North-West, and Anlong Veng, on Cambodia’s Northern border 
with Thailand. Siem Reap is home to a prominent memorial to the victims of the KR. Anlong 
Veng, a former KR stronghold, hosts a memorial to Pol Pot, a memorial to Ta Mok (a former 
KR military leader), and state sponsored conservation sites including the former residences 
and safe houses of former KR leaders (a number of whom are now indicted by the ECCC).  
Based on eight months of fieldwork conducted in Cambodia in 2008/9, the project critically 
reflects on the ECCC’s attempt to generate a unified and consensual account of political 
violence in Cambodia. Three key findings are evidenced.  
Firstly, whilst the ECCC attempts to frame and stabilise a preferred account of political 
violence through a judicial process that is characterised by disclosure and concealment, this 
process itself is contested by the subjects it calls upon to speak about the past (its ‘victims’ 
and ‘perpetrators’). Moreover, we see that the work of the ECCC actually catalyses 
multiple, often conflicted claims over what justice and reconciliation mean socially and 
politically. The ECCC continues to generate unintended and unexpected results in the way 
that it makes demands of the past.  
Secondly, the research findings evidence diverse and competing regimes of memory in 
Cambodia that call into question the possibilities of the ECCC in reconstructing a unified, 
shared public memory of political violence in Cambodia, and providing a sense of justice 
and reconciliation on that basis. These are frequently encountered exactly at the 
propagation of the ECCC preferred reading of past political violence, gesturing to the way 
that conflicting memory occurs – or is foregrounded – in resistance to power.  
Thirdly, the research findings evidence competing rationales for remembering and 
forgetting political violence (for example tourism and its attendant commercial interests). 
Moreover, the findings document ambivalence among some Cambodians toward memorial 
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sites and the pasts that they call attention to. In this sense, the project shows how these 
ambivalences are dislocated from and eschew the moral authority of the rationales 
grounding the ECCC’s work (the imperative to provide a sense of justice and the need to 
facilitate reconciliation in the name of problematic memory). 
 
This chapter has four sections that contextualise the thesis more broadly. The first section 
examines how the ECCC can be understood as a vehicle for the construction of memory. In 
that section I provide a basic background of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) period of KR 
rule, and then the domestic and international contexts within which the ECCC emerged. I 
examine the way the ECCC treats the past as a site of political practice before considering 
the way that this treatment is underpinned by assumptions about memory in Cambodia 
that are singular, generalising, and risk positioning Cambodians as passive and amnesiac in 
their relationship to memories of political violence. I then explain how these singular and 
generalising claims can be challenged by examining localised representations and accounts 
of the past in order to foreground the ethnographic research strategy employed by the 
project, discussed in Chapter Two, Researching Regimes of Memory.  The second section of 
this chapter situates the thesis within two key areas of relevant literature: the sociology of 
memory and approaches to transitional justice and human rights. I show how research 
questions raised by the Cambodian case reflect important debates within the sociology of 
memory and transitional justice concerning the workings and reproduction of regimes of 
memory, and around the rationales for ‘intervening’ on the past employed and theorised by 
transitional justice practitioners and scholars.2 I highlight the way that these two fields are 
unified by assumed verities about the transformative potential of memory, a set of 
assumptions that this research seeks to challenge. The third section offers a statement on 
the emergence of the project research questions, discussing the implications the key 
findings may have for case and the field. A final section offers chapter outlines for the thesis 
overall.         
                                                          
2 The thesis uses relevant literature in two ways. I employ contextual literature in this 
chapter to situate the project rationale and research questions within key debates on 
memory and transitional justice. I then use case specific research as it is variously relevant 
throughout the four substantive, empirically driven chapters presented by the thesis. 
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1.1 Democratic Kampuchea and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia 
 
The Khmer Rouge (KR) took control of Cambodia on 17th April 1975, founding the 
‘Democratic Kampuchea’ (DK) state (1975-1979).  Four years later, 1.5 million people had 
been executed or died of starvation or disease (Kiernan 1996: 460). The KR sought to build 
a classless, agrarian society and upon taking power began to evacuate urban centres across 
the country. The evacuation of Phnom Penh in April 1975 alone cost the lives of 10,400 
people (Kiernan 1996: 48). The KR quickly set about eliminating members of the former Lon 
Nol regime (1970-1975), against whom the communist insurgents had fought a protracted 
civil war. Those associated with the former government, including members of the civil 
service, teachers, and other educated professionals were considered by the KR to be 
‘American lackeys’, ‘class enemies’, not ‘real’ or ‘true’ Khmers and targeted for particularly 
harsh treatment once resettled (Hinton 1998: 363). Religion was banned and monks de-
robed. Moreover, ethnic minorities including the Cham Muslims, ethnic Chinese-Khmers, 
and the Vietnamese were severely persecuted. From 1977 onwards, internal purges of 
those perceived to be disloyal to the regime intensified and rebellion erupted in the East of 
Cambodia. At the same time, KR troops began to perpetrate cross-border massacres of 
civilians in Vietnamese territory and by late 1978 the Vietnamese were forced to intervene 
militarily. The Vietnamese army alongside Cambodian rebel forces captured Phnom Penh 
on 7th January 1979 establishing the ‘People’s Republic of Kampuchea’ (PRK), forcing KR 
troops across Cambodia’s Western border with Thailand. The Vietnamese intervention 
inaugurated an end to widespread KR atrocities, but also signalled the beginning of ten 
years of foreign occupation and nearly twenty years of further civil war (Kiernan 2002b).  
The Paris Peace Agreement was reached between Government, KR and other conflicting 
factions in 1991. The agreement sanctioned the presence of a United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping force in Cambodia – the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia 
(UNTAC) – to oversee a ‘transition’ to democracy, with elections held in 1993. The elections 
were boycotted by the KR and no mention of the DK years was made by UNTAC beyond a 
preference for “a non-return to the practices and policies of the past” (cited in Rajagopal 
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1998: 190), and the civil war continued after the peace keeping mission departed. Royal 
Government of Cambodia (RGC) amnesty initiatives launched in 1994 and 1996 enticed 
defections from the KR, eroding the insurgents’ fighting capacity (Fawthrop and Jarvis 
2004). By 1997, with peace a real prospect, the question of accountability for crimes 
perpetrated under DK resurfaced. The then Cambodian Co-Prime Ministers Hun Sen and 
Norodom Ranaridh approached the UN in late 1997 requesting assistance for the 
establishment of a tribunal to prosecute crimes perpetrated by KR leaders under DK. 
Meanwhile, the KR movement eventually crumbled in 1998 after factional infighting and 
the death of Pol Pot (see Rowley 2006). After several years of negotiations between the 
RGC and UN over the make-up and remit of the tribunal, an agreement mandating the 
prosecution of ‘senior leaders’ and ‘those most responsible’ for crimes perpetrated under 
the KR regime was reached in 2004.3 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC) began its work in 2006.   
 
The ECCC are now the central institutional site through which Cambodia is confronting the 
legacies of political violence. The ECCC is has been mandated with the prosecution of the 
‘classic’ crimes under international law, including genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes (Menzel 2007). Moreover, as one of a recent wave of ‘mixed’ international and 
domestic tribunals that have been established to prosecute past human rights abuses, the 
ECCC exists as a part-internationalised body within Cambodia’s existing judicial system, 
employs both Cambodian and international staff, and draws upon both international and 
domestic law for its prosecutions.  In this sense, the ECCC is reflective of a trend within 
transitional justice scholarship and practice toward the ‘localisation’ of attempts to reckon 
with past human rights violations, purportedly offering international standards of justice 
within a localised context, whilst at the same time affording a strong sense of domestic 
public ownership over proceedings (see Leebaw 2008: 102). Furthermore, the ECCC is novel 
– as a principally punitive mechanism – to the extent that it offers collective and moral 
                                                          
3 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments 
as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006).  
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reparations to the collective groups of victims that it recognises (these include initiatives 
such the construction of memorials, the funding of non-profit services for victims, or the 
publication of statements of apology).  
 
The emergence of the ECCC must be understood within a broader international historical 
context. The ECCC historically follows precedents originating at the Nuremberg trials and, 
more recently, seen at the ‘ad hoc’ prosecutions at the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Ciociari 2006). These precedents are manifestations of retributivist 
human rights norms that demand punishment for perpetrators of human rights violations. 
In this sense, the ECCC is principally validated by an international legalism that promotes 
punishment as the most appropriate response to atrocity. Proponents of the ECCC invoke 
retributive and legalist justifications when validating the ECCC, demanding that 
perpetrators of human rights violations must be punished; that such punishment can deter 
future human rights abuses; that the deterrence of further violence fosters peace and 
reconciliation; and that a transparent prosecution can act as a pedagogical exercise for local 
judicial institutions thus enhancing the rule of law (see Zalaquett 1990; Orentlicher 1991; 
Borneman 1997). The invocation of retributivist human rights norms stands in contrast to 
‘restorative’ justice techniques – principally manifest at the site of truth commissions – that 
(purport to) centre the experiences of victims, whilst tending to implement amnesties for 
perpetrators of violations of human rights (Hayner 2002; Minow and Rosenblum 2002; 
Moon 2008). Furthermore, the didactic role of prosecutions as exercises of ‘history writing’ 
and identity formation is significant (Simpson 1996; Douglas 2001; Koskenniemi 2002; 
Nimaga 2007), and proponents of the ECCC have supplemented legalist justifications for 
prosecution by invoking validations for the court associated with non-punitive mechanisms 
that respond to atrocity. In particular, the ECCC process is understood to facilitate 
reconciliation; its reparative procedure is a novel complement to its punitive mechanism; it 
can play a key role as a truth seeking exercise; and participation in the ECCC process has 
been argued to offer catharsis, dignity and redress for victims of the regime (Fawthrop and 
Jarvis 2004; Chhang 2007; Chhang 2010). I elaborate on the way that these ‘headline’ 
validations of the court are intertwined with processes of disclosure and concealment in 
further detail in Chapter Three, Trials and Tribulations.  
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These justifications for the ECCC raise important questions about memory in two ways. 
Firstly, it implicates a question of how the ECCC attends selectively to some periods of past 
political violence, but not to others, in the way it (re)constructs a public account of what 
happened in Cambodia (i.e. the victims and perpetrators it recognises and the story of 
events it tells and animates). Although the ECCC is predicated on retributivist norms that 
oblige the punishment of all perpetrators of human rights violations, the ECCC has a 
notably selective remit for prosecutions, the core content furnishing the account of the past 
it seeks to stabilise. Secondly, questions are raised by the way the ECCC situates the past as 
a site that must be disinterred as a means to ameliorate the present (i.e. as a field of 
knowledge and practice that can be acted upon to produce particular social outcomes). The 
personal and temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC can be examined as a ‘politics of memory’ in 
the first instance. In the second instance, we must examine the assumptions made about 
the ‘state’ of memory in Cambodia that are visible in attempts to justify the ECCC as a 
panacea to ‘problematic’ memory, and those outcomes of the ECCC’s work that are 
believed to constitute such a remedy through justice and reconciliation. I now discuss each 
set of issues in turn.     
 
The ECCC is mandated to bring charges against senior leaders and ‘those most responsible’ 
under the KR regime. As of July 2013 the ECCC had completed its first case, ‘001’, finding 
‘Duch’ – head of the notorious S-21 interrogation and execution centre – guilty of crimes 
against humanity. Duch was sentenced to life imprisonment after appeal. A second case, 
‘002’, bringing charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against four 
‘senior leaders’, began in 2011 though one defendant, Ieng Thirith, was severed from 
proceedings in 2012 due to suffering dementia, and another, Ieng Sary, died in March 2013. 
The trials of Khieu Samphan, former DK head of state, and Nuon Chea, chief ideologue of 
the KR regime, are ongoing. Further prosecutions of other former KR figures under third 
and fourth cases are now under investigation, but these have met resistance from the Royal 
Government of Cambodia. The RGC’s reluctance to see prosecutions beyond the five figures 
currently indicted has in turn provoked accusations of political interference in the work of 
the court (Menzel 2007; Claussen 2008; Banner 2009). In October 2010, Hor Namhong 
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(Cambodia’s serving Foreign Minister) expressed Prime Minster Hun Sen’s view that “Case 
003 will not be allowed… We have to think about peace in Cambodia or the court will fail” 
(Cheang 2010 ). For the Cambodian government, restricting the number of prosecutions at 
the ECCC to a handful of figures is considered a key tool in maintaining stability and the 
broader process of ‘national reconciliation’: a narrow claim that reconciliation equals peace 
(and the exculpation of the majority of ‘lower-level’ KR) underpins Government consent for 
the ECCC proceedings, conditional on only a handful of leaders facing charges. As 
Koskenniemi has argued, the (restrictive) ‘individualisation’ of prosecutions at war crimes 
trials is not neutral in effect because it serves to obfuscate the social and political contexts 
under which crimes may have occurred, and can exculpate broader sections of less senior 
perpetrators (2002: 14). In this sense, we must understand the formalisation of the ECCC’s 
individualised/personal jurisdiction as a tool for the reconstruction of the past in the service 
of particular present interests.  
 
The ECCC’s mandated timeframe (1975-1979) poses equally important questions 
surrounding the way that the UN and RGC have selectively sanctioned the scrutiny of 
political violence as worthy of redress and acknowledgement. The framing of the ECCC’s 
temporal jurisdiction to 1975-1979 was a key condition for international support for the 
trials (Ciociari 2006: 20), and delivers a timeframe that excludes the possibility of examining 
serious political violence perpetrated before and after the DK period (deemed to be 
important by many informants involved in this project). These include purges against left-
leaning dissidents under the Sihanouk regime in the 1960’s, pogroms against ethnic 
Vietnamese during Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic (1970-1975), the hundreds of thousands killed 
by the illegal carpet bombing of Cambodia by the US in 1973, the widespread use of forced 
labour and detention without trial by the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (1979-
1989), and the continuing Khmer Rouge perpetrated massacres of civilians that occurred 
after their removal from power in 1979 (Kiernan 2002b).  
 
Institutions tasked with confronting problematic pasts emerge within and subject to 
particular hierarchies of power: the delimitation of the ECCC’s temporal and personal 
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mandates emerged from both domestic and international influences (Fawthrop and Jarvis 
2004; Ciociari 2006; Ainley 2013). As a mechanism that acts on and (re)produces memory, 
we must understand the ECCC as framed through these national and international political 
interests as much as through human rights prerogatives. This shows how transitional justice 
mechanisms can reflect potentially ‘irreconcilable’ aims: law can be applied in the name of 
preventing or exposing abuses of power, whilst simultaneously sustaining the interests of 
power or concealing abuses conducted under its exercise (Leebaw 2008). 
  
While we can see that the ECCC acts on memory in the way it selectively attends to some 
pasts but not others, we can also see that memory is invoked when rationalising the need 
for the court. ECCC publicity relies on metaphors about memory when justifying the court’s 
work: outreach posters describe processes of the record being ‘set straight’ and ‘moving 
forward through justice’ (see Figure 1).4 In stating it is ‘time for the record to be set 
straight’, the poster positions the ECCC as a mechanism able to produce a ‘truthful’ and 
unified account of what happened. By ‘moving forward through justice’, the ECCC positions 
itself as the progressive agent that can ameliorate or ‘work through’ memories of political 
violence. Similar invocations of memory are made by ECCC partner organisations when 
addressing the need for the court. Youk Chhang, head of the Documentation Centre of 
Cambodia (DC-Cam), has suggested that “...a society cannot know itself if it does not have 
an accurate memory of its own history” (Chhang 2010). Chhang’s comment appeals to a 
process of self-examination and self-disclosure that hinges upon the assumption that a 
consensual public memory is ‘retrievable’ through particular forms of engagement with the 
past (DC-Cam is a key ECCC partner in publicising the work of the ECCC in provincial areas, 
whilst also soliciting applications for participation in the ECCC process). Foundational to all 
of the above are the presuppositions the past is the central site for civic renewal, that 
memory is an essential location of ‘collective identity’, and that the ECCC acts on and behalf 
of all Cambodians. This is important because, as I will show in the next section, mainstream 
debates within transitional justice and the sociology of memory are characterised by 
assumptions that treat the need to confront past political violence as self-evident and 
                                                          
4 Available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/public-affair/publication/poster 
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objectively possible, rather than an emergent and contingent feature of late modern 
political life that can only ever be realised subject to and within relations of power, and that 
are hence always already partial. 
 
 
Statements such as ‘moving forward through justice’ and ‘setting the record straight’ hinge 
on the idea that there is a collective memory today that can be ameliorated or corrected. In 
the first instance, the claim that it is ‘time for the record to be set straight’ suggests 
Figure 1 ECCC publicity poster 
20 
 
distortion or inaccuracy in the ‘public’ memory of what happened. To ‘move forward 
through justice’ implies that Cambodia has not until now ‘moved forward’ and remains 
hamstrung by that past. Youk Chhang’s remarks further rely on assumptions about the 
possibility of retrieving a unified and ‘accurate’ memory of the past, gesturing to 
psychological and medical approaches on issues of memory reintegration and trauma. 
These claims are indicative of the way ‘individual’ qualities about memory are ascribed to 
and read from collective groupings when arguments for the need to disinter the past are 
advanced: as Hamber and Wilson note, this is problematic because it suggests that memory 
is a ‘…static and collective object’ (2002: 36). The danger here is that when the ECCC 
mobilises claims like ‘moving forward through justice’ as a means of validating the need for 
the court, the Cambodian body politic as a whole is implied as amnesiac and passive in its 
relationship to past political violence (a key issue that this project looks to challenge) 
(Hughes and Pupavac 2005). In this sense, the validation of the need for the ECCC can hinge 
on (and run the risk of sustaining) representations of a ‘collective’ memory in Cambodia 
today that are pathologising, disempowering, animate infantalising relations of 
management and supervision, and therefore subordinate the agency of the subjects it seeks 
to redress.  
 
Whilst the ECCC is principally justified through claims that presume a collective or national 
memory as an object of renewal (the focus of discussion in Chapter Three, Trials and 
Tribulations), it is worth noting that attitudes toward the importance of ECCC among 
Cambodians remain mixed. In 2008 a nationwide study by the Berkley Centre for Human 
Rights showed that many Cambodians (85%) have little or no knowledge of the ECCC 
(Pham, Vinck et al. 2009). This calls into question the capability of the ECCC in disseminating 
a shared and unified account of past political violence. Moreover, the Berkley study further 
suggests that whilst many Cambodians do look favourably toward a process of 
‘accountability’, 
 
…respondents said their [immediate] priorities were jobs (83%), services to meet basic 
needs including health (20%), and food (17%). When asked what the priorities of the 
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government should be, justice was again seldom mentioned (2%), with the most frequent 
answers being the economy (56%) and building infrastructure (48%). (2009: 34) 
 
A second survey in 2010, conducted in the wake of the Duch trial, found improvements 
with knowledge and familiarity of the work of the ECCC, but that those Cambodians more 
concerned about their material day to day priorities – rather than the topic of 
accountability for the KR – had actually increased from 76% in 2008 to 83% in 2010 (Pham, 
Vinck et al. 2011). This means that that even when the work of the ECCC is successfully 
disseminated, it does not necessarily translate into immediate, unequivocal acceptance of 
the need for the court.  The implications for the work of the ECCC are significant. There 
continues to be a dislocation among the public between the importance afforded to the 
ECCC as an intervention on the past and other priorities in the present. The ambivalence of 
respondents toward the court as compared to other material priorities indicates that there 
may be other imperatives at work that can subsume (or co-opt) the importance of 
‘remembering’. I examine this point at length through a discussion of the role of memorial 
spaces within localised tourist economies in Chapters Five, The Wat Thmey Genocide 
Memorial and Six, The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng. In sum, the ECCC and its 
concomitant politics of justice and reconciliation are threatened by the ambivalence felt 
towards it by the Cambodian public. Indeed, this thesis attempts to show how the ECCC 
(regime of memory) is ‘sold’ through outreach work that works to combat such 
ambivalences (and seeks recourse to pre-existing memorials and museums to make its case, 
as I show in Chapter Four, Mediating Memory).    
 
In sum, the Berkley studies point to important dissonances between the ECCC process and 
wider attitudes toward past political violence (as noted, a key recommendation of both 
Berkley studies is deployment of enhanced outreach initiatives to combat this dissonance). 
On the one hand, the ECCC has been positioned by non-governmental organisations, the 
UN, RGC, and the media as the central institutional site through which Cambodia is 
confronting past political violence. On the other, the Berkley studies gesture toward the 
possibility of alternative or ambivalent attitudes to the work of the ECCC and past political 
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violence. Given the selective and restrictive period examined by the ECCC’s personal and 
temporal jurisdiction, and the protracted experiences of war and atrocity experienced in 
Cambodia beyond the 1975-1979 period, this project examines regimes of memory that 
may be exist in conflict with that sanctioned by the ECCC. Moreover, this project looks to 
challenge the way justifications for the ECCC situate the Cambodian body politic as passive 
in its relationship to memories of political violence (a key finding of this project is that 
Cambodians have been active in reconstructing and renegotiating accounts of political 
violence in ways that are dislocated from a formal mechanism that is intended to break an 
impasse in their abilities to do so). In order to examine each of these issues, it is crucial to 
examine the way the past is rendered meaningful within localised Cambodian communities. 
The role and meaning of memorial and museum sites that call attention to memories of 
political violence present themselves as key locations in doing so.    
 
To conclude this section, regimes of memory that exist in conflict with the ECCC have 
serious implications for the resonance, legitimacy and efficacy of the ECCC in delivering its 
purported aims. As noted, the ECCC’s work is a bid to formalise a singular, stable and 
unified reading of past events (that can be contested only within tightly defined 
institutional legal parameters). This regime of memory looks to formally map the contours 
of how justice is to be delivered and demarcates the field of memory around which 
conflicted parties should reconcile. As I argue in Chapter Three, Trials and Tribulations, the 
court has enjoyed mixed successes in this regard, and continues to produce unexpected and 
unanticipated outcomes as the subjects it licenses – its ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ –contest 
its memory work. At the same time, as I show in Chapter Four, Mediating Memory, whilst 
the different shape and form of claims over what justice and reconciliation actually entail 
varies according to the actors and agents proposing them, they are unified by the 
parameters of the ECCC’s jurisdiction, focusing on the guilt of senior leaders only whilst 
presenting lower-level perpetrators as victims of the KR. More broadly, reconciliatory 
claims advanced in Cambodia are conditioned by the acceptance of the ECCC’s particular 
retributive exercises as a response to memories of political violence, acceding to the courts 
authority as arbiter of the past. In this sense, strategies of justice and reconciliation hinge 
on a public and mutual acceptance of what to remember and accept the primacy of 
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prosecutions as a panacea to problematic memory. On this basis, we can understand that 
the existence of conflicting regimes of memory can challenge both the ‘content’ of memory 
and the appropriateness of punishment as a response to it. Moreover, conflicting regimes 
of memory may present different accounts of the past, grievances and appeals that may 
remain irreconcilable to the ECCC (and the politics of reconciliation more broadly) by 
presenting alternative sets of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ of atrocity.  
 
1.2 Key literatures 
 
Sociology and memory 
 
Sociological approaches to questions of memory have been principally preoccupied with 
two questions: how does memory work (a social ‘mechanics’ of memory); and secondly, 
why has memory emerged as such an important issue for contemporary societies which 
demands attention and action? These two questions are important for this research 
because they speak directly to the issues of how the past shapes who we are and how it can 
place moral burdens on the present. This section outlines each in turn. Halbwachs’ work on 
the ‘collective memory’ (1992) - heavily influenced by Durkheim’s concept of the 
‘conscience collective’ and his analysis of the affirmation of social groups through ritual 
(1984; 2001) - was the first sociological contribution to describe the group dynamics 
involved in remembering. For Halbwachs, it is membership in social groups that renders 
memory meaningful, because it is membership in social groups that organises and arranges 
what should be remembered and which images of the past are thus maintained. Although 
Halbwachs’ approach has been criticised (much like Durkheim’s) for providing a reified and 
totalised understanding of the ‘collective memory’ as an entity in itself, his work remains 
important as a point of departure because it sensitises us to the role and uses of memory 
by groups in the present (such as the maintenance of moral boundaries through the 
punishment of past crimes), and the pivotal role memory plays as a basis for identity 
formation (and therefore in processes of reconciling different groups).  
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The relationship between memory and identity has remained central to sociological 
debates on memory. On the one hand, sociological contributions have addressed shared 
memories as a pivotal force in the realisation of cultural identity (Assmann 1996), 
generational memory (Schuman and Scott 1989), and ‘public memory’ (Bodnar 1993; 
Bodnar 1994). Indeed, the idea that the past (as group memory) persists and constitutes 
group identities is central to ethno-symbolist accounts of nations and nationalism (Smith 
1998). On the other, critical contributions have looked to the relationship between memory 
and identity formation as a process of construction, through which memory is a vehicle for 
the legitimation of elite and state power (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Gillis 1994), or a 
terrain for resistance to dominant or imposed accounts of the past (Johnson and BCCCS 
1982). This opposition between, on the one hand, collective memory as an authentic 
reflection of the past, versus, on the other, memory as purely artefactual, synthetic and 
‘top down’ has plagued sociological approaches to memory. There are a number of notable 
contributions that have sought to escape this impasse by eschewing assessment of either 
the ‘truth’ of memory or approaches that foreground the fictitious production of the past in 
the present. Middleton and Edwards (1990), Wertsch (2002), and Olick (1998; 2007) have 
called for the rejection of an opposition between ‘illusionary’ versus ‘authentic’ accounts of 
collective memory, positing all remembering as an active and mediated process between 
individuals, groups, social texts, representations and social narratives. Anderson’s 
arguments on nations as ‘imagined communities’ provides a useful example of such an 
approach at work because it hinges upon an inter-subjective sense of belonging based on 
the social mediation of a shared sense of past, through texts like newspapers (2006). 
Approaches to memory that emphasise the ‘dynamics’ of remembering are therefore useful 
because they lead us away from conceptions of social memory that ‘naturalise’ memory as 
archival or which prematurely dismiss the formative role experience and agency may play in 
making particular memories persistent. Understanding memory as a dynamic and 
negotiated field allows us to critically reflect on the possible production of a unified and 
shared understanding of the past as a contested process. Moreover, crucially, theories of 
memory that recognise its realisation as negotiated and continuous allow analytical space 
for agency in remembering. In this sense, we can begin to ask different sets of questions: on 
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what terms are accounts of the past mobilised, why do some events persist as/in social 
memories, and on what terms are they resisted?     
 
Taking memory as an active and mediated process complements more recent contributions 
that have posited memory as a discursive field. These approaches are foundational to the 
methodological and analytical strategies I outline in the next chapter on methods 
(Researching Regimes of Memory). In particular, Antze and Lambek (1996) and Radstone 
and Hodgkin (2005) have called for an appreciation of the ‘uses’ of memory. Both sets of 
authors ground potential analysis of the way memory is situated as a field of knowledge to 
be ‘known’ and acted upon, as well as how memory ‘itself’ (the ‘contents’ of memory), is a 
product of discourse. This is significant because it sensitises us to how collective memories 
are situated as objects of practice and therefore embedded within relationships of power 
and social hierarchy. In the next chapter, Researching Regimes of Memory, I revisit this 
point to foreground the analytical and empirical approach adopted by the thesis through a 
closer reading of Foucault’s concept of discourse (1980; 1991; 2002). 
 
This brings us to the second set of questions arising from the literature: how and why has 
memory – and in particular, memories of political violence – become so important in 
contemporary societies as an object of social and political practice? From the 1990s 
debates turned to focus on a ‘crisis’ of memory (Terdiman 1993). Nora (1989) has 
suggested that the proliferation of ‘memory’ as ossified in sites and objects – ‘lieux de 
memoire’ – is a response to the absence of organic and contextual forms of community 
remembering under conditions of modernity. In this sense, it is the decline of tradition – a 
stable past – that inspires the current interest in cultural memory. In a similar vein, Huyssen 
has pointed to the ‘twilight’ of memory: as the experience of modernity accelerates, the 
dislocation with a sense of past engenders an obsession with memory as an anchoring 
social reference point (Huyssen 1995). These accounts have pointed to a broad cultural 
memory ‘boom’, key features of which have been the growth in heritage and conservation 
industries and the proliferation of museum and memorial sites. 
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One prominent aspect of the recent interest in the past is a focus on memories of suffering, 
conflict and atrocity. Whilst glorified accounts of war, conflict, sacrifice and valour have 
been (and remain) foundational to legitimating stories about the nation (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983; Renan 1990 [1882]; Gillis 1994; Anderson 2006), Williams has pointed to a 
growing willingness of political elites to recover and acknowledge histories of state crime 
and political violence (2007: 165). Olick has described the increasing imperative to self-
examine, self-disclose, disinter, prosecute and apologise for histories of conflict and 
suffering as bound to a nascent ‘politics of regret’, exemplifying ‘regret’ as a new principle 
of political legitimacy (2007: 22). Olick presents us with an argument that traces the ‘ethic’ 
of regret as an emergent condition of modernity. Drawing on Weber and Nietzsche, Olick 
points to the Enlightenment decline of theodicy and the demystification of public life as 
centring ‘secular man’ in linear time: secular humanitarianism increasingly supplants 
theological redemption as a form of directed ‘ressentiment’ (a politics of protecting the 
vulnerable); rational humanist ‘progress’ replaces Christian teleology as the prevailing 
moral narrative for the world view of (Western) man. Under such conditions of rational 
modernity, rapid technological development firstly enables and then obviates the arbitrary 
nature of human suffering resulting from conflict, as seen in the most dramatic form with 
‘total warfare’ during WWII and the experience of the Holocaust (2007: 172). Olick’s 
account seeks to conceptually map and empirically demonstrate how the thought and 
experience of modernity germinates regret as a moral and political imperative.      
Levy and Sznaider have argued, along similar lines to Olick, that memories of the 
experiences of suffering during WWII and the Holocaust contributed to a 
‘cosmopolitanistion’ of state sovereignty – the orientation of states’ rational interests 
around (human rights) principles of regret – premised on a willingness to remember and 
prevent the recurrence of such events (Levy and Sznaider 2002; 2004; 2006). In this sense, 
we can see how the emergence of an ethic of regret is most visible in the political-judicial 
responses to the Holocaust and WWII: the formalisation of the modern human rights 
regime – specifically privileging the dignity of the individual victim – with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Genocide Convention, the Geneva 
Conventions, and the Nuremberg prosecutions for Nazi war crimes.  
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Sociological contributions that theorise the obligations of memory tend to rely on the 
experience of the Holocaust and WWII as reference points, indicating the significance of 
these events for the formation of an ethic of remembrance. Moreover, these approaches 
tend to have accepted a ‘duty’ to remember suffering in order to counter forgetting, 
locating forgetting as a recapitulation to violence. For example, Adorno suggests that “(t)he 
abundance of real suffering tolerates no forgetting” (Adorno 1974: 84). Baudrillard has 
written that “forgetting extermination is part of extermination, because it is also the 
extermination of memory, of history, of the social…” (1994: 49). Baudrillard is at the same 
time anxious to diagnose the way that the ‘artificial’ mass simulation of memory through 
cultural channels such as film and television equally debases and surrenders itself to the 
‘violence’ of forgetting. Similarly central to sociological debates on the importance of 
memory is the assumption that the past promises lessons for the present. Bauman’s 
seminal Modernity and the Holocaust (2000), for example, diagnoses the Holocaust as the 
apotheosis of modernity – the accomplishments of rationalisation, efficiency and 
bureaucracy – revealing the immanent potential toward violence within modern social life 
that must be combated by a ‘duty’ of memory. Indeed, the potential for memory work to 
yield preventative, educational or ameliorative socio-political outcomes in the present has 
been treated as a truism within sociological accounts of the relationship of remembering to 
democratisation, trust, forgiveness and dignification (Misztal 2005; 2010; 2013), and the 
stabilisation the modern human rights project more broadly (Levy and Sznaider 2010). The 
structure of these claims is significant because they again posit a linear relationship 
between ‘correct’ practices of remembering translating neatly into social and political 
outcomes in the present, such as deterrence or democratisation. Sociological literature on 
memory has largely treated the normative injunction to remember as in itself apolitical, 
even when these accounts acknowledge that its emergence is historically contingent and 
conditioned.  
 
It is important here to examine the conditions and forms under which ‘regret’ as a principle 
of political life has become entrenched as a norm for the governance of post-conflict 
contexts, specifically within the fields of transitional justice and human rights. Whilst the 
Nuremberg prosecutions represent one of the first formal attempts to legally respond to 
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atrocity, the entrenchment of global norms and mechanisms that reckon with legacies of 
past political violence was impaired by the intractable bi-polar politics of the Cold War 
(Cassese 1998; Teitel 2003; Teitel 2005). In this sense, the realisation of a ‘politics of regret’ 
was enabled and conditioned by the fracturing of the international Cold War political 
landscape. Transitions to democracy across Latin America during the 1980s and in Eastern 
Europe from 1989 onwards have played a crucial role in shaping and cementing the current 
transitional justice regime in its varying approaches and aims (Cohen 1995). I now turn to 
the relationship between memory – and transitional justice-specific mechanisms – war 
crimes prosecutions, truth commissions and memorial projects – in the following section.  
 
Transitional justice 
 
It is beyond the scope of this section to provide an exhaustive account of the accumulation 
of writing that attends to the field now called ‘transitional justice’. Instead, I seek here to 
stake out a critical position in relation to some of the key assumptions at play in prevailing 
transitional justice practices and scholarship by examining some of the tensions at work in 
debates over what transitional justice has done and is meant to do, and the contingency of 
its core frameworks. I then link these approaches to the previous section on memory in 
order to foreground the contribution of this research to the sociology of memory and 
transitional justice. The term transitional justice came into use following the shifts away 
from authoritarian rule in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Kritz 
1996), and, constitutively, in the transition from apartheid in South Africa. Transitional 
justice has been broadly defined as a set of tools and strategies ‘associated with periods of 
political change’ (Teitel 2005: 837) that respond to the question of ‘how to reckon with 
massive crimes and abuses’ (Hayner 2002: 11). The scope of the field continues to be 
debated (Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006), and despite attempts to develop ‘models’ 
of transition (see Winter 2013, for example), scholarship has not yielded a ‘general’ theory 
of transitional justice or techniques for confronting past political violence (Arthur 2009). 
Transitional justice – as a field of knowledge and practice – remains conflicted, contested, 
and in flux.  
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Trevino-Rangel has identified three tendencies or ‘clusters’ within transitional scholarship 
that (loosely) map its conceptual and historical emergence (2012: chapter two). The first 
cluster is defined by the dilemmas and political trade-offs thought to characterise the first 
Latin American and Eastern European transitions.  Transitional justice (as a field of 
scholarship and practice) was initially preoccupied by two purportedly conflicting 
imperatives: retribution on the one hand, and restoration and reconciliation on the other. 
Retribution follows from a legalist imperative to punish those that perpetrate violations of 
human rights. This retributive legalism is visible as it materialises at war crimes trials and 
tribunals (beginning at Nuremberg, and more recently visible at the ad hoc prosecutions for 
crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and at the permanent 
International Criminal Court). These approaches have framed punishment through the lens 
of human rights (Kritz 1996; Mallinder 2007). Advocates of retributivist techniques stress 
the value of prosecutions as delineating individual and collective guilt for mass crimes 
(Méndez 1997), helping to establish the rule of law and foster democratic institutions 
(Borneman 1997), promoting memory and deterring the future perpetration of atrocity 
(Zalaquett 1990), enhancing social solidarity (Osiel 1997), and purportedly de-politicizing 
the treatment of perpetrators in the wake of political violence (Orentlicher 1991).       
As an alternative response to conflict and atrocity, restorative strategies situate ‘victims’ as 
the site of civic renewal, hinging on the deployment of mechanisms such as apology, 
reparation, and in particular, the recovery of ‘truth’ (through various techniques, i.e. public 
testimony at commissions, the disclosure of records from previous authorities, and the 
production of reports). Restorative approaches purport to better satisfy victims’ needs 
(Hayner 2002), offer victims dignity (Minow and Rosenblum 2002), prevent further atrocity 
by virtue of truth (Rotberg and Thompson 2000),  reform offenders (Braithwaite 1999), and 
reconcile and restore relationships between conflicted parties (Johnstone 2002). At the 
same time, restorative justice techniques – characterised by forms of disclosure manifest 
primarily at the site of truth commissions – have historically been bound to discourses of 
reconciliation and the use of amnesty agreements, visible (in early instances) in the 
institutional demands for ‘truth’ across the Latin American transitions, and most famously 
at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In South Africa, amnesty was 
granted to perpetrators of crimes committed during South Africa’s conflict in the name of 
‘truth’, ‘healing’ and ‘national reconciliation’ (see Moon 2006; 2008). Reconciliation and 
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restoration were thought to stand in conflict with retribution because they have tended to 
eschew punishment in the name of peace building.  
The second cluster of research on transitional justice departs from the first in important 
ways. These contributions tend to be more critical of the realisation of the goals of 
transitional justice whilst broadly still agreeing with the belief that interventions following 
political violence are necessary. They reformulate the debates about transitional justice 
through registers of the efficacy and outcomes yielded by the various approaches, rather 
than through a necessary trade-off between the imperatives to punishment on the one 
hand, and restoration and reconciliation on the other. Lastly, they shift the scope of 
debates in transitional justice to encompass a generalised and routine set of strategies for 
confronting political violence; they consider a broader range of techniques within the remit 
of the field; and they have focused on a wider range of problems (for example, 
incorporating the concept of ‘historical injustice’) (Trevino-Rangel 2012: 90 - 99).  
The second cluster of research has critically departed from the concepts and dilemmas 
examined by the first in important ways. For example, the concept of reconciliation itself 
has been questioned for its ambiguity (Pankhurst 1999). That said, the second cluster 
largely remains haunted by the assumption that to do ‘nothing’ in the wake of political 
violence is to leave unattended potentially vexing questions for societies that have 
suffered, which risks leaving them unable to ‘develop’ or ‘move on’ (Arenhövel 2008; 
Roehrig 2009). At the same time, the outcomes of transitional justice interventions have 
remained a key preoccupation for scholars within the field, framed as a question of ‘best 
practice’ (demonstrating again the way that transitional justice has emerged as field that 
mutually implicates knowledge and practice). For example, in the South African context, 
Gibson sought to quantify and test the causal relationship between ‘truth’ (as a technique) 
and ‘reconciliation’ as an observable and measurable output (2004). Interest in maximising 
the ameliorative socio-political impacts of transitional justice interventions has emerged co-
extensively with an increasing interest in ‘localising’ justice initiatives. Calls for ‘grassroots’ 
justice initiatives suggest that transitional justice mechanisms are most meaningful when 
they are sensitive to the variety and richness of the experiences they are intended to 
redress, and embedded within the communities that they are intended to renew (Arriaza 
and Roht-Arriaza 2008). As is visible with the Cambodian case, hybrid institutions were 
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rationalised on the basis of their ability to provide ‘international’ standards of justice whilst 
rendering resonant, meaningful verdicts for the local population and enhancing local 
judicial capacity (addressing critiques of the international tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda) (Urs 2007; Gellman 2008; Stensrud 2009). Moreover, the second 
cluster of research on transitional justice expands its scope in two senses. Firstly, the 
targets of transitional justice strategies are broadened to include the wider category of 
‘historical injustice’ (Torpey 2003). This extends the scope of the field to include questions 
of redress for crimes many years previous, in post-colonial contexts such as slavery (Posner 
and Vermeule 2003), or the treatment of aboriginal communities (Short 2003), principally 
through mechanisms of apology or compensation. Secondly, as indicated by the 
aforementioned interest in the use of apology and compensation, research into the 
techniques of the field are expanded to include, for example, memorialisation (Jelin 2007; 
Barsalou and Baxter 2009), or the public education system and school curricula (Cole 2007). 
Importantly, we must remind ourselves that scholarship in transitional justice mutually 
implicates its practice, and the widening of the field points to the normalisation of a 
generalised, continuous set of claims for the governance of societies that have suffered 
political violence.    
 
The third cluster of research is characterised by a more critical approach to the 
assumptions, concepts and frameworks underpinning transitional justice as a field of 
knowledge and practice. This line of enquiry moves beyond the (important) question of 
whether transitional justice mechanisms do – or even are able to do – what they claim to 
do (Mendeloff 2004). The first issue of importance that emerges from this cluster is the 
foregrounding of an interest in power. Rather than offering an institutional de-politicization 
of confronting past political violence (cf. Orentlicher 1991), transitional justice interventions 
emerge and work subject to and conditioned by hierarchies of power (Koskenniemi 2002; 
Moon 2008; Nagy 2008; Ainley 2011; Trevino-Rangel 2012; Ainley 2013). Recognising the 
role of power in shaping interventions is important because it gestures to the way that the 
vocabulary and concepts of transitional justice are treated by practitioners and many 
mainstream scholars as neutral, stable and apolitical. Indeed, Wilson’s work on 
reconciliation in South Africa specifically focused on the way that the language of human 
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rights had the effect of concealing a (pragmatic) politics of nation building, which was at 
points in conflict with locally embedded imperatives for retributive justice (2001). By 
appreciating the role of power and hierarchy in shaping specific ‘moments’ of intervention, 
we are historically better sensitised to the specific interests and actions that shape each 
case.  Moreover, a key point of departure for this research is an appreciation of how the 
language of human rights and transitional justice possesses specific structures and 
templates for thinking about suffering (Moon 2004), are discursively contested, 
appropriated and opposed, and buttress relationships of domination and resistance (Evans 
2005). This has consequences for how we approach the concepts at play in researching 
transitional justice.  For example, Moon’s examination of discourses of reconciliation in 
South Africa shows that it is more fruitful analytically to interrogate the specific 
architecture of reconciliatory claims as they are propagated on a case by case basis, rather 
than presuming a universal end or state that can be observed and judged as reconciled or 
not across contexts (2008).     
 
A second crucial issue concerns the representation of transitional justice contexts, bearing 
in mind that the particular construction or depiction of a problem tends to ‘obviate’ its 
resolution. Unifying the contributions of the first and second cluster is a tendency to 
acquiesce to the self-evident necessity or inevitability of transitional justice (Trevino-Rangel 
2012: 102). This acceptance is dangerous because it establishes teleological schemas that 
objectify states of suffering or ‘progression’ on a linear trajectory. It is on this basis that 
societies that have experienced political violence are framed and represented through the 
language of transitional justice in dichotomous functional/dysfunctional terms, implicating 
the need for (or purported success of) particular techniques of intervention (Hughes and 
Pupavac 2005). Indeed, as Short has argued, claims advanced within transitional justice 
must be understood as mediated by political interests, and not necessarily benevolent 
(2007). Moreover, a key methodological issue pertinent to questions of memory arises on 
this basis, because ‘individual’ qualities about the psyche are ascribed onto and read from 
collective groupings when arguments for the need to intervene are advanced. As Hamber 
and Wilson note, this is problematic because it positions memory as a ‘…static and 
collective object’ (2002: 36). The key problem here is that transitional justice tends to treat 
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its objects of intervention as homogenous, singular, passive entities, particularly in the way 
that such interventions tend to be bound to political nation building projects (Wilson 2001).          
 
At this point it is worth briefly revisiting the way that these various approaches and terms 
relate to memory. On the one hand, retributive and restorative vocabularies of transitional 
governance invoke and implicate memory in different ways. On the other, they are unified 
in the way they situate the past as a site that can renew and ameliorate the social and 
political conditions of the present. This is a significant overlap with the sociology of memory 
which I will return to shortly. Retribution, expressed through the spectacle of the war 
crimes trial, looks to the past to furnish its narrative content through the way it reckons 
with past conflict. It bids to produce an account of past crimes through the techniques and 
interplays of evidence, interpretation, performance and contextual political interests (Lynch 
and Bogen 1996; Koskenniemi 2002). Retribution simultaneously has one eye on the future, 
in the way it asks trials to act as both didactic agents (enhancing the rule of law or deterring 
future crimes, for example) and bodies that can affirm social solidarity (Osiel 1997: 18). 
Restoration, with its concomitant vocabulary of healing and renewal, more explicitly 
invokes memory as an object that must be ameliorated: as Moon (2009) notes, adopting a 
more critical lens, the South African Truth and Reconciliation commission specifically drew 
its authority from a medicalised and therapeutic language of (memory) repression, denial, 
trauma, and catharsis in the way it represented the national body politic (and its collective 
memory). Crucially, in the way they make demands of, act upon and (re)produce memory, 
both retributive and restorative vocabularies and frameworks presume to act on objects of 
collective memory, and the efficacy of their work therefore hinges on the construction of a 
unified and shared account of ‘what happened’. As each claim seeks to ‘reckon with’ and 
‘settle’ the past, the resonance of each requires the broad acceptance of its particular 
version of events, in either the provision of a sense of justice, or the realisation of bids to 
reconciliation (Osiel 1997; Douglas 2001; Hamber and Wilson 2002).      
 
There are two key common problems arising within the sociology of memory and the 
literatures on transitional justice that premise the thesis research questions. Firstly, 
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prevailing assumptions in both earlier approaches to transitional justice and the early 
sociology of memory assume the need to confront, disinter, and intervene in memories of 
political violence as a means of social progression, primarily through the formal processes 
and mechanisms of transitional justice (broadly defined). This research departs from this 
assumption by questioning the necessity of a formal mechanism for ‘moving on’ and the 
benefits it purports to yield on that basis. This project draws on the more critical 
approaches outlined in the third ‘cluster’ of transitional justice scholarship  and examines 
the relationships and hierarchies of power at play in this process. Secondly, the first wave of 
transitional justice scholarship, as well as much of the sociology of memory, relies upon 
fixed and objectified collective memory frameworks. This research employs a dynamic and 
discursive understanding of memory to explore the mediations, renegotiations, and 
resistances at play in transitional justice contexts. In doing so, it accommodates the roles of 
agency and difference to critically reflect on the validity of the collective memory 
frameworks that transitional justice presumes to act on, and the outcomes it purports to 
deliver.        
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
It is worth briefly reflecting on the development of the project’s research questions in light 
of eight months of fieldwork in Cambodia. The project began with the assumption that, 
given the narrow mandate of the ECCC and widespread suffering resulting from a conflict 
spanning nearly half a century, there would be alternative and conflicting memories of that 
period being advanced in Cambodia today. As Hamber and Wilson have noted, generating a 
shared sense of ‘what happened’ is crucial for the efficacy of mechanisms intended to 
provide symbolic ‘closure’ following political violence (Hamber and Wilson 2002: 36). The 
ECCC animates particular sets of ‘victims’ and a set of ‘perpetrators’, in turn calling 
attention to a restricted universe of past events. In order to ascertain the possibilities of the 
ECCC realising ‘closing’ ends, such as providing a sense of justice or realising claims for 
reconciliation, it would be important to assess the extent to which these categories 
resonated with the groups to which they were being attached. If localised accounts were in 
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conflict with the version of the past sanctioned by the ECCC, then the goals of the court 
could be and remain contested and resisted. As such, in order to explore these potential 
conflicts, the research began with the aim of explaining, as means of comparison to the 
account of ‘what happened’ formalised at the ECCC, the role of publicly available symbols 
and representations (memorials and museums) of the conflict within communities that 
were being ascribed positions within social groups broadly categorised as ‘victim’ (Siem 
Reap) and ‘perpetrator’ (Anlong Veng).5 
  
These questions changed as a period of eight months of fieldwork in Cambodia unfolded. In 
taking the ECCC as a point of departure, I was able to secure a hosting position within an 
ECCC-affiliated organisation, the Centre for Social Development, assisting with their 
outreach initiatives in support of the ECCC. This period of the fieldwork made it clear that 
fruitful questions could focus not only on the contrast between ‘central’ and ‘local’ 
accounts of political violence in Cambodia, as if the two were exclusive, but should also pay 
specific attention to the interfaces between the two; the particular avenues through which 
the ECCC account of the past was being mobilised; where and for whom these exercises 
were targeted; how they presumed to act upon conflicting memory at a local level; how 
these exercises supplemented the ECCC account through their own forms of expertise; and, 
most importantly, whether conflicting accounts of the past remained. Importantly, in 
establishing the importance of mediation within this process, the resonance of a neat, 
binary understanding of memory between ‘officially’ sanctioned memory and locally 
‘authentic’ memory diminished and could not do justice to the multiple and locally-
contingent claims on the past. An explanatory framework that could identify the discursive 
                                                          
5 The categories of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ are not stable. In using them, I recognise that 
both are terms that are negotiated, contested and produced within specific political 
contexts and around particular institutional bodies. Specifically, each emerge as subjects 
formalised by the ECCC (though there are important irregularities within this process, which 
I examine in Chapter 3 ‘Trials and Tribulations’). This opposition informed my decision to 
base the latter half of the fieldwork in Siem Reap and Anlong Veng. 
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qualities of competing regimes of memory became increasingly central in order to 
appreciate the complexities of the ‘remembering’ (and forgetting) process. 
 
This question of conflicting memory proved (and remains) particularly vexed. In the latter 
half of my fieldwork, I turned to concentrate on the meanings and roles of localised 
representations of the past in ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ communities. I was specifically 
interested in what localised accounts of the past were ‘doing’, independent of the ECCC, in 
order to address an emergent question: what if the ‘conflicting’ nature of memory is only 
rendered meaningful in opposition to that of the ECCC; in other words, does resistance to 
the ECCC’s reading of the past emerge only at its points of propagation (i.e. does the ECCC 
actually generate – or exacerbate – the conflicts and divisions it is meant to resolve)? On 
the one hand, in light of the initial phase of fieldwork, I identified a particular tendency for 
ECCC outreach work to concentrate on and elicit ‘memory spectacles’; exceptional 
moments of grief, remorse, contrition or reconciliation. On the other hand, it was striking 
that when conflicting memory was manifest, it tended to emerge only in relation to, and as 
a response to, the demands made on behalf of the ECCC, rather than with the ‘story’ itself. 
This should not discount the importance of appeals for the recognition of suffering that the 
research still encountered that occurred beyond the mandate of the ECCC, as these remain 
an important point of contention and pose challenges for the efficacy of the ECCC in 
‘reconciling’ conflicting memory. 
 
It became clear to me that local, community-level representations of the past were already 
being renegotiated as meaningful under alternative sets of both localised and national 
imperatives (particularly questions around a nexus of community development and 
support, varying practices of tourism, and wealth augmentation; but also quite simply 
through ambivalence and disinterest). These alternative imperatives provide vehicles for 
memory claims in ways that are dislocated from the ECCC, but not necessarily in ‘direct’ 
conflict with it. The challenge of rethinking these alternative renegotiations of the past in 
relation to the more singular demands of the ECCC – that justice and reconciliation must be 
achieved through particular institutional mechanisms and programs, and through the 
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acceptance of a particular account of political violence – is crucial because they displace 
and subsume the ‘exceptional’ politics of memory to one that is ‘everyday’ and banal. 
Moreover, instead of an exclusive focus on the conflicts of memory, it became important to 
examine both the conflicts and the commensurabilities of seemingly diverse and inchoate 
rationales for knowing the past, in order to grasp a more nuanced picture of the politics of 
memory in Cambodia today. 
 
The following research questions therefore emerged: 
 
How does the ECCC organise a particular regime of memory and how is this presented and 
contested?   
 
How is this reading of the past mediated with the public? Through what agents and 
technologies of memory?  
 
On what basis do localised regimes of memory in ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ communities 
exist in conflict or congruence with the ECCC? What implications do these have for the 
goals of the ECCC?              
 
The implications of these research questions are threefold. In the first instance, by 
examining memories of past violence that conflict with, or are ambivalent towards, the 
official memory sanctioned by the ECCC, the project problematizes the possibility that the 
ECCC can deliver a unified and shared account of political violence in Cambodia. As 
stressed, this poses a serious challenge to the resonance of the ECCC among the wider 
Cambodian public, and calls into question the capacity of the ECCC in delivering a sense of 
justice or reconciliation. Conflicting regimes of memory can mobilise claims and grievances 
around past political violence and suffering outside the ECCC mandate that directly 
challenges the moral authority of the ECCC’s privileging of the 1975-1979 period. Moreover, 
examination of Cambodian ambivalences toward the past can render questions of justice 
and reconciliation moot. This again poses challenges for the ECCC, to the extent that it 
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problematizes the way in which the stakeholders of the court and the bulk of transitional 
justice scholarship and practice have treated such interventions as self-evidently necessary.    
 
The second key set of implications is theoretical. By furnishing an analysis of memory as 
discursive – a contested, ongoing, (re)negotiated set of practices and performances – the 
project critically contributes to the literature on the sociology of memory. Analysis of 
‘regimes of memory’ invites us away from reified and singular understandings of collective 
memory that appear to treat national collectivities, society and collective memory as 
synonymous. This, in turn, has important implications for the way transitional justice and 
human rights practices treat social groupings as objects of ‘memory’ policy.      
 
Transitional justice mechanisms are a form of memory politics because they intervene in 
the past in two ways. Firstly, in the way they act on memory and (re)construct an account 
of ‘what happened’. As I have suggested, this is not a neutral process because it emerges 
through and subject to particular power interests (be they state or international). Secondly, 
transitional justice mechanisms are principally rationalised and validated by situating 
memory and the past as a problematic field that must be ameliorated. In doing so, memory 
is positioned as an ‘object’ of political practice. The tendency here, following the above, is 
to conceptualise these approaches through ‘collective’ memory frameworks; i.e. that they 
act in the name of, or to ameliorate, the problematic memory of national groups or 
societies. Beyond the methodological issue posed here – that these assumptions posit an 
overly reified notion of collective memory – the risk is that interventions position whole 
collective groups as passive and disempowered in their relationship to memories of 
suffering. In this sense, by pointing to the active role communities play in renegotiating 
memories of atrocity, the project looks to challenge the more singular (and potentially 
pathologising) claims advanced by transitional justice practitioners and scholars in order to 
justify interventions on memory.  
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1.4 Outline of the thesis 
 
 
Chapter Two  
Researching Regimes of Memory  
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is devoted to the key conceptual 
frameworks employed by the project. I begin with an elaboration of Hodgkin and 
Radstone’s concept of ‘regimes of memory’ by examining the discursive characteristics and 
foundations of remembering. I then define and explain the key empirical foci of the project 
– technologies of memory – and situate the role they occupy within regimes of memory. 
The second section links the project research questions to the case sites studied over eight 
months of fieldwork in Cambodia. The third section offers a methodological statement, 
introducing an ethnographic rationale for fieldwork, before briefly discussing the specific 
data gathering techniques employed by the project. The final section comprises the second 
half of this chapter. It offers a critical reflection on the research biography that discusses 
three overlapping issues related to the practicalities of the fieldwork: the ethics and politics 
resulting from institutional hosting, methodological dilemmas arising from cross-language 
research, and the methodological, ethical and political issues emergent from variously 
positioned field relationships. I use this section to suggest a methodological and substantive 
parallel exists between the co-production of research data and the reconstruction of 
memory as conditioned within the social and political contexts within which they occur.   
 
Chapter Three 
Trials and Tribulations 
This chapter has three sections that examine how the ECCC makes claims that seek to 
stabilise an account of political violence in Cambodia. I argue that it enjoys mixed successes 
to this end. The chapter opens with a discussion of the framing of the ECCC’s jurisdiction 
within speeches and press releases by ECCC stakeholders. I argue that the restriction of 
prosecutions to ‘senior leaders’ only reactivates a longstanding reconciliatory politics in 
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Cambodia because it obscures and exculpates the role of lower-level perpetrators of 
political violence. This is a crucial premise for the varied forms of reconciliatory claim 
deployed in Cambodia (and memory work more broadly) because it underpins an 
individualised rather than collective construction of guilt. The ECCC focus on senior leaders 
only is reflective of processes of disclosure and concealment in the way it looks to set the 
parameters for memory work. On this basis, I turn to examine the subjects animated by the 
court, its ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’, and the techniques of memory that they are bound 
to, or employ. Three specific moments in the ECCC’s work are considered as examples of 
memory work. I examine patterns of defence testimony by Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea 
to identify particular scripts and strategies of denial and rupture. On the one hand, these 
types of strategy seek to challenge the authority of the ECCC as an arbiter of punishment. 
On the other, we must understand these forms of resistance as bound to the adversarial 
process as a form of memory work, and thus actually constitutive of the authority of the 
ECCC as a memory-making site.  The second moment examined is the Duch verdict, 
whereby a continuously pliant and contrite defendant reneged on his previous remorse in 
requesting release in his closing statement. I argue that this is an example of the 
unintended outcomes of the ECCC that continue to generate unexpected claims over the 
past. The last examples examined are the responses to the Duch verdict by victims groups, 
who, disappointed with an initially lenient 19 year sentence, lobbied for an appeal by the 
prosecution to have Duch’s sentence increased to life in prison. This is a notable example of 
the way that the meaning of particular actions in the past – here signified by the verdict – 
can be contested in ways that the ECCC struggles to satisfy.      
 
Chapter Four 
Mediating Memory 
 
This chapter explores how outreach and public education work for the ECCC acts to shape 
and reframe potentially ambivalent and conflicting memories of political violence through 
the use of particular technologies of memory: existing memorial and museum sites, 
educational seminars and provincially held public forums on ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’. 
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The chapter is based on participant observation data yielded from working with the Centre 
for Social Development during the build up to, and day of, the ‘Pailin’ public forum. The 
case is important because it involves the targeting of a community comprised of former 
lower-level KR (and the home of a number of ‘senior leaders’ facing prosecution at the 
ECCC). This group has been situated as a key party within wider processes of ‘justice’ and 
‘reconciliation’, a key feature of which is the articulation of lower-level KR as victims of the 
regime. The chapter begins with a discussion of the role of civil society groups in the 
provision of public education about the ECCC, and the way that such groups bring 
complementary expertise to posit supplementary outcomes of the work of the ECCC. The 
chapter then explores the Pailin residents’ encounters with the sites and crucibles of 
memory that outreach work for the ECCC utilises in licensing its preferred reading of 
Cambodia’s experiences of war and genocide. Specifically, the chapter shows how existing 
museum and memorial sites are ‘reactivated’ to work as technologies of memory. I show 
how these can produce acquiescent, ambivalent and resistant effects among the former KR 
visitors. I then consider the consolidation and contestation of memory at a public forum 
event, noting the ways in which the forum attempts to disarm and reconstitute memory 
that conflicts with the officially sanctioned reading of Cambodia’s past political violence 
formalised by the ECCC. The outreach exercise enjoys mixed successes to these ends as a 
practical, programmatic task; this raises important questions about the possibility of 
producing a unified and shared understanding about Cambodia’s past, but also the contexts 
in which resistance or ambivalence is manifested and provoked. I argue that the case is 
instructive of regimes of memory that may potentially remain incongruous to that enacted 
by the ECCC. Moreover, I suggest that the case reveals persisting regimes of memory that, 
when activated, challenge the inconsistency of the ECCC prosecutorial strategy, and the 
moral legitimacy of two of the ECCC’s wider aims: providing a sense of justice and enabling 
reconciliation.  
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Chapter Five 
The Wat Thmey Genocide Memorial 
This chapter is based on four months of participant observation data gathering at the Wat 
Thmey genocide memorial in Siem Reap. The chapter explores the ways in which the 
memorial to victims of the KR can be understood to reproduce or ‘carry’ memory; the way 
that those living near or attending the memorial respond to its representation of loss; and 
the way that the memorial is appropriable and directed to purposes that are potentially in 
conflict with the site’s religious role. The chapter has four sections. The first section 
introduces the Wat Thmey pagoda (that hosts the memorial) and maps the role of pagodas 
as spaces within Cambodian communities today. The second section situates the Wat 
Thmey memorial within a history of Cambodian state-sanctioned memorial initiatives 
originating in the 1980s. The third section problematizes the key representational 
technologies at work at the memorial site: the display of mass human remains and the 
employment of an information board that opens the possibility of multiple ‘audiencings’ of 
the memorial. The fourth section offers an extended discussion of Cambodian responses 
and perspectives regarding the Wat Thmey memorial site. I outline the varied and uneven 
way the memorial cues and provokes conflicted, resistant and ambivalent memories of 
political violence. The final section contrasts these ‘everyday’ accounts of Wat Thmey to a 
significant state-led commemorative initiative: the Day of Remembrance.  
 
The Wat Thmey pagoda and genocide memorial, its role within the community and its 
reception by Cambodians is haunted by a series of seemingly stark oppositions. It is first 
and foremost an explicitly political representation of political violence that employs the 
display of ‘profane’ human remains within a ‘pure’ and ‘sacred’ space that is intended to be 
immune from the secular field of politics. The display of bones continues to produce 
resistant and uncomfortable responses among Cambodian attendees at the pagoda. In this 
sense, as a technology of memory, the memorial does not necessarily produce the 
deterrent or pedagogical lessons it is intended to generate. Moreover, it appeared from the 
accounts of respondents I met that the memorial itself should not be understood 
specifically as a ‘carrier’ of collective memory. Rather, in calling attention to loss, the 
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memorial at times served to cue alternative accounts of the past that challenge the 
preferred reading of the past offered by the memorial. These alternative accounts of the 
past also exist in conflict with that sanctioned by the ECCC, evidencing regimes of memory 
that seem incompatible with the central tenets of Cambodia’s bids to provide justice and 
reconciliation.  
 
Chapter Six 
The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng 
 
This chapter examines the reproduction of memory around heritage and memorial sites in 
Anlong Veng. Anlong Veng is a key research site for understanding the relationship between 
memory and reconciliation because it is governed and populated by former KR cadre and 
was home to several senior KR leaders (two of whom are currently held at the ECCC). As 
such, Anlong Veng has been positioned by ECCC outreach groups like DC-Cam as an 
important locale for reconciliation initiatives and the provision of genocide education. 
Moreover, as the final ‘stronghold’ of the KR insurgency until 1999, the town has achieved a 
level of notoriety that attracts large numbers of both Cambodian and foreign tourists, 
implicating the uses of heritage sites and memory within processes of demobilisation, 
reintegration and reconciliation of former combatants. As such, the Anlong Veng area is a 
compelling case for understanding the limits and resonance of the ECCC and state-
sanctioned readings of past political violence among ‘perpetrator’ groups that may 
subscribe to or maintain ‘counter’ memories.        
 
The chapter draws three key conclusions. The first is that the KR heritage and memorial 
sites do not seem to play an active role in furnishing collective memory. Rather, these sites 
tend to operate as equivocal spaces that allow room for the expression of ambivalent and 
conflicting memories toward the past. The second identifies a tendency towards the 
hagiography of a (now deceased) KR leader, Chit Chuon, alias Ta Mok, noting the way that 
similar generous remembrances are not observed for other KR leaders. Ta Mok was the KR 
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military chief from 1977 and responsible for some of the worst atrocities perpetrated under 
the KR, earning him the moniker of ‘the butcher’. From the 1990s, Ta Mok supervised the 
Anlong Veng area and was responsible for the 1997 arrest and detention of Pol Pot. I 
examine the way that both former KR cadre and Cambodians from non-KR backgrounds 
celebrate, or are allured by, his memory as a ‘patriot’ that defended national borders from 
invading forces (and I consider important contextual factors in such tendencies, including a 
high profile territorial dispute occurring between Cambodia and Thailand at the time of 
fieldwork). The final conclusion drawn from this chapter concerns the implications of such 
counter-memories for reconciliation and the resonance of the work of the ECCC. I argue 
that a regime of memory exists in Anlong Veng that, superficially, appears in conflict with 
the way that the ECCC works to denounce the KR leadership and stabilise a consensual 
popular account of the past on that basis. I suggest that the existence of memories that 
celebrate KR figures like Ta Mok actually emerge from a sense of nostalgia and obligation, 
rather than through the maintenance of a grievance that compels political action in the 
present. On this basis I argue that these counter-memories are highly ambivalent and 
render questions of reconciliation moot.         
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Chapter Two 
Researching Regimes of Memory  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is devoted to the key conceptual 
frameworks employed by the project. I begin with an elaboration of Hodgkin and 
Radstone’s concept of ‘regimes of memory’ (2005) by unpacking the discursive 
characteristics and foundations of remembering. I then define and explain the key empirical 
foci of the project – technologies of memory – and situate the role they occupy within 
regimes of memory. The second section links the project research questions to the case 
sites studied over eight months of fieldwork in Cambodia. The third section offers a 
methodological statement, introducing an ethnographic rationale for fieldwork, before 
briefly discussing the specific data gathering techniques employed by the project. The final 
section comprises the second half of this chapter. It offers a critical reflection on the 
research biography that discusses three overlapping issues related to the practicalities of 
the fieldwork: the ethics and politics resulting from institutional hosting, methodological 
dilemmas arising from cross-language research, and the methodological, ethical and 
political issues emergent from variously positioned field relationships. I use this section to 
suggest a methodological and substantive parallel exists between the co-production of 
research data and the reconstruction of memory as conditioned within the social and 
political contexts within which they occur; that is, memory, like qualitative data, is 
constituted by, and specific to, the interactions within which it is (re)constructed.  
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2.1 Regimes of memory: memory as discourse 
 
This project is concerned with the relationships between different ‘regimes of memory’ of 
political violence in Cambodia. Radstone and Hodgkin use the term ‘regimes of memory’ to 
describe the social organisation, institutionalisation, systems and figurations of memory. 
Their emphasis on the ‘discursive productions of memory’ and a ‘politics of memory 
discourses’ necessitates an appreciation of the way that social formations of memory exist 
as contestable bodies of knowledge (and power) that are historically situated and 
conditioned (Radstone and Hodgkin 2005 1-2). For Radstone and Hodgkin, regimes of 
memory can be understood as discursive in two senses. Regimes of memory can constitute 
bodies of knowledge that lay claim over what has happened, i.e. over specific events, telling 
specific stories about the past. Moreover, regimes of memory can offer lenses for knowing 
what memory ‘is’. In this sense, we must be attentive to the way in which a discourse of 
memory can be constitutive of subjectivity, gesturing to the relationship between memory 
and identity. At the same time, we must be aware of the way in which particular discourses 
situate memory as an object of knowledge and a field of practice and intervention.      
 
Unpacking the discursive character of regimes of memory requires a closer reading of the 
concept of discourse. In doing so, we can further furnish the groundwork and assumptions 
underpinning the documentary analysis strategies utilised by this project (visual and 
transcript based). According to Foucault (2002), discourse can be understood as a body of 
knowledge and statements that structure the way we think about particular things. In this 
sense, we must think of memory discourses – or regimes of memory – as groups of 
statements about the past that define particular objects of knowledge (i.e. particular 
events; the memories of individuals as a field of knowledge and practice). Moreover, we 
must recognise the ways that individuals as social beings are constituted within and 
produced by these (potentially conflicting) discourses. Specifically, according to Foucault, a 
discourse is more than a system of representation (i.e. language and signs) (2002: 54). The 
way that discourse operates as a form of practice that designates ‘things’ is crucial in the 
process of constituting the meaning of objects of knowledge (2002: 35). The relationships 
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and ‘regularities’ between potentially dispersed groups of statements are unified by ‘rules’: 
such rules represent the conditions for the ‘existence’, ‘maintenance’, and ‘modification’ of 
a ‘discursive formation’ (2002: 32-42). For example, in Chapter Three, Trials and 
Tribulations, I show how there have historically been, and there continues to be, a variety 
of claims at work in Cambodia over what ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’ mean and involve, 
though these are unified by a basic set of ‘rules’ that posit the responsibility of senior KR 
leaders for the perpetration of atrocity.  
Foucault’s method is specifically concerned with the conditions under which we have come 
to know particular things in particular ways. In ‘Politics and the Study of Discourse’ (1991), 
Foucault examines the ways in which discourse defines the parameters of what is ‘sayable’ 
(pg. 59); ‘what it is possible to speak of’; and ‘those utterances that are destined to 
disappear without a trace’ (pg. 60). He explicitly refers to ‘the limits and forms of memory 
as it appears in different discursive formations’, encouraging the recognition of those 
‘utterances’ that have been marginalised or excluded as ‘unmemorable’. Foucault 
specifically calls attention to the ‘…types of relationship that are established between the 
system of present statements and past ones’, the ways that some ‘discourses’ (but not 
others) are ‘valued’, or can be ‘reactivated’, and, more broadly, the ‘limits of appropriation’: 
how particular discourses are accessible to or contested by some but not others (pg. 60). 
Three issues are pertinent here. Foucault’s corpus offers a methodological manifesto for 
the study of regimes of memory by highlighting the way they render some things 
‘forgettable’ whilst calling attention to others. This manifesto shows that remembering is 
deeply implicated and embedded within relations of power. Secondly, by showing how 
discourses organise meaning to render certain memories permissible but not others, 
Foucault shows that discourses of memory are formative of subjectivity (and social 
identity).6 Lastly, by considering ‘the limits of appropriation’, Foucault gestures toward the 
                                                          
6 The mutually constitutive relationship of memory to identity is foundational to literature 
on ‘collective’ and ‘social’ memory. See, for example, Schuman, H. and J. Scott (1989). 
"Generations and Collective Memories." American Sociological Review 54(3): 359-381, 
Halbwachs, M. and L. A. Coser (1992). On collective memory. Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, Gillis, J. R. (1994). Commemorations : the politics of national identity. Princeton, N.J, 
Princeton University Press, Olick, J. K. and J. Robbins (1998). "Social memory studies: From 
collective memory” to the historical sociology of mnemonic practices." Annual Review of 
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ways in which memory has been established as a particular discursive field of expertise by 
authoritative speakers who are legitimated to ‘intervene’ upon memory in particular ways. 
 
Understanding regimes of memory as fields of practice brings us to the key empirical foci to 
which this project has attended: technologies of memory, their contexts, and how they are 
mobilised. Foucault defines technologies – “specific techniques that human beings use to 
understand themselves” (1997: 224) – through four overlapping types: 
 
(1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform or manipulate things 
(2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, symbols, or signification (3) 
technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals, and submit them to 
certain ends or domination, an objectivising of the subject (4) technologies of the self, which 
permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number 
of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality. (Foucault 1997: 225) 
 
Foucault emphasises that these four forms of technology ‘…hardly ever function separately, 
although each one is associated with a different type of domination’ (1997: 225). These 
forms are particularly fruitful when considered as technologies of memory. Firstly, memory 
is embedded, depicted and can be reproduced within visual systems of representation, 
iconographies and images that render the past ‘knowable’. Taken with Foucault’s first 
definition, we can see that a visual technology of memory can be both material and 
symbolic at once. This is a particularly important conception of technologies of memory for 
the analysis of displays and representational devices, and their organisation within 
memorial and museum sites; but also in the visual materials produced for public 
consumption by the ECCC. Secondly, the production of memory within more coercive 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Sociology 24(1): 105-140, Wertsch, J. V. (2002). Voices of Collective Remembering. 
Cambridge Cambridge University Press. 
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‘objectivising’ discourses for the ends of domination is a notable hallmark for the 
theorisation of the relationship between memory and the legitimation of authority (in 
particular the state). This is a particularly important conception of technologies of memory 
for an analysis of the role of institutional bodies and the memories they affirm at the 
service of wider systems of power. Thirdly, memory can also be understood through ‘self-
subjectivising’ practices that enable individuals to remember things, by their own effects, in 
the name of particular ends. Foucault’s work in the History of Sexuality Vol. 1 on the 
‘confessional’ as a technique of self-disclosure for the production of truth is particularly 
resonant as a technology of memory in this case (1998: 58). This conception of technologies 
of memory is crucial for an analysis of the practices of memory visible at, for example, 
public forums on the ECCC (see Chapter Four, Mediating Memory) or when analysing 
practices of visitation at memorial and museum spaces (Chapter Five, The Wat Thmey 
Genocide Memorial, and Chapter Six, The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng).  
 
Understanding technologies of memory as embedded in regimes of memory necessitates 
an appreciation of the institutional and social contexts within which they operate, and the 
ends to which they are mobilised. Foucault’s concept of ‘strategies’ is particularly useful in 
this regard, specifically in relation to the way memory is situated as a field of knowledge 
amenable to intervention. For Foucault, ‘strategies’ are not ‘anterior to discourse’ (2002: 
77), but rather flow from particular ‘discursive formations’ (i.e. bodies of knowledge, sets of 
relational statements), that structure the way our choices are oriented to particular ends or 
outcomes (2002: 76-78). For example, as Moon has argued (drawing on Foucault) in 
relation to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a specific discursive 
strategy of ‘reconciliation’ emerged to act as a ‘template-script’ of what reconciliation 
should entail, which subjects were called into being by such a process, and what acts were 
alleged to be conducive to the realisation of such ends (2008: 54-55). As Moon notes, the 
confessional practice was foundational to this process (2008: chapter four). Thus we can 
see how technologies of memory are bound to (and become meaningful when deployed 
within) particular institutional sites and contexts, or rather, within particular regimes of 
memory. In Chapter Three, Trials and Tribulations, I examine how the ECCC anchors 
strategies of justice and reconciliation that are principally targeted at the level of the 
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population (i.e. a national memory). In Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’, I show how 
strategic public education and outreach programs bid to license the ECCC-sanctioned 
reading of past political violence in Cambodia specifically through the use of museums and 
memorial technologies.           
Foucault suggests that strategies are deeply embedded within (potentially diffuse and 
dispersed) systems and networks of power, but eschews the notion that strategies flow 
cleanly from a neat opposition of ‘dominator’ to ‘dominated’. Rather, for Foucault, 
strategies and power should be understood as operating on potentially diverse, multiple 
platforms and layers, while retaining a ‘more or less unitary strategic form’ (1980: 142). This 
is important because, as I argue in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’, discourses of 
reconciliation in Cambodia vary in form according to the agendas of the agents promoting 
them; but they still share a ‘unitary strategic form’ that is characterised by acceptance of 
the authority of the ECCC as an arbiter of the past, the guilt of the senior leaders only, and 
the exculpation of lower-level KR perpetrators. The concept of ‘strategy’ – organised tactics 
informed by particular bodies of knowledge about populations, designed to bring about 
particular ameliorative effects among those populations – became increasingly prominent 
in Foucault’s latter work on ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1979; Rose, O'Malley et al. 2006). 
Crucially, Foucault notes that ‘…there are no relations of power without resistances’ and 
that these resistances are manifest at the point of the exercise of power (1980: 142).  This is 
an important issue for an appreciation of an account of the pervasiveness of power that is 
at the same time not omnipotent and totalising. As this research claims in ‘Mediating 
Memory’ (Chapter Four), in many instances, resistance to an officially sanctioned regime of 
memory that is formalised by and flows from the ECCC is most pronounced exactly at the 
point of its propagation (potentially where divergent regimes of memory conflict). 
Moreover, any failure of a particular ‘strategy’ – an attempt to bring about particular 
effects among the social body (or formal programming of such a strategy) – can provide 
fertile terrain for analysis. As Gordon suggests, the imperfections in the correspondence of 
‘strategies’, ‘technologies’ and the effects they are enacted to bring about remains an area 
that is significant for the investigation of the ‘…real but unprogrammed effects’ of 
strategies and technologies (1980: 247-248). This is a particularly vexed issue explored in 
the final empirical Chapter Six, ‘The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng’, which is concerned 
with the existence of conflicting memory in a former KR stronghold in the context of a 
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(stalled) state-sponsored effort to disarm and mute ‘counter’ memory through the 
commodification of memorial and museum spaces.  
 
Questions of ‘resistance’ and ‘de-correspondence’ within and between strategies7, as they 
are deployed within or constitute regimes of memory, necessitate a methodological 
approach that focuses on both the figuration of regimes of memory and analysis of the 
specific technologies employed therein, but also the specific instances, interactions and 
renegotiations between social groups’ encounters with those technologies of memory as 
they are activated. This entails a focus on both technologies of memory themselves, and 
also their mobilisation and reception. For example, in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’, I 
show how the mobilisation of the ECCC’s preferred reading of the past, through outreach 
exercises which centre memorial sites, actually provokes resistant and conflicting memory. 
Moreover, this necessitates the recognition that a focus on the discursive character of 
regimes of memory (and their technologies) does not entail an ‘objectivising’ denial of 
subjectivity, but rather those conflicts and discontinuities within its production can be 
constitutive of varied forms of active political agency. As Willis and Trondman suggest, we 
need to understand that ‘…discourses/ideologies cannot be treated as if their constructed 
contents can be equated with lived outcomes’ (2000: 395). This final point is foundational 
to the ethnographic rationale underpinning this project and the various qualitative data 
gathering approaches employed over fieldwork. 
 
                                                          
7 It should be stressed that a regime of memory is not necessarily expressed as a form of 
‘strategy’: this concept is however particularly fruitful when analysing the formal 
deployment of particular technologies of memory to bring about particular social and 
political effects, i.e. justice or reconciliation. Similarly, technologies of memory may exist 
outside of particular strategies or programs (though, as I will show, particular strategies 
may seek recourse to or ‘reactivate’ them in doing so). The final two substantive chapters 
this project offers on localised regimes of memory - ‘The Wat Thmey Genocide Memorial’ 
and ‘The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng – specifically point to the way technologies of 
memory are appropriated or renegotiated outside of, or despite, formal or programmatic 
contexts.   
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2.2 Case sites 
Before detailing the methodological rationale that informed data collection, it is important 
to establish the link between the project’s research questions and the sites addressed over 
eight months of fieldwork. As a premise, the project takes the ECCC as animating particular 
sets of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ through the ways that it calls attention to some events 
(but not others) through registers of individual responsibility. In order to weigh the efficacy 
of the ECCC in realising strategic normative ends, such as providing a sense of justice or 
enabling reconciliation, I deemed it crucial to assess the extent to which these categories 
resonated with the groups to which they were being attached. If localised accounts were in 
conflict with the version of the past sanctioned by the ECCC, then the normative goals of 
the court would remain contested, unsettled and/or moot. In order to explore these 
potential conflicts, the project began with the aim of explaining, as means of comparison to 
the account of ‘what happened’ developed by the ECCC, the role of publicly available 
symbols and representations (memorials and museums) of the conflict within communities 
that were being ascribed positions within the ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ opposition. 
Following this, the project examines three questions:  
 
1) How does the ECCC organise a particular regime of memory and how is this 
validated, constituted, and contested?   
 
2) How is this reading of the past mediated with the public? Through what agents and 
technologies of memory?  
 
3) On what basis do localised regimes of memory in ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ 
communities exist in conflict or congruence with the ECCC? What implications do 
these have for the goals of the ECCC? 
 
 
The project can loosely be divided into three stages (though, as I will detail, these 
overlapped to an extent and the final stage was truncated for practical reasons). Each stage 
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loosely reflects a distinct corpora of data from which analysis for the project has been 
based. The first stage of this project was conducted from Phnom Penh between September 
and December 2008. During this period I was attached to and worked with the Centre for 
Social Development (CSD)8 in its Phnom Penh office. The period attached to CSD facilitated 
three important means of interrogating how the ECCC has licensed a particular regime of 
memory. In the first instance it provided a space from which to examine ECCC court 
documents, speeches, press releases and media coverage of the court process, as well as 
access to ECCC hearings, showing how the ECCC has enacted and now works on a particular 
set of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’. Secondly, attachment to CSD allowed daily participant 
observation with and around staff that are active in working on ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ 
participation at the ECCC and an opportunity to engage ‘first hand’ in the politics of justice 
and reconciliation more broadly. Thirdly, hosting with CSD generated an important research 
angle as I came to acknowledge the importance of the mediation of the ECCC’s work with 
the public, specifically through outreach work. I was able to assist and observe at a number 
of the CSD-organised provincial forums on national reconciliation (constituting the 
substantive data examined in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’), allowing particular 
insight at the points of contact, convergence and friction between local communities and 
the official memory authorised by the ECCC. 
                                                          
8 I return to the importance of this relationship in the subsequent section 2.4 ‘Research 
biography’. 
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Figure 2 Map of Cambodia (Sourced at http://www.canbypublications.com/maps/camroad.htm) 
 
 
From January-March 2009 the research turned to focus upon memorial and museum sites 
within a ‘victim’ community. Siem Reap is Cambodia’s third largest city and is located in 
Cambodia’s North-West. It is also a tourist hub that has experienced rapid economic 
development since the cessation of the war in 1999. In this sense, Siem Reap was chosen as 
a case site because it could yield insight into the active, competing demands that shape and 
renegotiate regimes of memory. As Cohen has suggested, ‘memory’ is interrupted by 
‘regimes of discontinuity’ or rapid change as new demands are placed on people (2001: 
243). I have taken the Wat Thmey genocide memorial as the principal focus in this context. 
Wat Thmey is located just north of the city and was one of many genocide memorials 
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constructed during the 1980s by the local authorities at the direction of the Cambodian 
government. It is one of approximately seventy provincial genocide memorials constructed 
across the country during the protracted civil war in the 1980s (Hughes 2006:121-122). 
These memorials served as loci for consolidation of popular support against the KR, and are 
still the location for a number of commemorative ceremonies today, such as Tivea Chang 
Khmang (the May 20th Day of Anger). Today the memorial site is managed and maintained 
by monks resident at the site and is dependent on visitor donations for its upkeep. The 
transition from Government to independent control is factor that presented this site as a 
particularly interesting research context because it raises questions about the persistence 
of state sanctioned accounts of the past outside of the stewardship of state authorities.  
 
Following the 1979 Vietnamese intervention, KR troops regrouped along Cambodia’s 
Western and Northern borders with Thailand. Senior KR leaders, a number of whom have 
now been indicted by the ECCC, operated from these areas during the civil war until as 
recently as 1999, and many of these areas are populated by former KR members. Anlong 
Veng is located on Cambodia’s Northern border. Fieldwork in Anlong Veng took place in late 
April and May 2009. Anlong Veng was the KR’s final stronghold, the site of Pol Pot’s house 
arrest and cremation, and the residence of other leaders of the DK period such as Nuon 
Chea and Khieu Samphan (both currently indicted), and Ta Mok ‘the butcher’ who died in 
custody in 2006. An elaborate memorial site for Ta Mok was erected shortly after his death 
in 2006, funded by donations from the local community. In contrast, a few miles away, the 
site of Pol Pot’s cremation is marked simply by a small corrugated iron roof to protect the 
ashes from rain, and a small fence to mark the area off. Anlong Veng was chosen as a case 
site because these sites host a distinct politics of memory in these processes of 
memorialisation and conservation. Moreover, the area has also been subject to a state-
sponsored conservation initiative in the last decade, with a number of other sites in this 
vicinity set aside as ‘historically significant’ by the Cambodian Ministry of Tourism. These 
include Ta Mok’s former house, the site of Pol Pot’s 1997 trial and house arrest by the KR, 
and Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan’s former residences.  
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2.3 Methodological rationale 
 
The data collection strategies employed by this project are informed by an ethnographic 
rationale. On the one hand, it is worth noting that ethnography is not a settled field of 
methodological practice that lends a prescriptive, ‘ready-made’, ‘one-size-fits-all’ or fixed 
set of data gathering strategies (beyond, loosely, the centrality of participant observation as 
a principal mode of enquiry). I use the term ‘ethnographic rationale’ to indicate the 
gathering of data, by a variety of different methods, as and when it presented itself to the 
project as useful. Ethnography should be broadly understood as distinctive in that it 
encompasses a set of methods emphasising: 
 
the close-up, on the-ground observation of people and institutions in real time and 
space, in which the investigator embeds herself near (or within) the phenomenon so as 
to detect how and why agents on the scene act, think and feel the way they do 
(Wacquant 2003: 5) 
 
This broad definition of ethnography sensitises us to the key empirical foci of the project. 
On the one hand, this project is concerned with the production and organisation of a 
particular regime of memory around the ECCC, as an institutional site, and the validation of 
this institution through particular expert knowledge on memory and politics in the wake of 
conflict (this forms the basis of Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’). Data gathering for 
this aspect of the project foregrounded analysis of ECCC documents (such as the Law on the 
Establishment of the ECCC, the ECCC’s internal rules, court publications, press releases and 
transcripts of speeches by ECCC officials and Government spokesmen, transcripts of trial 
proceedings). This aspect of the project, however, was also informed by three months of 
participant observation in which I occupied specific roles under hosting with a domestic 
NGO: this involved reporting on ECCC hearings; assisting the organisation in conducting 
public education on the ECCC’s work, drafting press releases and speeches; and, more 
directly, conducting interviews with civil society leaders involved in the process. The 
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importance that this project places on the contexts, mobilisation, reception and conflicts 
between regimes of memory invited a more unambiguously ethnographic approach (in the 
sense that it took participant observation rather than documentary sources as a principal 
focus). Appreciation of how the regime of memory propagated by the ECCC is mobilised, 
and to what effect, entailed participant observation (PO) strategies at outreach and public 
education events on the ECCC (see Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’) and examination of 
localised regimes of memory – community level sites and technologies of memory – 
grounded the decision to conduct (participant) observation and interviewing strategies at 
memorial and museum sites in Siem Reap and Anlong Veng. 
 
The range and diversity of contexts across which fieldwork for this project took place, and 
the diversity of roles and research informants occupied within them, means that the project 
resists neat categorisation as an ‘ethnography’ in a ‘classical’ sense. The project did not 
exclusively confine fieldwork to a single locale or group, thus arguably under-appreciating 
the ‘direct and sustained contact with social agents’ that Willis and Trondman emphasise as 
a qualification for what constitutes ‘ethnography’ (2000: 5). Ethnography, however, does 
not offer a ‘one size fits all’ methodological strategy. Various disciplinary orientations have 
generated sub-genres of ethnography with their own distinctive methodological and 
thematic emphases that can sensitise us to the range of social settings and phenomena to 
which ethnography has been applied, and the varying research strategies employed 
therein. Of particular relevance here are ethnographies that have focused on, for example, 
both the wider contexts and interactive minutiae of political processes and institutions, or 
‘political ethnography’ (Tilly 2006); the instances and formalisations of transnational ideas, 
institutions, and legal technologies across national borders and sites (Merry 2006); 
ethnography that has examined the role of non-governmental organisations in order to 
challenge conventional theorisations of ‘state’ level and local processes as discretely sealed 
from one another, or necessarily in opposition for the processes of ‘governance’ (Ferguson 
and Gupta 2002); ethnography that has emphasised the local reception, renegotiation and 
contestation of political processes, specifically in the field of transitional justice (Borneman 
1997; Wilson 2003); ethnography that recognises the social ‘accomplishment’ of memory 
and its role within ‘collective ventures’ (Prus 2007: 378); and ethnography that has explored 
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the importance of the production of sites and representations of memory – memorials and 
museums – as key for understanding locally embedded forms of ‘community’ memory 
(Scott 1996). The listed examples gesture to the diversity of sites, processes and groups that 
ethnography has and can attend to (reflected in the diversity of sites, processes and groups 
that inform this project). For the purposes of this research, it is important to emphasise 
that the fieldwork was informed by an ethnographic rationale that examined both the 
institutional establishment, propagation and reception of different regimes of memory; the 
way that institutional processes are mediated with the Cambodian public; and the way that 
(less formal) localised regimes of memory are still pivotal to, conditioned within and 
potentially conflicting with wider political processes and systems.  
 
Before turning to outline the specific methodological strategies used during fieldwork, it is 
worth examining a further set of (cautionary) issues concerning the ethnographic rationale 
employed by this project. A number of key debates about ethnographic practice have 
yielded important lessons for the analysis of data presented here. The ‘classical’ 
ethnographic accounts that sought to provide exhaustive descriptions of cultural groups as 
discrete, observable objects have come under sustained criticism. Specifically, a number of 
key texts emerging in the late 1970s and 1980s have challenged the legitimacy of the 
ethnographer as the principal observer, source and author of the ethnographic 
representation of ‘difference’. Said’s Orientalism (1995 [1978]) was influential in pointing to 
the discursive relationships at play in securing the authority of the ‘West’ as defined against 
particular images of the ‘Other’ (pg. 1). The construction and representation of different 
cultural groupings depends on ‘positional superiority’ of the ‘Westerner’ that affirms, in 
varied ways, specific systems of hierarchy and subordination (pg. 7). Writing specifically 
about ethnographic practice, James Clifford has questioned how ‘unruly experience’ is 
translated into ‘an authoritative written account’ and called for the acknowledgement that 
ethnographic encounters are ‘shot through with power relations and personal cross 
purposes’ (1983: 120). Clifford urges the appreciation of the ‘relations of production’ at 
play in the process of ethnographic representation in any ethnographic encounter (as a co-
productive, reciprocal and dialogical relationship between ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’) 
(1986: 13-15). Moreover, understanding the ethnographer as a ‘positioned subject’ entails 
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the recognition of the ‘particular angle of vision’, dependent on various relations of 
difference and subjectivity, that conditions what insights an ethnographer and informants 
may co-produce (Rosaldo 1993: 19). These lessons are crucial for understanding the specific 
production and conditioning of the data presented by this project. This follows Willis’ 
emphasis on the importance of research to recognise ‘one’s role in a social relationship and 
its variable patterning’  (1980: 94). I specifically examine issues of positionality, 
representation and ethics as practical concerns arising from fieldwork in the latter half of 
this chapter. Three issues remain important here nevertheless. Firstly, that an analysis of a 
particular regime or technology of memory cannot furnish an exhaustive account of either 
the cultural life of a community and neither can it disinter a stable ‘archival’ memory of any 
permanence: Clifford’s work gestures to the possibility that memory, like culture, is realised 
as an unfolding, contested and shifting set of meanings, rooted as much in speech and 
practice than a ‘black box’ recording. Secondly, it follows that we can begin to appreciate a 
methodological and substantive parallel in the discursive co-production of both qualitative 
data and (reconstructed) memory. Lastly, the research encounters informing this project 
cannot be understood as ‘extractive’ exercises of ‘naturally’ occurring data (memory), but 
hinge upon the specific relationships at play in the co-production of texts.       
 
2.4 Overview of Research Strategies 
In this section, I briefly outline the specific data gathering strategies employed during 
fieldwork (I turn to discuss the practical, political and ethical issues arising from their 
implementation in the next section). As noted above, this project is informed by an 
ethnographic rationale that informed an interlinked set of methodological strategies. It is 
important to emphasise that these are not discrete approaches and the process of 
fieldwork frequently interspersed the employment of each.9 I examine the analysis of 
documentary sources, the PO strategy, and strategies for interviewing in turn, loosely 
                                                          
9 For example, PO at memorial sites involved both informal interviews with attendees and 
analysis of memorial installations in their own right. Similarly, analysis of ECCC 
documentary sources frequently informed and prompted areas of conversation with CSD 
staff under the rubric of a wider PO strategy. 
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reflecting the structure of the thesis as the emphasis shifted from ‘institutional’ to 
‘informal’ contexts. 
Analysis of documentary sources (and transcripts) 
In the opening section of this chapter, I outlined how regimes of memory can be 
understood as discursive in the way that they organise and structure knowledge about the 
past: as practical fields involving groups of relational statements, and particular subject 
positions differentiated by power from which to ‘speak’ them e.g. the authority of court 
judges over witnesses within the structure of legal proceedings. This project has not 
conducted formal ‘discourse analysis’ to the extent that is has been less attentive to 
rhetoric or language through its systematic organisation (and issues of language and 
translation addressed later in this chapter may have rendered such an approach moot 
irrespective). Rather, in examining the construction and representation of past conflict by 
looking at documentary sources (including visual imagery) we can borrow from the 
principles of discourse analysis to think in more thematic terms about power, 
inclusion/exclusion, and hierarchy as they relate to memory. Similar approaches have been 
adopted by, for example, Peled-Elhanan in examining the legitimation of past massacres 
through Israeli school textbooks (2010: 377); Oddo in showing how US Presidential 
speeches can produce inclusions and exclusions based on past violence that justify war in 
the present (2011: 287); and Achugar in explaining how memory can be discursively 
constructed through particular narratives that exculpate state authorities for the 
perpetration of human rights violations (2007: 521). In each of these examples we can see 
how the core principles of discourse analysis – a focus on power, inclusion/exclusion, and 
hierarchy – can help illuminate the construction of the past subject to particular relations of 
power in the present. Moreover, crucially, the gathering and analysis of documents can be 
understood as a constitutive dimension of a wider PO strategy (analysis of such documents 
actually started whilst on fieldwork in order to develop interview strategies). In terms of 
substantive focus, it is Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, that foregrounds an 
examination of the way the ECCC formalises a particular regime of memory: I examine legal 
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documents,10 ECCC outreach publications (see next section on visual analysis), speeches 
and press releases by ECCC staff.  
Rose has suggested that 
visual images and 
representations can be 
understood as discursive; 
they can render particular 
things visible in particular 
ways whilst obscuring or 
hiding others (2007: 143). 
In this sense, images are 
key for the promotion of 
meanings as ‘memorable’. 
Visual analysis works to 
situate images within 
broader ‘systems of 
representation’ (discursive 
formations) through which 
particular images gain their 
meanings (Hall 1997: 7). For 
Hall, this means that the process of meaning making is dynamic – preferred meanings may 
be ‘encoded’ during image production but must also be (variously) ‘decoded’ by audiences 
(Hall 1980:130-131) – and that the meaning of particular images cannot be understood as 
‘finally fixed’ (1997: 23). Rather, visual analysis must be attentive the particular meanings 
carried by images at particular points (and for particular audiences), and the means through 
which images gain authority or are presented as truthful.  
                                                          
10 The two most important documents are the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (2004) 
and the ECCC internal rules (2008) both available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/court  
Figure 3 ECCC publicity poster 
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As Foucault notes, (visual) sign systems can work as particular forms of political technology 
(1997: 225). This project has examined two forms of visual technology (of memory): images 
produced by the ECCC and civil society groups that articulate meaning about past violence, 
and images and representations displayed at memorial and museum sites in ‘victim’ and 
‘perpetrator’ communities. Analysis of a series of ECCC publicity and educational posters 
(see example above) is incorporated in the Chapter Three, Trials and Tribulations, and 
Chapter Four, Mediating Memory, includes analysis of visual representations of traumatic 
memory in an NGO sponsored handbook. Moreover, the final two chapters ‘The Wat Thmey 
Genocide Memorial’ and Chapter Six, The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng, are also 
attentive to the representational devices, images and displays at memorial and museum 
sites. As Young notes, displays and images at memorial and museum sites may also be read 
as ‘texts’ (1993: viii), and Williams has suggested that particular memorial and museum 
sites organise objects, artefacts and displays to communicate a ‘cluster’ of meanings about 
victimhood and responsibility (2007: 25).  
Visual analysis must also be understood as part of a wider PO strategy. This entails analysis 
of images, displays and representational devices, but also practices of visitation and 
audience engagement with visual technologies. This means that attention to the 
institutional organisation of displays and objects at memorial and museum sites is also 
important in gaining insight into how each site is authenticated and presented as truthful. 
As a final note, I have taken evidential documentary photographs of displays and images at 
memorial and museum sites in order to support the analysis (see examples in the 
subsequent section). 
 
Participant observation 
Ethnographic fieldwork is (usually) distinguished by the use of participant observation as a 
principal or encompassing fieldwork strategy. Hammersly and Atkinson suggest this can 
entail (but not be reduced to) participating ‘…in people’s daily lives… watching what 
happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal 
interviews, collecting documents and artefacts…’ (2007: 3). Participant observation, as 
defined under these broad terms, captures the breadth of methods employed by this 
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project over the course of the fieldwork. The range and diversity of potential roles that 
constitute PO can be qualified further. As Willis has urged, it is important to ‘break down’ 
the ‘spectrum’ of possible positions that may fall under the rubric of ‘participant 
observation’ as a distinct form of social encounter in order to sensitise us to the 
researcher’s ‘role in a social relationship and its variable patterning’ (1980: 94). For Willis, 
PO may involve:  
participation; observation; participant as observer; observation as participant; just 
‘being around’; group discussion; recorded group conversation; unfocused interview; 
recorded unfocused interview (Willis 1980: 94) 
During eight months of fieldwork, I occupied a range of different positions across this 
spectrum and utilised a number of the related interview techniques (which I discuss below). 
For example, early stages of the fieldwork were hosted by a Cambodian NGO, 
foregrounding a role as a participant observer, whereas latter encounters at memorial sites 
often involved blurred positions of ‘just being around’ and ‘observation as participant’. In 
the latter half of this chapter I offer a more sustained engagement with the methodological, 
ethical and political realities of conducting fieldwork within differentially positioned 
political and social settings, reflecting on how these issues serve to structure data in specific 
ways. For the purposes of this summary, it should be noted that these various roles 
generated data that was gathered in written field notes, personally recorded audio notes 
and noted informal interviews.   
Interviewing 
Interviewing is frequently employed within wider PO research strategies. Atkinson and 
Coffey have suggested that PO and interviewing should not necessarily be understood as 
competing research techniques (2003). Re-reading Becker and Geer’s commentary on the 
merits of PO over interviewing (1957), Atkinson and Coffey (2003) suggest that any 
distinction between ‘talk’ (in interviews) and ‘action’ (as something to participate in and 
observe) provides a false opposition. Atkinson and Coffey eschew the view that one 
technique may yield more or less ‘authentic’ data than the other, suggesting that both 
interviewing and PO should be understood as forms of social encounter that involve the 
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production rather than disinterral of data. I discuss examples of these encounters in the 
subsequent Research Biography.  
The majority of interviews conducted for this project could not be described as interviews 
in a ‘formal’ sense; the principal source of data, particularly arising from work with CSD and 
at memorials and museums in Siem Reap and Anlong Veng, was based around informal, 
unstructured conversations. These interviews should be understood as constitutive of the 
broader PO strategy to the extent that they sought to address, in the loosest sense, how 
and on what basis different groups understood the meanings and role of various 
technologies of memory, for themselves, for their communities, and for the country. Before 
fieldwork I had designed (loose) topic guides for possible interviews at memorial and 
museum sites, but these proved too clumsy and formalistic to yield data of much interest. 
Similarly, while based in Phnom Penh, early attempts to conduct more formal semi-
structured interviews with ‘key players’ – civil society and ECCC staff – did not produce the 
data that I hoped for (in fact I felt that I wasted a number of opportunities with senior ECCC 
staff because I attempted interviews with them too early during fieldwork). During the 
latter half of the fieldwork, I began to conduct more directed and formal interviews which 
were planned on a case by case basis and informed by the wider PO strategy. These 
encounters must still be understood to implicate the aforementioned issues of positionality 
discussed in relation to PO: rather than accessing informant subjectivity, or extracting 
information, loosely structured interviewing involves an active negotiation between 
researcher and informant that co-produces interview data. This relationship generates data 
within and subject to particular power dynamics that, at given points, may be appropriated 
or held by either interviewer or informant, for example through the way an interview 
agenda is directed or circumscribed, or through more implicit power dynamics patterned by 
difference between researcher and informant (Hoffman 2007: 320-321).   
The formal interviews were all recorded on dictaphone, while informal conversations 
tended to be written up within field notes. 
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2.6 Research biography 
Appointment at the Centre for Social Development 
My decision to concentrate on the ECCC as an initial research focus dictated that the early 
stages of fieldwork were based in Phnom Penh. The research design was grounded in the 
assumption that examining the regime of memory formalised by the ECCC – quite simply, 
how, what and why the ECCC was trying to tell a story about past political violence – would 
mean exploring the details of the court mechanism: who was being blamed for what 
exactly, who was seeking redress or compensation, and the rules governing this process. 
My intention was to look at these issues by following court hearings, talking to court staff, 
and analysing court documents and public affairs output. I was aware that a number of 
non-Cambodian researchers working on issues of memory and transitional justice in 
Cambodia had sought institutional hosting within civil society organisations to facilitate 
fieldwork (Hughes 2006; Gellman 2008), and with help from London-based colleagues that 
had previously worked on Cambodia, I secured a Visiting Researcher appointment with a 
local Cambodian NGO based in Phnom Penh, the Centre for Social Development.11 CSD has 
been conducting public education and outreach in cooperation with the ECCC Public Affairs 
Office since 2006 and on issues of justice and reconciliation since 2000. As such, hosting 
with CSD proved to be an extremely fruitful platform from which to look at the ways the 
ECCC had formally animated and began to administer a particular regime of memory: it 
allowed exposure to practitioners in the field, easy access to court documents and the court 
itself, and very practically, office space, internet access and a more structured daily working 
pattern in Phnom Penh. I arrived in Phnom Penh and started working with CSD in late 
September 2008.  
Rachel Hughes’ (2006) fieldwork on Cambodia’s principal memorial sites, hosted by the 
Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam), shows how institutional placement can 
facilitate a process of research co-production. For Hughes, this was in part due to the 
direction yielded as a result of DC-Cam’s institutional expertise as a key player in 
                                                          
11 I would like to thank Margo Picken for suggesting CSD as a host group and helping 
establish contact with the organisation.   
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preservation efforts regarding documents and artefacts relevant to the KR period. DC-Cam 
has been heavily involved in recording the history of Cambodian memorial sites, and is 
affiliated closely with the ongoing management of the Tuol Sleng Museum (2006: 69). The 
organisation was therefore both an ideal host for Hughes’ work on visitation practices at 
the Tuol Sleng Museum site, and an important potential site of research data in its own 
right. However, as Hughes notes, institutional hosting can also pose complications and 
dilemmas in terms of access and ethics. For Hughes the reciprocal working relationship she 
developed with DC-Cam engendered a reluctance from scrutinising the work of DC-Cam as 
an ‘object’ in itself, which she felt may constitute a betrayal of trust from the original 
working relationship negotiated with the organisation (2006: 70). In accepting appointment 
at CSD, I was aware that mining the specific modes and vocabularies through which the 
ECCC account of political violence was disseminated (as a form of practice) was also crucial 
for understanding how such a reading may become persuasive or authoritative. The early 
stages of fieldwork confirmed that civil society groups such as CSD were also ‘key players’, 
leading public education and outreach for the court – the interfacing of the ECCC’s regime 
of memory and the public – rather than the ECCC Public Affairs Office itself. As a key 
‘carrier’ for the ECCC’s outreach it became increasingly important to foreground analysis of 
CSD’s public education work; for example, the ECCC Public Affairs Office considered CSD-
organised public forums to be an important context in which to conduct public education 
on the trials (and therefore where memory is mediated between the ECCC and the 
Cambodian public: see Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’).  
My relationship with the organisation, therefore, raised specific ethical issues concerning 
trust, access to data and a broader practical and political engagement with a public process 
heavily invested with ethical and normative value among stakeholders and sections of the 
Cambodian public. These three issues share significant overlap. I had ensured that, during 
discussions about my appointment with CSD, my research aims were clear: to understand 
the way memory is mediated between the ECCC and the public, the subject groups this 
creates, and what role museum and memorial sites play in this process (and otherwise). On 
the one hand, the principal source of data I sought to examine were public forums, and as 
public events open to all, I deemed these not to pose an ethical or political dilemma for my 
analysis. On the other hand, my fieldwork more broadly enjoyed the support and input of 
working with an organisation invested in the ECCC process, and my time spent based with 
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CSD constituted a key period of PO. Crucially, the basis of trust grounding this relationship 
was reciprocal in that it hinged upon the expectation to fulfil duties and obligations toward 
the organisation, constituting my role as a participant observer.12 I was asked to assist in 
the drafting and editing of funding proposals, press releases and reports on CSD’s court 
monitoring work, and to attend meetings with other local NGOs and ECCC staff in the role 
of CSD representative. I also developed friendships within these groups that were an 
important form of support and insight outside of the immediate research context. 
In particular, as an English language speaker, as part of the reciprocal relationship with CSD 
I was expected to take ‘verbatim’ written transcripts at the public forums on ‘justice and 
reconciliation’ (bi-monthly provincial meetings between court staff and community groups; 
I attended forums in October, February, and April in Pailin, Sisophon and Stung Treng). The 
public forum format operates through a ‘continuous’ audio translation system as the 
attendees frequently include non-Khmer speaking ECCC staff. The role transcribing at the 
public forums posed particular practical research dilemmas. My role at the forums was 
circumscribed by the need to sit, listen and record proceedings word for word (at the latter 
forums in February and April I overcame this by making a personal recording of proceedings 
and transcribing them for CSD at later points). I was less able to observe the non-verbal 
interactions occurring at the October forum in Pailin, where I could only infer the way that 
participants were articulating emphasis or meaning through intonation, rather than, for 
example, gestures. Importantly, the obligation toward CSD to provide full transcripts of the 
forums entailed a form of co-production of data. In the first instance, the transcripts 
emerged through interactions between CSD staff, attendees at public forums, a 
professional translator employed by CSD, and myself as ‘transcriber’.13 On the one hand, 
                                                          
12 One important way to ensure ethical good practice is to feedback research findings to 
informants, particularly prior to publication (see Ali and Kelly 2011). I ensured that CSD staff 
(and all other key informants) are able to contact me about research findings and I have 
disseminated relevant sections to those informants that provided me with an email 
address.  In December 2010 I was fortunate enough to return to Cambodia and was able to 
discuss the chapter ‘Mediating Memory’ with a number of CSD staff prior to its publication 
in the journal Memory Studies (2012).   
13 In Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’, I show how the CSD public forum itinerary 
represents a practical attempt to act upon ambivalent and conflicting memory (in specific 
ways). I emphasises that it is an active process between varying social agents that are 
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this allowed access to ‘verbatim’ transcripts (despite what I felt at the time to be a 
laborious task). On the other, this did not mean that there were not specific issues arising 
from the translation and transcription process as a form of co-production of data; the CSD 
public forum team insisted, for example, that I ‘tidy up’ the English language transcripts 
before their use or dissemination (I return to issues of language and power in the next 
section on cross-language research).  
Importantly, as a visiting Ph.D. student and active member of CSD staff working on issues of 
‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’, I was aware of a tension between my dual roles as a ‘critical’ 
researcher, on the one hand, and an implicit commitment to the normative cause of the 
ECCC required by my duties as a ‘practitioner’ on the other. Despite my initial (misguided) 
intention to remain as ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ as possible in my observance of the actual 
machinations and work going on around and for the court, my obligations toward CSD 
meant that I was involved in CSD outreach programs and therefore entangled in the 
broader dissemination of the ECCC’s reading of the past, a key research site. Moreover, I 
had personally held reservations and concerns about the normative benefits of the ECCC 
process that were assumed as a result of my pre-existing academic interest on Cambodia’s 
transitional justice strategy which I found difficult to articulate to colleagues in both 
working and non-working contexts without conflicting my role as a committed 
‘practitioner’. Transitional justice as a field of practice invites and is established through a 
discursive moral authority embodied within particular human rights tropes (specifically 
around the dignity and rights of individuals). These can lend themselves to more 
prescriptive, normatively directed forms of output (that my research specifically does not 
provide). This tension remained a vexed issue; because this project emerged from a more 
critically oriented research direction (eschewing policy prescriptive output regarding the 
trials and/or outreach) – a point emphasised during my first contact with CSD prior to 
appointment – my role at the organisation remained in some ways conflicted. Tania Murray 
                                                                                                                                                                    
differentially positioned in the social world. I would suggest that there is a methodological 
and substantive parallel between the way memory is socially reconstructed and the way 
that qualitative data is co-produced, because knowledge (data or memory) emerges 
through social processes and is constantly revised subject to the social settings within which 
it is called into being. 
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Li (2007) has noted the ethical and methodological tensions within critical, ethnographic 
research into processes of ‘governmental improvement’. Her research on Indonesian 
developmental practices revealed a conflict between her academic positioning as an 
‘expert’, an inductive and ethnographic research design that did not ‘test’ or ‘evaluate’ 
specific policy initiatives, and the expectations of her informants concerning her ‘expertise’ 
in developmental practice in Indonesia (2007: 3). For Li, this tension was both ‘diagnostic’ of 
specific modes of thought within developmental practice and ‘productive’ in that her 
research was (politically) committed in its intention to evidence the specific ways of 
thinking that underpin ameliorative (developmental) assumptions. My own reluctance (and 
inability) to engage either programmatically or prescriptively with the tasks of ‘justice’ and 
‘reconciliation’ both confounded and grounded my relationships with CSD staff. After three 
weeks with the organisation, Sok Leang, head of CSD’s outreach initiatives, asked what my 
final thesis was. I replied that after three weeks, I didn’t really know, but that I wanted to 
understand how justice and reconciliation had come to mean exactly what they had. Sok 
Leang then asked what the research could do for wider processes of justice and 
reconciliation. Again, I was taken off guard and replied that I wasn’t particularly sure. The 
fact that I’d spent a large sum of money to travel to Cambodia to conduct fieldwork on this 
basis was something we agreed was quite funny. 
In spite of the fact that there emerged something of a shared joke among some staff 
regarding ‘Peter’s research into the justice that he doesn’t think exists’14 – I was constantly 
reminded that the project was occurring in an environment burdened with expectation 
about what the ECCC could actually achieve – it must be stressed that the relationship that 
developed with the CSD staff was itself productive of research data. Staff provided a 
number of detailed interviews throughout my period of hosting, but also helped facilitate 
interviews and conversations during outreach events that wouldn’t have otherwise 
occurred (I return to issues of positionality in the coming sections).  For example, in 
preparation for the October public forum in Pailin, a group of largely former KR were taken 
to tour Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, the Cheoung Ek Memorial site and to visit the ECCC 
for a seminar with the public affairs group (see Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’). At the 
                                                          
14 This became a running gag among some of the other members of the CSD staff.   
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time, my Khmer language skills remained limited. This meant that whilst I was able to 
participate in the group visit and obtain a good understanding of the forms of observance 
occurring at the site, I was largely excluded from the verbal interactions occurring between 
participants. As Willis has suggested, researchers must be flexible as they negotiate a 
balance between ‘participant’ and ‘observer’ roles because neither are stable as social roles 
(1980: 94). At the CSD-led tours of Tuol Sleng, specific linguistic constraints foregrounded 
my role as ‘observer’ as opposed to ‘participant’. I was engaged in a form of ‘participant’ or 
‘engaged listening’ (Gerard Forsey 2010: 560), as I relied upon CSD staff assisting the tour to 
relay conversations between participants and staff back to me in English. I was 
subsequently able to undertake a number of informal interviews with participants through 
CSD staff acting as interpreters. This is not to suggest that my presence and the specific 
positioning of the CSD staff within these encounters did not structure the data yielded in 
specific ways, as I discuss in the next section.   
 
 
Cross-language research  
Over the course of the fieldwork I was confronted with the issue of how to access and 
analyse data that was not immediately available in English. Conducting cross-language 
research poses a problem for researchers because the interplay between languages is a 
critical part of the way data is constructed as meaningful (Spivak 1992: 177). Moreover, it is 
now commonly accepted that the presumed availability of equivalent terms with equivalent 
meanings across languages does not necessarily exist; there may not be a single correct 
translation of a text across languages, and that translators/interpreters must actively 
choose the words used from a potential variety of options to reconstruct meaning transfer 
(Temple and Edwards 2002). Whilst some cross-language researchers rely upon a criterion 
of ‘accuracy’ in order to ensure the validity of research - assuming that informants’ 
accounts are objectively accessible research sites that can simply be translated ‘validly’ with 
the elimination of error (see, for example, Esposito 2001) – commentators such as Temple 
and Young (2004) stress that the meaning produced in qualitative research is contingent on 
the location of researchers and informants within the social world, and their perceptions of 
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the social world therein. To this end, the role of translators/translation and 
interpreters/interpretation is critically important in explaining the conditioning of cross-
language research data.        
During the initial phase of the fieldwork, my own Khmer language skills were very limited 
(despite weekly lessons). Towards the latter stages of the project I was able to 
communicate in Khmer at a conversational level, though I remained uncomfortable about 
the prospect of conducting interviews in more formalised contexts where appropriate 
terms for addressing individuals in positions of relative authority may apply (for example 
toward older individuals, Government officials, and particularly for monks whereby whole 
alternative sets of vocabulary are required to convey respect and reverence). I adopted a 
number of (often highly opportunistic) strategies to work around these problems: using 
bilingual speakers on hand to conduct ad hoc interpretation (for example using CSD staff at 
the tour of Tuol Sleng and Cheoung Ek by Pailin residents); transcribing the already 
available CSD ‘continuous’ translation at public forums myself; negotiating less formalised 
encounters using my own K’mai language skills; and formally employing an interpreter (as I 
did on an ad hoc basis in Siem Reap and during my time in Anlong Veng). 
The first important encounter that raised issues of accessing cross-language data occurred 
at the CSD-organised tour of Tuol Sleng and Cheoung Ek by a group of Pailin residents, held 
in preparation for the public forum in Pailin province later that month. The research 
opportunity was significant because Tuol Sleng and Cheoung Ek are Cambodia’s principal 
memorial sites to the DK period and the participants from Pailin included a large number of 
former KR and their families (key parties to Cambodia’s reconciliation strategy). As noted, I 
relied on CSD staff facilitating the tour to help mediate conversations with the tour 
participants. This occurred as a form of ‘consecutive’ interpretation, rather than through 
‘continuous’ translation. By ‘consecutive’ interpretation and ‘continuous’ (verbal) 
translation, I adopt two terms used by CSD staff to indicate whether ‘translation’ occurs as 
the source speaks, or whether the ‘interpreter’ allows a source to make pauses, at which 
point the interpreted ‘text’ is then  spoken.  
The attachment of the terms ‘translation’ and ‘interpretation’ to differentiate ‘continuous’ 
and ‘consecutive’ styles is useful because it shows that the aims of the mediator are 
different according to each approach; one lends itself toward the production of 
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instantaneous verbatim texts whilst the other is (arguably) better able to reflect context or 
any particular points of emphasis in the source text. On the one hand, both of these styles 
of emphasis are useful in the way they may offer the particular criterion of accuracy to 
ensure validity. In the first instance, according to the continuous method, this may be by 
attempting to make word-for-word matches in continuous translation. In the second, using 
the consecutive system, this may be by reflecting particular complexities and nuances that 
elucidate the ‘true’ meaning of the text under consecutive interpretation, emphasising the 
active role of the interpreter in the production of an accurate text. That said, these two 
approaches both represent aspirations toward an unrealistic standard of ‘objectivity’ that 
can be misleading for our understanding of cross-language data. The deployment of each 
style must be scrutinised for the potential to ‘write out’ the translator/interpreter from the 
data production process as a ‘neutral’ mediating agent, a danger that ignores the fact that 
‘authors’ and ‘speakers’ are not situated equally within the social world (Temple and Young 
2004).  
Two examples are pertinent here. During the tour of the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, CSD 
staff members helped with an ad hoc consecutive interview of a former student of the high 
school that occupied the site before its use as an interrogation facility. In a similar scenario, 
bilingual CSD staff mediated informal consecutive conversations with former KR cadre at 
the Cheoung Ek mass grave site. It is important to stress how the style of interpretation 
(consecutive), and the positioning of the interpreter specifically conditions the data elicited. 
It was clear that the former KR cadre were, unsurprisingly, particularly cautious about 
speaking to unknown non-Cambodians. As it was relatively early in the fieldwork my own 
strategies for approaching informants, explaining my research aims clearly, and negotiating 
permission to speak about sites such as Tuol Sleng were quite underdeveloped; in this 
instance the ‘brokerage’ provided by a CSD staff member conducting consecutive 
interpretation proved crucial in securing these conversations (as short as they were). These 
early interviews and conversations, mediated through CSD staff, allowed me to watch the 
pauses offered (through the consecutive style of interpretation), and the particular 
conversational styles employed proved instructive for latter interviews I conducted (both 
on my own and through an interpreter). The approach adopted by an interpreter can have 
highly specific effects (sometimes encouraging and sometimes, it seemed, discouraging 
informants). Perhaps more importantly as a methodological lesson, during those initial 
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encounters, I recognised the way that the pauses offered using the consecutive translation 
style allowed more room for thought about introducing new or unanticipated areas of 
conversation. The ‘messiness’ of these forms of encounter remained; as successful as I felt 
these conversations were, I was told afterwards that the informants may have expressed 
very different views regarding the authenticity of the museum and memorial site had we 
not been on a CSD-organised tour with CSD staff present. In the first instance, this was an 
important lesson for future research encounters in Anlong Veng (a former KR stronghold) in 
that I would introduce myself to informants as a researcher working on issues about the 
ECCC, and not specifically for the ECCC itself, an implicit risk at ECCC-licensed outreach 
exercises. This is indicative of the politically sensitive dynamics involving locale, social and 
political context, and language. Moreover, the production of data as it emerged from 
specific interplays between sites visited, informants and the authority of various speakers 
leading the tours, reflects the importance of recognising the co-productive construction of 
qualitative data.      
The contextual conditioning and co-production of research data through and across 
languages was a particularly vexed issue at public forums. Translation or interpretation 
involves the re-writing of meaning, as opposed to its transfer (Venuti 1998). When using a 
‘continuous’ translation style at public forums, the resulting text was treated by CSD staff as 
confused and incoherent in appearance. This was in part a result of the speed required to 
translate ‘verbatim’, but also reflective of the contention that there are no necessary 
equivalences in the meanings of terms across languages. At the first public forum I 
attended, I was tasked with transcribing first-hand the continuous oral text of proceedings 
(which was relayed through an audio system from a professional Cambodian translator). 
The speed of the exchanges between Cambodian participants at the forum meant that it 
was difficult for the audio translator to keep up with the proceedings. Moreover, English 
language structures do not necessarily have a neat correspondence to Khmer, further 
precluding any clean, ‘objective’, ‘verbatim’ text-for-text translation. Anticipating what 
could potentially look like a ‘messy’ text in English, the CSD staff encouraged me to ‘tidy-up’ 
the text (public forum transcripts were an important indicator of ‘output’ for donors). This 
represented a ‘secondary’ reconstruction of the forum data. It has been noted that the 
requirement for researchers to produce direct quotation in English can create a an ethical 
dilemma in the way it ‘hides’ the source language (Ladd 2003): through initial Khmer-
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English translation, and then through ‘tidying’, particular meanings were reconstructed in 
the production of English language transcripts. In the case of the public forums, the need to 
edit a ‘high quality’ (tidied) transcript arguably reflects the need for a Cambodian NGO 
financially dependent on donors to produce tangible research output in English; this in turn 
reflects a concern that languages are themselves perceived hierarchically, as mediums for 
the promotion of dominant or ‘correct’ perspectives, and that non-English language 
research may be perceived as holding less ‘value’.  
 
Positioning in the field 
The CSD appointment enabled access to data at public forums and provided exposure to 
the ‘hands on’ workings of the ECCC and its staff. Moreover, the ad hoc help and assistance 
lent by CSD staff as interpreters and ‘brokers’ at public forum events was key to securing a 
number of interviews focusing on visitation at Cambodian memorial sites during ECCC 
outreach exercises. Conversely, I have noted that the role of CSD staff as interpreters also 
had an impact on the shape and content of those interviews. Most importantly for the 
fieldwork ‘learning curve’, hosting by CSD proved to be a form of introduction to the field of 
Cambodian ‘memory politics’ that rendered visible one particularly active perspective on 
the importance of the ECCC, its role in reckoning with the legacy of political violence, and 
particularly, its role as an entity that facilitates ‘reconciliation’. The public forum events 
consistently revealed the diversity of provincial perspectives on the history of the 
Cambodian conflict – specific regimes of memory laying claim over what had actually 
happened – but also pointed to the tendency toward quite particular responses among 
provincial groups to NGO outreach licensed by the ECCC: the CSD forums were powerful in 
prioritising both particular events worthy of remembering but also the ‘moral’ meaning of 
memory. In this sense, we must understand the reconstruction and performance of 
memory as contextually dependent, emergent through relations between specific positions 
within the social world (again, crucially, in parallel with the way qualitative data is co-
produced). Recognising this sensitised me to the fact that groups or communities may think 
very differently about the legacies of the conflict outside of the context of ECCC outreach 
and the human rights agenda that is part and parcel of NGO public education. Whilst I felt 
this was an important validation of my decision to conduct fieldwork from January 2009 in 
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Siem Reap and Anlong  Veng ‘un-hosted’, conducting research independently presented a 
series of new positions from which research data emerged and ‘regimes of memory’ were 
accessed. At the end of December 2008 the appointment at CSD’s Phnom Penh office 
finished. I continued to assist CSD and gather data at the public forums in Sisophon 
(February, North-West Cambodia) and Stung Treng (March, North-East Cambodia). 
However, from January 2009 the research focus had shifted to concentrate on exploring 
specifically localised memorial sites and contexts, rather than attending to the production 
and dissemination of a central account of political violence in Cambodia stemming from the 
ECCC. The first site the fieldwork looked to address was the Wat Thmei pagoda, located just 
to the North of Siem Reap. 
 
After a number of visits to Wat Thmey it became apparent that I would have to adopt 
particular strategies through which to negotiate my role as a participant observer. 
Qualitative data is structured by the relationships, encounters and specific positions of 
informants and researchers (Willis 1980; Clifford, Marcus et al. 1986). Overt participant 
observation requires a researcher to adopt particular roles, and maintaining such roles, and 
the relationships they entail, is productive of the specific data that is generated. The 
differential positioning of subjects in the field is ‘read’ and established through varying 
lenses. The initial phase of fieldwork at Wat Thmei illuminated and ‘fixed’ two distinct, 
conflicting roles. On the one hand, as a researcher, the process of ensuring informants were 
briefed on the scope and aims of the project served to ‘fix’ specific positions defined 
between ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’. On the other, as a ‘participant’ observer at the 
memorial site, residents, monks and other attendees had basic expectations about what a 
Western visitor was doing there, i.e. also visiting as tourist, the principal use of museum 
and memorial sites in Cambodia. These two basic structuring relationships were present 
across encounters at the memorial and museum research sites in the latter sections of 
fieldwork and germinated two possible research strategies: ‘anchoring’, understood as 
adopting a role more embedded within the expectations of field groups, and ‘withdrawing’ 
to adopt a more distanced position as ‘researcher’ (Castellano 2007: 707). I now turn to 
examples of how each was manifest and the practical-methodological and ethical dilemmas 
they presented.  
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The reluctance of senior monks to talk about the decision making processes behind display 
installations can be interpreted in a number of ways.15 In the first instance, this reluctance 
gestures to how sensitive the topic of conflict and genocide remains as a public issue in 
Cambodia. Moreover, specific research encounters appeared to be governed by the detail; 
some monks appeared particularly uncomfortable when I visibly wore or presented my 
‘official’ LSE (library) card on a lanyard; conversely, other visitors (particularly European and 
American) were intrigued by what I was doing (loitering) at the memorial site and about my 
research more broadly. Resolving to wait for a week and to present myself less formally, I 
strategically chose to speak with monks only incidentally in future. Whilst this approach 
bore results, yielding a number of informal interviews with younger attendees about 
visitors to the site and also perceptions of Cambodia’s emergence from conflict more 
generally, the tension between my aims and position as ‘researcher’ and the expectations 
of my assumed presence as ‘tourist’ was particularly visible. The presence and 
confrontation of a ‘researcher’ did not sit comfortably with the expectations of informants 
of the everyday ‘tourist’: ethnographic fieldwork necessarily generates specific field 
dynamics that structure data. This reflects the aforementioned critiques of the assumed 
accessibility of ‘naturally’ available field data.    
                                                          
15 Broadly, across research sites in the latter half of fieldwork, informants tended to be 
reluctant to speak whilst recorded on dictaphone; they were, however, happy for me to 
make notes about informal conversations and interviews. 
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The Wat Thmei genocide memorial, a site I continuously visited between January and April 
2009, evidences dynamic, often confusing field relations. As noted, the early conversations I 
had with monks and local residents attending the pagoda were confounded by an 
entrenched assumption (despite an explanation of my research aims) that I was attending 
as a visitor to witness and observe the memorial as a tourist. My continued attendance at 
the site became a matter of considerable mirth to residents of the site pagoda because of 
the perceived banality of my interests; on a day to day basis I would watch and speak to 
large tour groups bussed 
into the pagoda 
compound, observing 
visits usually lasting 
less than fifteen 
minutes comprising 
of a rushed circle of 
the memorial exhibit 
and brief examination 
of the information 
board. Residents of 
the pagoda asked 
why I seemed to 
repeatedly need to 
witness what was 
considered a daily 
and seemingly 
routine practice. On 
the one hand, my continued insistence on the importance of these observations involved a 
process of ‘withdrawal’, a directed attempt to establish my position as researcher. On the 
other, my continued presence generated relationships that specifically ‘anchored’ and 
embedded my presence: I spent much of the time discussing the visitor groups to practice 
my own K’mai with Cambodian pagoda attendees and monks – as they practiced their 
English skills with me –while I attempted to ascertain a sense of whether this form of 
visitation was considered problematic (a question I address in Chapter Five, ‘The Wat 
Figure 4 A tour group visits the Wat Thmey memorial stupa 
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Thmey Genocide Memorial’). In this sense, a peculiar research dynamic emerged between 
the gradual blurring of my position as either ‘researcher’ or ‘tourist’. Data emerged 
specifically from informants’ renegotiation of my ‘fit’ within either category, catalysed by a 
seemingly bemused suspicion that I was wasting my time. 
In March 2009 I made contact with a professional Cambodian interpreter, Yout, as I turned 
my attention to the memorial and museum sites located in Anlong Veng on the Northern 
border with Thailand. Yout had previously worked on politically sensitive issues having been 
employed by international election observers in Cambodia and so was particularly well 
equipped to help with the fieldwork. As noted, field interpreters co-produce data, rather 
than neutrally mediating its transfer. In understanding this process, we must be attentive to 
the specific positionalities that govern these encounters. Suki Ali has suggested ‘…that we 
cannot ever hope to escape (non)hierarchical power relations in research, that all research 
is inevitably, to an extent, racialising’ (Ali 2006: 471). In Anlong Veng, Yout was active in 
managing specifically localised forms of racialised hierarchy. Data emerging from 
encounters with former KR in Anlong Veng were generated through a prism of mistrust of 
the non-Cambodian (white) researcher but trust in a racially-located positioning of Yout as a 
Khmer interpreter: Yout explained that because he had a darker skin complexion, a 
complexion understood as hierarchically inferior according to schemas employed by some 
urban and affluent Cambodians, he appeared more like a ‘real’ or ‘true’ Khmer in the eyes 
of the KR cadre, and distinct from ‘untrustworthy’ paler ‘Vietnam-ised’ Khmers (several 
former KR informants had communicated this to him). These encounters are important to 
note because they show how the production of data hinges upon multiple levels and 
constructions of difference: the former KR felt authorised to speak about memory in 
specific ways because of a perceived racialised ‘solidarity’ with Ben. Moreover, these 
encounters show how potentially stigmatized social groups are able to negotiate research 
encounters in specific ways (Crowley 2007: 605) (as a form of resistance for many former 
KR). Beyond the immediate ‘Western’/‘local’ barrier that emerged frequently during 
fieldwork, this reveals exclusions and inclusions with and between Cambodians that 
condition the way memory is rearticulated, through differentiated racialised and culturally-
located lenses and schemas. It further supports the contention that the binary 
insider/outsider opposition conventionally thought to constitute ethnographic encounters 
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needs to be re-thought as able to generate different, multiple texts from multiple ‘insider’ 
or ‘outsider’ positions (Twine 2000). 
 
Ethics 
During the research design I was keenly aware that the fieldwork would explore political 
technologies pertaining to ‘sensitive’ fields of memory. Research on memories of suffering 
poses a number of ethical concerns surrounding issues of intrusion, mental distress and 
harm to informants. I specifically chose to base the research around analysis of 
technologies of memory (rather than, for example, oral histories) as a research strategy to 
mitigate against this. As such, I judged the fieldwork would not pose serious ethical 
concerns beyond the need to obtain consent before conducting research at sites. As I found 
during the proceedings at CSD public forums, publicly engaging with personal memory of 
political violence was, on the one hand, a prominent and frequently deployed testimonial 
technique and technology of memory and, on the other, an often deeply distressing 
experience for the attendees. These instances, however, represent examples of how 
potentially problematic ethical issues concerning harm arise from a research context before 
a research methodology is brought to bear on it (Hobbs 1988). In this sense, the research 
did not cause or exacerbate any harm. Rather, I deemed the deployment of intrusive 
testimonial technologies of memory by groups such as CSD and the ECCC to be an ethically 
important area to highlight as part of the research (see, for example, Ross 2003 on the 
ethical implications of public testimony in these contexts). 
Despite my intention to avoid the elicitation of personal memory, the issue of testimony 
haunted many fieldwork encounters. As noted above, data produced in qualitative research 
is governed by the specific positionalities occupied by various subjects in the field. I was 
confronted with quite frequent ethical dilemmas regarding the way in which informants 
thought they should ‘speak’ to or for the research. In both explicitly research-focused and 
more casual contexts, many Cambodians appeared intent on re-telling personal stories 
concerning both the DK period and the civil war more broadly. I had not intended to elicit 
personal narrative and had taken care to word conversation to evade personal biography. 
Important ethical inferences are available here that can reflect more broadly on the politics 
of memory in Cambodia. On the one hand, the tendency to testify without invitation could 
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mean that those informants felt compelled to do so, arguably as an affirmative act. On the 
other, bearing in mind the insider/outsider positioning of these encounters, it is possible 
that they felt compelled to do so on the assumption that personal narrative must be what a 
non-Cambodian researcher was interested by. The two dominant modalities of 
remembering political violence in Cambodia today are the ECCC proceedings and the 
centrality of museums and memorials to the tourist economy. This speaks to a serious 
power imbalance implicating the expectations of Cambodians and non-Cambodians as they 
encounter: through practices of tourism and research, non-Cambodians may have 
entrenched the assumption among Cambodians that non-Cambodians want to bear witness 
or consume memories of political violence. Irrespective, in such circumstances I often felt 
that to close down such personal narrative could potentially present more ethical problems 
than to let the stories, simply, be told.   
 
Conclusion 
The latter half of this chapter has identified some of the key (overlapping) methodological, 
political, and ethical dilemmas arising from the period of fieldwork. I have noted how 
institutional hosting with an NGO working on issues surrounding the ECCC generated 
particular conflicts between my roles as a ‘participant’ practitioner and ‘non-expert’ 
researcher, with ensuing ethical dilemmas concerning trust; I have shown how language 
and interpretation involved both practical research dilemmas as well as reflecting broader 
methodological issues on the co-production of research data and the need to acknowledge 
a politics of translation; and I have examined the way in which field relations were 
governed by differentially positioned, shifting sets of assumptions and expectations 
between researcher and research informants. On the one hand, through a more critical 
reflection on the period of fieldwork, I have shown that the substantive focus of this project 
– regimes of memory – is a field of negotiated practice (whether exceptional and 
programmatic at public forums, or seemingly banal and ‘everyday’ around localised 
memorial forms). Similarly, we can understand the process of researching regimes of 
memory as a form of practice that further has effects on the way memory is understood, 
articulated and reconstructed. In this sense there is a methodological and substantive 
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parallel between the co-production of qualitative data and the context dependent process 
of remembering as reconstruction around and through various technologies of memory.  
The ethical and political questions that arise from the aforementioned issues are significant. 
Researchers must negotiate (vexed) ethical issues that may be not be easily resolved. I 
would suggest, however, that such issues can (in some circumstances) be harnessed to 
more broadly reflect on the politics of a particular research context. Two examples 
specifically gesture to the dominant ‘regimes of memory’ licensed in Cambodia today. 
Firstly, whilst hosted by CSD, conflicts between my role as ‘researcher’ and ‘participant 
practitioner’ illuminate the normative authority embodied by the regime of memory at the 
ECCC, as it attempts to provide justice and reconciliation. Practical field encounters within 
this context were haunted by the way a regime of memory directed to such ends could 
discursively structure the way particular pasts were to be thought about and acted upon. 
Secondly, issues of positionality and power, specifically the varied multiple relations of 
‘outsider’ as ‘researcher’ or ‘tourist’ to ‘insider’, reflected more broadly on assumptions and 
expectations among informants about what non-Cambodians would want to know about 
the past. Both the ECCC process and the now-burgeoning tourist economy have situated 
memories of political violence as objects to be known, witnessed, or transformed with 
important and outstanding implications for the politics of memory, justice and 
reconciliation.   
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Chapter Three 
Trials and Tribulations 
 
I do not pity them – I want history to write about them as killers 
 
(Anonymous civil party member) 
 
By August 2013 the ongoing work of the ECCC faced serious challenges. Whilst the 
sentencing of Duch, former head of the S-21 interrogation centre, to life imprisonment in 
‘Case 001’ in 2012 was celebrated by ECCC staff and civil society leaders as a landmark 
success of the court, the fate of the ‘headline’ trials of the four more senior KR leaders in 
‘Case 002’ appeared uncertain. Ieng Thirith,  former Minister of Social Affairs under DK, was 
‘severed’ from proceedings in November 2011 as being unfit to stand trial due to dementia. 
Ieng Sary, former Foreign Minister of DK, died in March 2013, and the health of the 
remaining defendants, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, was also ailing. In response to the 
need to expedite proceedings, ECCC judicial staff broke the remainder of Case 002 into 
‘mini’ trials, with each meant to focus on specific events that occurred under DK. The mini 
trial of Case 002/1, examining the evacuation of Phnom Penh in 1975, is ongoing, though 
widely expected to be the last significant verdict reached by the ECCC: prospective 
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prosecutions beyond the five indicted individuals appear unlikely to materialise in the face 
of opposition from the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). More broadly, the tribunal 
remains beset by funding problems, with unpaid Cambodian staff observing a series of 
strike actions in July 2013, with international backers increasingly suffering ‘donor fatigue’ 
(Sperfeldt 2012). As one former civil society colleague recently remarked as a joke, the 
ECCC began to resemble the insatiable ‘monster plant’ in the 1980s film The Little Shop of 
Horrors:  “Feed me Seymour”.  
 
The ongoing uncertainty emanating from the ECCC contrasts sharply with the early rhetoric 
and exuberance among stakeholders toward the court, which was defined by the assertion 
that the ECCC could and would remedy the past. Moreover, the continued work of the 
court remains underpinned by specific assumptions about memory: that disinterring, 
reframing, retelling, and denouncing memory in appropriate ways can and will lead to 
ameliorative outcomes in the present. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the way 
that the disappointments, uncertainties, and unanticipated outcomes of the ECCC should 
be understood to follow from the rigidity of the progressive and necessary linearity of the 
claim that disinterring the past remedies the present. In order to do this, I highlight the way 
that Cambodian government, UN and civil society staff ‘sold’ the ECCC to the Cambodian 
public, presenting the court as an ameliorative agent; I examine the contingent, political 
constitution of the ECCC mechanism; and then consider the contestation of the preferred 
‘scripts’ of the ECCC that were thought to flow neatly into states of ‘justice’ and 
‘reconciliation’.  
 
Legal interventions into the past converge with, and constitute, political techniques of 
memory. The relationship between law and collective memory has been theorised as 
mutually constitutive: law provides a framework for the reconstruction of memory whilst 
memories shape and furnish the content and authority of law (Savelsberg and King 2007). 
For example, Levy and Sznaider specifically point to the ‘institutional’ memory of the 
Nuremberg trials as a reference point for all subsequent tribunals (2010). The use of trials 
and punishment as both a political technique for the construction of history and a means of 
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rectifying ‘problematic’ pasts has been approached by sociologists in a number of ways. 
Within classical sociology, Durkheim suggested that the role of the trial is a ritual 
performance that affirms the norms and values of given collectivities (1984). In a similar 
vein, Osiel has pointed to the potential for trials to enable ‘discursive solidarity’ in the way 
trials act as a crucible for the resolution of conflicting stories about the past (1997: 51). 
Misztal has further evaluated the varying contributions that ritual interventions on the past 
may yield for the promotion of democratic values (2005). Indeed, from Nuremberg to the 
more recent Milosevic trials, prosecutions for past injustices are now understood as much 
through their didactic function (and outputs) as their basic discharging of lex talionis 
(Koskenniemi 2002). At the same time, we must be attentive to how transitional justice 
interventions emerge and work subject to hierarchies of power (Moon 2008; Ainley 2011; 
Ainley 2013), and the implications for a politically-directed framing of memory therein.   
 
The chapter has three sections. The first section examines the way that the ECCC has been 
presented through claims for ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’ by UN and RGC staff. These claims 
are important because they construct the meaning of justice and reconciliation on varied 
terms, revealing the political conditioning of the terms through which the ECCC is validated 
(and the outcomes thought to flow from it). Moreover, they implicate memory in 
problematic ways because, as I show, they invoke and naturalise collective memory 
frameworks that position the national community as passive and uniform in relation to past 
political violence. The second section examines the formalisation of the ECCC process by 
examining the court’s law to interrogate the way in which the ECCC worked to produce a 
stable account of the past; the ECCC law, it is argued, ‘hides’ memories as much as it calls 
attention to them, animating a specific universe of victims and perpetrators. On this basis, I 
argue that trials must be understood through varied processes of disclosure and 
concealment in the way in which they reconstruct memory. The final section of the chapter 
challenges the extent to which the ECCC can be understood to ‘predetermine’ a stable 
account of past political violence. I consider patterns and ‘scripts’ employed by prosecution 
and defence teams as they contest necessarily equivocal competing memory claims, before 
examining some of the ‘unexpected’ outcomes of the ECCC process. The minutiae of 
memory work rests in these details. 
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3.1 Presenting the ECCC 
 
This section looks at the claims presented to justify the need for the ECCC. These claims are 
important to examine because they are the main way in which the terms ‘justice’ and 
‘reconciliation’ are given meaning as outcomes of the ECCC process. Moreover, these 
claims implicate memory by naturalising an understanding of the nation as a wounded 
entity, thus invoking and promoting collective memory frameworks. A number of important 
caveats are crucial to bear in mind at this point. Justice and reconciliation are presented as 
meaning different things according to the actors invoking them (i.e. the RGC, civil society or 
UN staff). The ECCC should not be understood as a monolithic entity in the way it 
reconstructs the past, but it is purported to be. At the same time, claims that the ECCC acts 
to remedy a national memory share a loose conformity – specifically around the scope of 
culpability to senior leaders only – that is traceable to conditions set by the RGC in 
establishing the court (i.e. a framing of memory in the interests of the present). In this 
sense, I argue that the terms ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’ operate subject to power, or as a 
discursive formation that has a set of ‘rules’ (but are necessarily contestable) (Foucault 
2002). Two arguments follow from this. Firstly, that the meanings of justice or 
reconciliation are not self-evident, but are negotiated. Secondly, that discourses of justice 
and reconciliation tend to naturalise collective memory frameworks about the nation in 
problematic ways because they treat the national community as a homogenous entity that 
has a uniform relation to the past.  
 
Shortly after the establishment of the ECCC, a high profile international conference titled 
‘Dealing with a Past Holocaust and National Reconciliation: Learning from Experiences’16 
                                                          
16 ‘Dealing with a Past Holocaust and National Reconciliation: Learning from Experiences’, 
28th-29th August 2006, available at http://ipf-ssg-sea.net/1st_WS/D+C_3-2006.pdf  
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was held in Phnom Penh to discuss the importance of the court. The conference brought 
together a range of experts in transitional justice, legal practitioners and human rights 
scholars, newly appointed ECCC staff, Cambodian government officials and the then 
speaker of the Cambodian National Assembly, His Royal Highness Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh. His Excellency Sean Visoth, a senior Cambodian government official and the 
then Director of the ECCC’s Office of Administration remarked: 
 
The first [principle] is respect for and the search for justice. We condemn the crimes of the 
Khmer Rouge as crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. We seek justice for their 
victims, and for the entire Cambodian people, and we wish also to contribute to the 
development of international humanitarian principles, condemning genocidal crimes and 
seeking to prevent their recurrence… 
 
The second principle is maintaining peace, political stability and national unity, which Cambodia 
has achieved only in recent years... we are proud of moving forward in the process of 
strengthening political stability, peace and security in Cambodia, and this is a valuable 
achievement for our beloved motherland after a whole generation of conflict. Whatever we do 
must not damage our peace and stability, and throughout the process over the past four years of 
designing the Khmer Rouge trials we have always sought to gain consensus, based on respect for 
the highest national interests.  
 
Visoth was outlining the RGC’s position in regard to the ECCC trials. His comments are 
notable in the way in which they counterpose, on the one hand, the imperative to punish 
KR crimes and, on the other, a national imperative to maintain stability (ensuring 
reconciliation) in the name of the ‘motherland’. Visoth’s remarks present important 
tensions that haunt justifications of the ECCC because the imperatives of accountability and 
punishment are seemingly tempered by the constraints of the need for reconciliation and 
stability. This type of statement is notable for the way it reproduces and invokes the 
oppositions between punishment and reconciliation visible in the first cluster of research 
on transitional justice outlined in Chapter One, ‘Remembering Political Violence’ (see, for 
example, Zalaquett 1990; Rotberg and Thompson 2000; Hayner 2002). 
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In the closing remarks of the conference, His Excellency Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, 
reiterated the ECCC’s principal goal of rendering ‘justice for the victims of the tragedy’ 
while stressing ‘reconciliation’ as a state to be maintained: 
 
Today the former Khmer Rouge have resumed their lives within the general 
community, and all the former factions have taken up the challenge of working 
together to develop the country. This precious achievement must not be undermined 
by the [ECCC] judicial process 
 
Furthermore, reconciliation was defined as the 
 
…prevention and non-recurrence of the genocide, maintaining peace, political stability 
and national unity; and respect for national sovereignty.
17
 
 
Similarly, at the 2006 ceremony to mark the swearing in of ECCC judicial staff, Sok An 
remarked again that: 
 
Our foremost objective is to provide justice for the victims, and for the entire 
Cambodian people. In striving to achieve this long-awaited justice we must not 
jeopardise our country’s newly-won national peace and stability.18 
                                                          
17 ‘Dealing with a Past Holocaust and National Reconciliation: Learning from Experiences’, 
28th-29th August 2006, available at http://ipf-ssg-sea.net/1st_WS/D+C_3-2006.pdf 
18 ‘Remarks at the reception following the swearing in of the national and international 
judicial officers for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’, 3rd July 2006. 
Available at 
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Two sets of issues are notable in these claims in regard to what the ECCC is trying to do, and 
who it is trying to do it for. Firstly, these remarks present a view that prosecutions of 
former KR figures can be politically destabilising. The ‘national’ memory of the KR period, in 
this sense, is invoked as a site to be acted on for potential national renewal – achieving 
justice – but through the application of techniques of memory (prosecutions) that are 
specifically limited and constrained by present political interests (stability, peace, 
reconciliation). Notably, the appeals to sovereignty and national unity foreground the 
‘nation’ as the referential point and site for amelioration through the ECCC process, rather 
than, for example, adherence to internationalised human rights norms. Secondly, important 
irregularities are also visible here. The distinction made between the need for justice for 
‘the victims’ and the ‘entire Cambodian people’ points to gaps between the subjects to 
whom calls for justice and reconciliation are addressed. At the establishment of ECCC, 
divisions between formally recognised communities of victims (as civil parties or 
complainants) and informally addressed communities(constituting the wounded nation) 
were in play. This distinction continues to play an important role because, seven years later 
in 2013, constraints of time, funding problems and a lack of political impetus meant that 
the ECCC could not feasibly address the formal complaints of all potential victims of the KR. 
On this basis, the role of the ECCC as a mechanism that renews a ‘national’ collective 
memory has been foregrounded at the same time as it has been unable to satisfy the 
formal demands of all ‘individual’ victims.          
 
At the time of the establishment of the ECCC, statements made by the international and 
Cambodian court staff reflected the ‘narrow’ anchoring aims and conditions of the ECCC 
process as staked out by the RGC: that justice must be served, but not at the expense of 
reconciliation. The national and international judicial staff remarked in a joint statement: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Cambodia_3_Jul_06_Remarks_at_the_Reception_
Following_the_Swearing-In_of_National_and_International_Judicial_Officers.pdf 
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We wish to acknowledge above all the importance of these proceedings for the people 
of Cambodia… We recognise how important our work is in bringing justice to the 
Cambodian people for crimes committed almost thirty years ago in order to help to 
continue the process of ensuring social harmony.
19
  
 
Again, broad reference is made to ‘the Cambodian people’ as a subject category, in whose 
name justice must be delivered. This claim is again important because it references and 
invokes a collective, national memory of past political violence as the object and target of 
renewal following prosecutions. Furthermore, this statement also begins to show how the 
conceptualisation of justice and reconciliation varies between different stakeholders that 
are embedded within the ECCC process. Rather than positioning prosecutions as a threat to 
‘reconciliation’, as stressed by the RGC, the joint judicial staffs’ statement positions 
prosecution as a technique of memory that actually contributes to the ‘process of ensuring 
social harmony’: in other words, still supporting a claim that reconciliation is constituted by 
political stability, but placing the past as the site for its realisation, rather than as an 
impediment. In this sense, we can see that there are constraints on appeals for justice and 
reconciliation as memory claims, but we can equally see that each operates in contestable 
and negotiated ways, depending on the agents making them.              
 
ECCC and UN staff have propagated further ‘secondary’ or supplementary validations of the 
purported outcomes yielded by the ECCC process that implicate memory in the work of the 
court. The UN Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights (UNHCHR) has highlighted 
enhanced judicial capacity as a key ‘legacy’ of the ECCC because it can ‘act as a model court’ 
that could enhance the ‘rule of law’: 
 
                                                          
19 ‘Joint Statement by National and International Judicial Officers of the ECCC’, 25th 
November 2006. Available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/media/PRESSRELEASE_PLENARY_in_ENG_FREN
CH_.pdf  
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Although the primary aim of the ECCC is to provide Cambodians with a measure of 
justice for the suffering experienced during the Khmer Rouge era, a secondary and 
equally significant aim is for the court to act as a role model for Cambodia’s domestic 
courts. The ECCC can do so both through creating a ‘demonstration effect’ – by 
evincing the independence and impartiality of proceedings and the credibility of its 
process – as well as by actively engaging in programs that ensure the effective transfer 
of knowledge, skills and practices from the ECCC to the national legal sector. Broadly 
speaking, this is known as a hybrid tribunal’s legal and judicial ‘legacy’.20 
 
Notably, the UNHCHR explicitly differentiates between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ aims of 
the ECCC process. In effect, the emphasis placed on enhancing domestic judicial capacity 
and independence as a secondary outcome of the ECCC is not in itself neutral. In ascribing a 
capacity-building role to the ECCC – by virtue of international (i.e. hybrid) participation – 
the UNHCHR’s statement implies a domestic inability to conduct prosecutions properly. In 
the first instance, this shows again how the work of the ECCC is understood by different 
stakeholders involved in the process in different ways, i.e. as simply a dispensation of lex 
talionis, or a wider inculcation of human rights norms. Moreover, by positioning the 
Cambodian side as incapable of prosecuting proceedings transparently, the UNHCHR 
statement implies a supervisory and managerial relationship over Cambodia overseen by 
international agents (Hughes and Pupavac 2005), reflecting Said’s famous concern that the 
‘Orient’ is a political space that is constructed without agency, only ever subject to action 
and intervention by ‘the West’ (1995 [1978]).  
 
Other actors have proved more accomplished in negotiating the apparent opposition 
between international and domestic (state-sanctioned) imperatives that underpin 
                                                          
20 United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Supporting the 
Legacy of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’. Available at 
http://cambodia.ohchr.org/EN/PagesFiles/ECCC_legacy_program.htm  
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justifications for the ECCC. Speaking at a public forum event in 2007, Dr. Helen Jarvis,21 then 
the Chief of ECCC Public Affairs, again stressed that the principal goal of the ECCC was to 
‘give justice to Cambodian victims’, whilst noting that:  
 
We are working to prevent [these events] from happening again in Cambodian society 
and other countries in the world. We must record this story for the next generation to 
be clearly aware of what happened in Democratic Kampuchea. Also, we must think of 
establishment of the court and the roles of keeping peace, freedom, political stability, 
national consolidation and reconciliation, and the respect of principles of national 
democracy stipulated in the constitution of the United Nations.
22  
 
In connecting the prevention of the recurrence of ‘these’ events in Cambodia and ‘other 
countries’, Jarvis’ remarks attempt to link the ECCC process to a wider consolidation of 
internationalised human rights norms that demands punishment for the perpetration of 
atrocity as a means of deterring its recurrence. Indeed, we are reminded that transitional 
justice and international criminal justice are unified by the belief that deterrence is one of 
the key outcomes of prosecution (Cronin-Furman 2013). As this relates to memory, 
prosecutions (as techniques of remembering and denunciation) are situated as contributing 
                                                          
21 Jarvis’ position within this process is significant. Jarvis worked over a long period 
advocating prosecutions for senior KR figures in Cambodia, co-authoring a prominent text 
on the negotiations leading to the establishment of the ECCC (Fawthrop, T. and H. Jarvis 
(2004). Getting away with genocide? : elusive justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. 
London ; Ann Arbor, MI, Pluto Press.) Jarvis was then appointed as a senior member of the 
ECCC staff as Chief of Public Affairs. Notably, Jarvis has worked in the past as an advisor to 
the RGC and is believed to be sympathetic to RGC views on the ECCC process. Moreover, 
Jarvis’ subsequent appointment as head of the ECCC Victims Unit attracted criticism from 
civil society leaders because of the belief that her role as a government advisor presented a 
conflict of interest, and that a non-Cambodian would be unsuitable due to linguistic and 
cultural barriers (see Kong, S. (2009). "Head of Tribunal Victim Unit Under Fire."   Retrieved 
19/01/2012, 2012, from http://www.voanews.com/khmer-english/news/a-40-2009-06-09-
voa3-90170167.html.)  
22 Center for Social Development Public Forum on “Justice and National Reconciliation” at 
Parady Angkor Hotel, Seim Reap, 2nd March, 2007 
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to wider internationalised human rights imperatives for the prevention of genocide. 
Moreover, the capacity of the ECCC to deter the future perpetration of atrocity directly 
establishes a relationship between the past, present action and the future, implicating 
assumptions about the progressive, linear sequence of memory work. At the same time, 
haunting these comments, the RGC’s constraints are visible in the invocation of political 
stability as reconciliation. Jarvis’ remarks can be read as negotiating a position between the 
national community and human rights norms as referents for the court. It is these two 
referents that the ECCC is thought to act in the name of: human rights, on the one hand, 
and the integrity of the national community on the other.  
 
Importantly, Jarvis’ 2007 comments supplement the imperative to offer justice and 
maintain reconciliation by offering a further appeal for the ECCC to record an account of 
‘what happened’ during the KR regime. This is important because claims that the ECCC acts 
as a truth-seeking mechanism posit the court as able to consolidate and acknowledge 
public memory. As Koskenniemi has suggested, the sheer scope of the actions that fall 
under internationally categorised crimes means that trials to be ‘…less about judging a 
person than about establishing the truth of the events’ (2002: 3). The role of the ECCC in 
‘setting the record straight’ – implying an absent or distorted record, ‘truth’ or public 
memory – has increasingly been articulated as a key strategy for the court.23 This is 
important because its truth-seeking situates public memory as incomplete, ‘unresolved’, or 
unacknowledged without the ECCC. The positioning of public memory as a site that must be 
corrected is again here employed by the ECCC as a way of justifying the court as an 
intervention on the past.   
 
To summarise, the presentation of the ECCC has involved varied conceptualisations of what 
justice and reconciliation mean, differing according to the actors propagating them. On the 
one hand, this evidences the way that neither term has a self-evident meaning, but are 
                                                          
23 ECCC Poster campaign. Available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/publication/its-time-
record-be-set-straight  
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contingent, contestable and unresolved. In other words, the meaning of the terms justice 
and reconciliation emerges subject to power and they are therefore necessarily preferential 
in the way they construct memory. On the other, I have attempted to show the way in 
which the varied conceptualisations of justice and reconciliation do share a loose 
uniformity, or rules, defined around the scope of culpability for past human rights 
violations. This reflects the conditions of the RGC for the establishment of the ECCC and will 
be explored in further detail through an examination on the law establishing the court in 
the next section. Lastly, memory is invoked by these claims in important ways. Firstly, as is 
common across transitional justice (see Hamber and Wilson 2002), the ECCC is presented in 
a way that invokes and naturalises collective memory frameworks, specifically around the 
concept of the national community. As I have suggested, this poses problems for the way it 
assumes that the national community, as collective memory, has a uniform and passive 
relationship to past political violence. In the next section, I point out how this enacts 
tensions with the process of formal recognition of victims, which tends to narrow and at 
points individualise memories of suffering. 
 
 
 3.2 The objects and subjects of the courtroom 
 
“I was wondering, I’m not sure, I want to talk about the Pol Pot regime. I want the 
prosecutors to clarify whether… what do you mean by Khmer Rouge? From what time 
to what time?” 
 
(Resident of Battambang province) 
 
This section examines the formal parameters of the ECCC process: the legal frameworks 
that set the limits of memory work at the court; the key protagonists animated by these 
frameworks; and lastly, the events and agents that are omitted, ignored, or neglected by 
94 
 
these frameworks. I argue that this process is characterised by disclosure and concealment 
in the way in which the past is reconstructed.   
 
As noted in the preceding section, the ECCC is now the authoritative body from which, and 
around which, claims over the KR period are made. There exists a tension between the way 
the ECCC predetermines a stable and unified account of what happened and yet underpins 
a contested process of memory work. The first part of this section considers the way in 
which it works to predetermine what is remembered, in demarcating a particular 
timeframe for examining past violence and specifying particular criminal acts to prosecute 
therein. The ECCC law designates a narrow formal universe of ‘memorable’ events, calling 
attention to some pasts but not others. In this context, the law works as a technology of 
memory in an objectivising way because it seeks to define the parameters upon which a 
renewed collective memory can be stabilised. Moreover, as well as attempting to 
demarcate the outer limits of political action (and remembering), the law furnishes further 
‘rules’ around which memory can be contested in the courtroom. It is on this basis that the 
formal subjects of the ECCC – officially recognised victims and perpetrators, the ‘arbiters’ of 
the justice process – are animated and licensed. However, and as I will suggest in the final 
section of this chapter, the contestation of the ‘rules’ and ‘scripts’ of the ECCC reveal 
important limitations in the ability of political trials to stabilise any account of the past. 
 
Who and what to remember? 
 
In the first instance, the ECCC was meant to code specific memories as acts of criminality 
through the Cambodian 1956 Penal Code, ascribing memory meaning by binding it to 
criminal law:24 
                                                          
24 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments 
as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006), Article 3 
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• Homicide (Article 501, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507 and 508)  
• Torture (Article 500)  
• Religious Persecution (Articles 209 and 210)  
 
The incorporation and use of existing domestic law was meant to be a key feature of the 
‘hybrid’ composition of the ECCC. Notably, however, the application of domestic law could 
not be agreed for Case 001 and no domestic charges were levelled in Case 002/01. The 
possible application of domestic law in in further cases is unclear. The ECCC is more visibly 
faithful to the heritage (and influences) of precedent international tribunals such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda in the international law at work in its prosecutions. This includes the ‘classic’ 
international prosecutions as outlined in the ECCC law:25 Article 4 specifies the power to 
prosecute genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations Genocide Conevtnion; Article 5 
specifies the power to prosecute crimes against humanity; Article 6 specifies the power to 
prosecute crimes that fall under grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Article 
7 specifies the power to prosecute the crime of the destruction of cultural property during 
armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention for Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict; lastly, Article 8 specifies the power to prosecute crimes 
against internationally protected persons pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.  
 
The invocation of such bodies of law consolidates a field of objects which represent a field 
of memorable events (or the content of a regime of memory). Moreover, the ECCC’s 
employment of international criminal categories serves to ‘code’ memory as meaningful 
with important consequences. In the first instance, it situates the events of 1975-1979 
                                                          
25 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments 
as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006).  
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within universal categories of human rights violation. This is important because these 
categories carry the additional weight of memories of past internationally-recognised 
experiences of political violence (Levy and Sznaider 2010: 14). In this sense, human rights 
legal frameworks help to reconstitute the meaning of memories of suffering. At the same 
time, as outlined in the preceding section on the justifications for the ECCC, we can see that 
the ‘target’ of intervention by the ECCC process is the renewal of the national community 
and its collective memory.  
 
The mandate of the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC represents the main constraint 
as to what the Cambodian state has sanctioned as permissibly ‘memorable’. This is crucial 
because it is a form of both disclosure and concealment (and it provides the terrain in which 
further processes of disclosure and concealment can occur within the courtroom).  The Law 
on the Establishment of the ECCC must therefore be understood as a bid to contain the 
trials because it follows directly as a condition of the RGC for the establishment of the 
tribunal in the first place. The ECCC law, in this sense, seeks to fix and stabilise memory in 
narrowing the account of the past examined by the court (but, as I will argue, is not entirely 
successful to this end):   
 
The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and 
those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian 
penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions 
recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 
6 January 1979.
26
 
 
                                                          
26 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments 
as promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). Articles 1 and 2 
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During preliminary investigations into the feasibility of a trial for KR figures, the UN initially 
envisaged a prosecution of up to twenty five former KR leaders.27 Against this, the RGC (as 
visible in their heavily caveated justifications for the ECCC outlined in the first section) has 
consistently opposed prosecutions beyond the five figures indicted between 2006 and 
2010: these focus on the role of Duch, the head of the former S-21 security centre as the 
focus of case 001, and the former ‘senior leaders’, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, 
comprising those charged under case 002. As noted, the justification for the restriction of 
prosecutions to senior figures only is made on the basis of maintaining stability and 
reconciliation. Reconciliation, in this iteration, acts as both a constraint over what can be 
remembered and a purported outcome of the court process. It is both dependent on and 
purportedly endangered by the ECCC’s prosecutions (as acts of remembering), because it 
hinges on a narrow reconstruction of the past around the actions of a small field of persons. 
Moreover, it frames both processes of disclosure and concealment within the courtroom. 
One important consequence of this restriction is that the culpability of lower-level KR 
figures is, in the first instance, left unexplained by the ECCC, and the restriction of the 
prosecutions can be read to enact a de facto amnesty in this regard. This represents an 
important technology of memory in the way it recasts the actions of lower-level 
perpetrators as exculpable. 
 
The ECCC should be re-situated again here in the context of Cambodia’s history since the 
fall of the KR, because the narrow restriction of blame to only a handful of KR leaders has 
been the defining characteristic of the way the Cambodian state has narrated KR history 
since 1979. This is important to note because it evidences the Cambodian government’s 
longstanding interest in protecting lower- and mid-level KR by winnowing and personalising 
the framing of responsibility for DK. There is an important parallel with the 1979 People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) manifest in this restriction of culpability at the ECCC. In 1979, 
the Cambodian state justified retributive action against only a handful of KR leaders – the 
‘Pol Pot Ieng Sary clique’ – in the name of maintaining stability and facilitating national 
                                                          
27 Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly 
resolution 52/135, 1999. 
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reconciliation. Similar ‘international’ crimes were prosecuted, including genocide and 
crimes against humanity and then, as now, the trials attracted criticism from international 
groups as illegitimate predetermined ‘show trials’ due to perceived state interference and 
control. Gottesman explains that in 1979 the newly founded PRK had an interest in offering 
public redress for the atrocities perpetrated under DK as a means of cleanly demarcating a 
new era of government and symbolically discharging the popular anger against the KR 
regime (2002: chapter three). At the same time, while anxious and divided on whether to 
re-integrate (lower-level) KR holding ‘blood debts’, the PRK needed to find strategies for co-
opting lower-level KR as a means of consolidating domestic control and eroding the fighting 
strength of the resistance. In this sense, blame for crimes perpetrated during the KR period 
established at the PRT neatly matches that enacted at the ECCC: a personalised and 
individualised story of the guilt of the few rather than the many emerged, eliding the moral 
status of mid- and lower-level KR. This de facto amnesty (a key technology of memory by 
omission) has remained a crucial component in state attempts to narrate the past: on the 
one hand, it was established immediately by the Cambodian state in the aftermath of the 
KR and, on the other, it is visible in the RGC’s conditions for the establishment of the ECCC. 
The RGC’s interest in restricting prosecutions is bound to a longstanding reading  of blame 
that has been ‘reactivated’ at the ECCC (see  Foucault 1991a: 60).  
 
The narrow remit for prosecutions at the ECCC also reflects a wider tendency to 
individualise proceedings at international legal tribunals. This reflects the way that law, as a 
discursive system, is preoccupied with an understanding of individual rational 
responsibility, rather than considering, for example, wider socio-political histories. 
Moreover, as Koskenniemi suggests, the tendency to individualise prosecutions (because of 
expediency, logistics and/or politics) is not neutral in its effects (2002). In the broadest 
sense, because international law is predicated on a universal imperative that all 
perpetrators of human rights violations be punished, restricted prosecutions reduce 
attempts to provide ‘justice’ to a symbolic level. This is specifically visible in the Law on the 
Establishment of the ECCC (Chapter VIII ‘Individual Responsibility’) that specifically locates 
the adjudicative and fact-finding process as directed toward establishing ‘individual’ 
responsibility. Moreover, a wider legal tendency that situates individual agents as rational 
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actors, with particular intentions and ‘free will’, is the liberal ideology underpinning the 
logistics of punishment and its institutionalisation in and by liberal democracies which 
obfuscates wider contexts and meanings that are integral to the understanding of the 
events at hand and the reconstruction of a coherent public ‘memory’ (Koskenniemi 2002: 
13-14). In this sense, one unintended consequence of the attempts to delimit what is and is 
not counted as ‘memorable’ is that legal defence teams in political trials reach to wider 
historical contexts in order to contest the legitimacy of trials as arbiters of memory and 
truth. I return to how this generates strategies of ‘rupture’ and ‘denial’ – contesting the 
possibilities of a consensual account of political violence – in the final section, though 
notable examples include the defence appealing to periods of political violence beyond the 
mandate of the ECCC such as the 1970s US bombing campaigns, or the role of current 
leading political figures (who have refused calls to participate at the ECCC) during the KR 
years.      
 
The invocation of wider histories by defence teams, beyond the limited mandate of the 
ECCC, is important because the RGC and UN deliberately framed the temporal jurisdiction 
to avoid scrutiny of periods that implicate other powerful state actors in the perpetration of 
human rights violations. More broadly, the history of international law (and international 
tribunals in particular) is characterised by powerful states specifically suspending their own 
regulation by law (Bartholomew 2006). Specifically in regard to the Cambodian case, the 
temporal jurisdiction neatly circumscribes the dates of the DK regime’s existence (1975-
1979). As such, actions that may fall under the criminal categories employed by the ECCC 
(outlined above) but occurring beyond this period are omitted from consideration, despite 
the imperative to punish all perpetrators of human rights abuses (as a purported 
universality). Commentators have pointed to serious violations of human rights both before 
and after the 1975-1979 period as examples: in the context of the protracted Indochina 
conflicts, pogroms against intellectuals and Vietnamese by subsequent royalist and republic 
regimes constitute serious violations of human rights (Kiernan 2002b); the US carpet 
bombing campaigns launched over Cambodia in the context of the Vietnam War are 
believed to have killed 600,000 (Kiljunen 1984), acting as a key contributory factor to the 
growth of the KR insurgency (Kiernan 1996) and constituting a prima facie case of war 
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crimes (Barrett 2000; Kiernan and Owen 2006); moreover, systemic abuses of human rights 
by the PRK successor regime throughout the 1980s has been suggested to constitute crimes 
against humanity (Etcheson 2005) and the Khmer Rouge continued to perpetrate atrocities 
against ethnic minorities and civilian groups into the 1990s (Fawthrop and Jarvis 2004). In 
sum, the ECCC is notable as a site of memory-making in the extent to which it conceals as 
much as discloses. 
 
The personal jurisdiction of the ECCC is restricted to senior leaders and the most 
responsible figures only. Alongside the delimitation of the ECCC temporal jurisdiction to 
1975-1979, the containment of the personal jurisdiction narrows the reconstruction of a 
field of criminal actions, or objects of memory. These constraints represent the main 
determinants over the construction of who may be considered ‘perpetrators’. The reverse 
of these constraints is the foreclosure of the field of formal victims eligible for 
representation within the ECCC process (in contrast to the more vague renewal of the 
national community illustrated in the first section). In this sense, we must understand the 
ECCC trials as fundamentally politicised sites of memory-making because they enact a series 
of thorny inclusions and exclusions as to who and what they can acknowledge and punish. 
Moreover, one notable implication of the containment of the ECCC prosecutions is a 
contradiction of process and presentation. The ECCC must be presented as a deliberative 
and unresolved exercise at the same time as serious constraints act on its possible 
outcomes: it must be deliberative because it purports to enhance the rule of law and act as 
an agent of democratisation; it must be contained because the political interests that 
sanctioned its existence dictate so; and yet it must also deliver justice and civic repair, 
outcomes purported to follow from both deliberation and containment. Jacques Verges has 
noted that for political trials to fail to account, reckon or condemn is a failure of the 
intended process of national renewal: “Louis cannot be judged; either he is already 
condemned or the Republic is not acquitted’ (1968: 97-99). At the same time, the ECCC 
must be presented as the neutral application of the legal process in order to fulfil its 
credentials as a progressive agent of democratisation. Addressing this tension, 
Christodoulidis suggests, “What becomes possible… is not just the containment of the trial 
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but also the redemption of that containment through democratic categories. Containment 
and justification stand and fall together” (2009: 132). 
 
The narrow mandate of the ECCC can be read as a means of predetermining its legal 
outcomes for present political purposes, i.e. gesturing to the qualification for what 
constitutes a ‘show trial’ (Findlay 1989; Osiel 1997; Peterson 2007). The role of the 
‘suspect’/‘perpetrator’ is the key site for the work of the court. In this sense, the 
‘suspect’/’perpetrator’ acts as both an object and subject of governance within the 
courtroom. On the one hand, the court mechanism is necessarily geared to the punishment 
of the guilty party as its object or target, the prime technology of memory at play in a 
retributive intervention on the past. On the other, as I show in the latter section on the 
contestation of memory at the ECCC, the ‘suspect’/’perpetrator’ is allowed only limited 
degrees of strategy available within this process: they may acquiesce to the legitimacy of 
the court process and confess (as did Duch during case 001), they may seek exculpation on 
the terms of the trial employing strategies of ‘connivance’ or ‘denial’ (Cohen 2001), or they 
may employ strategies of ‘rupture’, resisting and disrupting the legitimacy of the court 
process itself by contesting the terms of the past that are grounding the legal process. In 
the last section of this chapter, I will return to discuss the ‘suspect’/‘perpetrator’ and the 
varying scripts to which they can seek recourse. 
        
The implications of the ECCC law for framing memory are significant. The formal 
jurisdictions of the ECCC demarcate claims over the contours of what can and cannot be 
remembered. In this sense, they present bids to ‘limit’ the contours and ‘rules’ of what is 
permissibly memorable at the ECCC (but, as I will show, this does not neatly translate into 
an uncontested process, or the determination of a stable ‘collective memory’). The 
mandate of the ECCC presents the parameters of a ‘regime of memory’ both inside and 
‘outside’ the courtroom, and the content of that regime of memory is furnished by the 
‘objects’ of discourse as memory, i.e. specific criminal categories of knowledge. Crucially, 
this must be understood as a form of practice that involves the designation of events as 
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meaningful in different ways by different actors. We must therefore understand the ECCC 
as anchoring a contestable, negotiated process of memory-making (Foucault 2002: 35).  
 
Victims and civil parties  
  
The location of the ECCC within Cambodia has been suggested to present a prime 
opportunity for engagement with the victims of the KR. This poses serious implications for 
memory in the way it enacts an inconsistent politics of acknowledgement. Cockayne has 
described the ECCC as a ‘degradation’ and ‘denouncement ceremony’ that can ‘restore’ 
victims by virtue of their proximity to the trial proceedings (2005). Moreover, the ECCC 
mechanism allows for the formal recognition of victims as ‘civil parties’, providing ‘unique’ 
and ‘unprecedented’ roles for victim participation within trial proceedings (Bair 2008), and 
the possibilities of ‘collective and moral reparation’.28 McGonigle has suggested that the 
level of participatory rights allowed for victims represents a combination of ‘retributive’ and 
‘restorative’ imperatives, and that the ECCC should be understood (on this basis) as a ‘quasi 
truth commission’ (2009: 129). This section examines the question of how ‘victims’ are 
formally recognised and constructed, how their participatory rights within the ECCC are 
endowed on that basis, and some of the notable omissions and irregularities that have 
occurred within this process. This has serious consequences for the construction of memory 
because it implicates an uneven politics of acknowledgement over whose shared memories 
are recognised and whose are ignored.   
 
The ECCC allows scope for any person who suffered under the DK regime to file complaints 
to the Co-Prosecutors, who may use the information detailed within their investigations. 
The ECCC Internal Rules, however, further enact and specify the category of ‘Civil Party’ 
                                                          
28 Internal Rules (Rev.8), 3 August 2011, Rule 23. 1 b) ‘General Principles of Victims 
Participation as Civil Parties’  
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through which victims may seek formal recognition by the ECCC, participate within court 
proceedings, and seek collective and moral reparations.  
 
“In order for Civil Party action to be admissible, the Civil Party applicant shall:  
 
a) be clearly identified; and  
 
b) demonstrate as a direct consequence of at least one of the crimes alleged against the 
Charged Person, that he or she has in fact suffered physical, material or psychological injury 
upon which a claim of collective and moral reparation might be based.”
29
   
 
The distinction between complainants (as victims in a loose sense) and formally recognised 
civil parties (as those who are entitled to reparation) represents the first important 
inconsistency within the official category of victimhood because it enacts a hierarchy of 
entitlements based on the demonstration of suffering. Moreover, on the one hand we see 
how the ECCC identifies a narrow universe of formally acknowledged victims whilst, on the 
other, the appeals for the work of the ECCC outlined in the first section of this chapter 
operate in the name of renewing a national community and national memory that is meant 
to be inclusive and equitable in its treatment of the past for all Cambodians. 
 
The ‘clearly identified’ victims’ ability to ‘demonstrate’ their injury is assessed, in the first 
instance, by the Co-Investigating Judges during the investigative stages of ECCC 
proceedings. Immediately prior to a case closing order, indicating the start of trial 
proceedings or the case dismissal, Co-Investigating Judges rule on the final admissibility of 
civil party applications. Under initial formulations, the ECCC’s internal rules prescribed civil 
parties with a range of participatory rights, broadly on par with the defence and 
                                                          
29 Internal Rules (Rev.8), 3 August 2011, Rule 23 bis. 1. ‘Application and admission of Civil 
Parties’ 
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prosecution. These rights included access to case files, the right to address the pre-trial and 
trial chambers and, as an outcome of guilty verdicts, the right to collective and moral 
reparations. However, following delays and procedural teething problems during early 
proceedings, the rights of civil parties were increasingly curtailed (Chy 2008) and the 
internal rules subsequently reformulated to provide a far narrower role. In particular, the 
rights of civil parties to address the court chambers were significantly reduced, arguably 
subordinating the key participatory role of ‘victims’ within the legal process, a key ‘selling 
point’ of the court. The final section of this chapter examines several examples among the 
15 victim testimonials [selected from 3850 recognised civil parties] heard during case 002.          
 
Civil party applications accepted to a case, i.e. those able to prove injury resulting from a 
link to the criminal proceedings, have been amalgamated into broader ‘Victims 
Associations’ before trial proceedings commenced. The collectivisation of victim groups is 
determined by the particular types of harm suffered. This process is overseen by the ECCC 
‘Victims Support Section’ (VSS, formerly the Victims Unit). This process has serious 
consequences for the reframing of memory and bridging the ‘individual’ and ‘national’ 
memory work of the court because the specificities of individual memories of suffering are 
recast, obfuscated and defined by collectivised frameworks. The VSS further coordinates 
victim support, witness protection and access to civil party lawyers, though much of this 
work has occurred in conjunction with advocacy and civil society groups. For example, in 
the investigative stages of both cases 001 and 002, the CSD appealed for the recognition of 
a collective ‘orphans class’ association (the unifying, shared harm being the loss of both 
parents under the KR). This example is notable because it reflects the way that civil society 
groups have been key in acting to collectivise victim groups: the emergence and 
formalisation of the specific category of victim occurred through the collection and 
processing of ‘orphans class’ complaints, in the first instance, filtered through and led by 
CSD, before then being passed on to the ECCC. The agents constructing the category of 
victim – as a memory framework – are, in this instance, actively furnishing and 
renegotiating memory within the frameworks afforded by the ECCC law. Similar collective 
arrangements have been sponsored by ‘intermediary’ civil society groups including the DC-
Cam, the Cambodia Defenders Project, the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights, the Khmer 
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Institute for Democracy and the Cambodian Human Rights & Development Association. 
These groups have been active in soliciting complaints on behalf of various civil party 
collectivities. Beyond the ‘orphans class’, these include: victims of S-21 (Tuol Sleng), victims 
of forced marriage, victims of forced labour, victims of torture, and victims of gender-based 
and sexual crimes, amongst others. The elicitation, compilation and filing of complaints and 
civil party applications through intermediary organisations is striking for a further reason. It 
shows that there is a field of actors negotiating the interplays between the ECCC, the ‘state’ 
(as a purportedly determining force over memory) and a universe of (‘pre-existing’) victims. 
In other words, civil society organisations are active in renegotiating the interface between 
the ECCC and the public. At the same time, they are legitimated in doing so through 
particular agendas toward the past: as I will show in the following chapter, ‘Mediating 
Memory’, organisations active in the construction of victim groups rationalise their work 
through specific techniques of memory and of knowing victims’ suffering, such as the 
trauma paradigm and its concomitant medicalisation of memory.  
 
Two further sets of issues are pertinent here: the contingency of the specific civil parties 
animated by the ECCC and the negotiated process through which they are recognised. It is 
important to note that victims groups are not afforded equal access or recognition by the 
ECCC. This means that the ECCC is uneven in the acknowledgement of their memory claims 
to suffering. In the first instance, we can point to groups that have not been formally 
recognised by the ECCC. For example, Khmer Krom applications for civil party 
representation (an ethnic minority group resident of the Mekong delta regions of Cambodia 
and Vietnam) are instructive of these inconsistencies because the ECCC has rejected the 
legitimacy of their applications. According to Mohan: 
 
The Khmer Krom’s conspicuous absence from the legal record stems, in part, from a 
presumption amongst ECCC affiliates that the average Khmer Krom victim living in 
Cambodia’s rural provinces is not concerned about the legal characterization of the 
mass crimes they suffered. (Mohan 2008: 45) 
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Mohan’s comments point to the contested process through which victim groups are 
constructed. This is another important example of disclosure and concealment in the way 
that memories are acknowledged. Mohan’s research suggests that the deliberative process 
over the eligibility of civil parties is not ‘neutral’, and further, the effect of the omission of 
the Khmer Krom is the construction of a category of legal ‘unperson’. This again contrasts 
sharply with the wider framing construction of a wounded national community discussed in 
the first section of this chapter and implies that groups omitted from the court process are 
either unworthy or not part of the national account of past political violence.  
 
To summarise, we can see that the recognition of formal victims within the ECCC process is 
a negotiated, constructed and, at points, contested process. The universe of formal victims 
animated by the court is contingent on the events that the court recognises as criminal. The 
effects of this process are powerful: there exists a hierarchy of entitlements and 
acknowledgement rooted in the recognition of civil parties, and as exemplified by the 
Khmer Krom omission, to reject the legitimacy of a claim is necessarily an act that denies 
(the validity or worthiness of) particular groups’ memories. This is dangerous because it 
potentially inflicts a secondary violence on memory. Finally, to reiterate, the narrow 
universe of formally recognised civil parties presents an important irregularity between the 
victims within and outside of the courtroom: the ECCC is validated as an intervention in the 
name of a wounded nation but the politics of formal acknowledgement within the court 
process shows us that not all members of the national community are afforded the same 
entitlements within this endeavour. 
 
3.3 Memory work at the ECCC    
 
This section identifies some of the prevailing ‘scripts’ that have been deployed within the 
courtroom in order to reflect on how the court works as a site of memory-making in closer 
detail. It should be stressed again that memory is invoked specifically within the courtroom 
in complex and varied ways. For example, probing the ‘reliability’ of memories, hearing 
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accounts of victims suffering, and examining artefacts of memory that are thought to 
disclose knowledge of the past, such as order papers, meeting minutes, or propaganda 
texts. Crucially, the first purpose of the trial as a (deliberative) spectacle is the adjudication 
of the guilt or innocence of suspects. It therefore either vindicates or denounces past 
actions, reframing memory under new moral terms. Moreover, the arrival at (and reception 
of) such adjudications is a contested process, gesturing to the way in which the courtroom 
can act as a crucible for competing memories. In this section I firstly identify specific 
patterns, or ‘scripts’, evident in prosecutorial and victim statements within the courtroom, 
locating memory claims that are registered on the basis of their ‘reliability’ or their 
‘theatre’. I then examine how defence teams have contested these memory claims, 
focusing in particular on strategies of ‘acquiescence’, ‘denial’ and ‘rupture’. Lastly, I 
examine examples of how the outcomes of the court process can be ‘unscripted’, and the 
way they can be received by stakeholders – specifically civil parties – in problematic ways. 
The aim of this section is to examine how disclosure and concealment operate in their 
minutiae, but also how the process of memory work within the courtroom generates 
unexpected and unforeseen outcomes and resistances that challenge the containment of 
the ECCC process.  
 
The Prosecution 
 
Lynch and Bogen explain that the basic discursive structure of a trial process is a ‘question’ 
and ‘answer’ format; this is necessarily contested according to adversarial positioning of 
accusatory and defendant subjects, and their various accounts of past events (1996: 130). 
In this sense, we can see one characteristic of the way memory is reconstructed within the 
courtroom: competing claims over the past that are located on ‘factual’ registers of legal 
truth. Importantly, these claims are structured within and around the mandate of the ECCC. 
There are several useful examples from the ECCC proceedings that illustrate this. The 
prosecutorial strategy against Duch in case 001, running through 2009 and 2010, 
emphasised his role as a ‘most responsible’ figure within the perpetration of atrocity at the 
S-21 site, utilising documentary evidence such as confessions extracted from prisoners, and 
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the testimony of his subordinates and the survivors of the centre. The prosecutorial 
strategy during case 002 has been characterised by attempts to prove or refute – again, a 
specific genre of memory claim – the roles of ‘senior leaders’ on the basis of their position 
and authority within the DK command structure. For example, substantive hearings against 
Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan have seen the prosecution attempting to corroborate and 
‘triangulate’ proof between documents such as civil party testimony on ‘self-criticism’30 (as 
a mode of ‘confession’ encouraged by the leadership), reports from lower-level KR to the 
leadership outlining the ‘situation of internal enemy’31, and communications between 
districts and Angkar (command) on the policy of ‘smashing enemies’ (members of the 
former regime)32. Together, these submissions were intended to evidence eliminatory 
intent and/or complicity on the behalf of the accused. As such they characterise a central 
genre of memory claim at work at tribunals: that knowledge of the past, as a set of 
memories and artefacts, can be objectively reproduced as a set of unequivocal facts. This is 
pivotal to the way trials seek to authorise a renewed collective memory of past political 
violence because of the assumption that the past can be disinterred, definitively resolved, 
and placed on record.      
 
 
 
Victims 
 
A second genre of memory claim that has been particularly notable within the prosecutorial 
strategy at the ECCC is victim testimony. A number of victims have been afforded the 
                                                          
30 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 26 June 2013 (pg. 
72) 
31 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 26 June 2013 (pg. 
17) 
32 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 26 June 2013 (pg. 8) 
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opportunity to testify within the courtroom (termed ‘Victim Impact Hearings’) on the basis 
of the participatory role afforded to civil parties at the ECCC. As the ECCC has declared, 
“over the last two weeks of trial hearings, 15 victims [out of 3,866] who are participating in 
Case 002 as Civil Parties provided emotional testimonies about the harm they suffered 
personally during and in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime”33. These types of 
memory claim are endowed with authority on the basis of an ‘emotive’ rather than ‘factual’ 
register. In this sense, their participation and role within the process is authorised by 
emphasising the severity of the harm they have suffered as an expressive and performative 
gesture. This works in contrast to interchanges over the authenticity or factual truth of 
particular documents or testimonies, which have been frequently curtailed on the basis of 
evidential relevance, i.e. the extent to which they conform to registers of ‘proof’. 
Moreover, it should be stressed again that under the terms of civil party participation, 
victims are obliged to evidence the harm they have suffered (to not do so contradicts their 
formal status as civil parties), further retelling their experiences as a form of spectacle of 
remembering. To this extent, victim testimony has tended to take on specific temporal 
structures and formats that include (and move through) general descriptions of routine 
suffering, specific instances of loss, enduring effects and harms, and appeals for redress. In 
this sense, the process of remembering – of pressing a memory claim – has a particular 
linear format. One example from the hearings on 22nd October 2012 is useful in illustrating 
this point. Yim Sovann’s testimony opens by locating itself as an ‘expression of suffering’:34     
 
I thank you very much Mr President and Your Honours, for allowing me this 
opportunity to read out my expression of suffering. From 1975 to 1976, I was 
mistreated. I was accused of being a 17 of April Person. Although I was falling sick, I 
was still forced to work. I was very young at that time. I worked at cooperatives; the 
cooperatives that I had been working after I had been evacuated by Phnom Penh... As 
                                                          
33 ECCC Blog, ‘The purpose of hearing victims’ suffering’, 7th June 2013. Available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/blog/2013/06/07/purpose-hearing-victims-suffering  
34 Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 22 October 2012 
(pp. 18-22)  
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one of the 17 People (sic), I was accused by the Base People as an enemy. I did not 
have enough to eat. I started to pick some grains of corns, and with that I was accused 
of being an enemy... When I was at home, I was accused of being too liberal. And every 
now and -- every time I recall the moment, I am traumatized, and I am always shocked 
to recollect the events, the times when I were forced to work days and nights. I am a 
good person; I was forcing myself to commit some petty crimes by stealing to survive.  
 
…They gave me only very little food. And at one point, before the second phase of 
evacuation, I said to myself, if I was not allowed to go and see my parents, I would die 
anyway. And I lost everything. I lost my properties, cattle, and the farmland.  
 
The opening of Yim’s statement offers a general portrayal of hunger and exclusion. 
Memory, here, operates in a way that furnishes a broad and contextual depiction of 
injustice; Yim’s sense of shock and mistreatment at the hands of the KR is bound to her 
categorisation as an ‘enemy’ and ‘criminal’. Moreover, the enduring impact of suffering is 
invoked specifically through the vocabulary of trauma.35  Yim’s testimony here, in the act of 
remembering, establishes a specific relation between memories of loss and suffering in the 
present. Memory is thus visible in two ways: as a performative act of remembrance, or 
recollection and retelling (by the subject); and, through the invocation of trauma, as a set of 
references, frames and descriptors for the state of memory (as an object of knowledge). 
Yim follows this by detailing a particular incident of loss: 
 
When I saw my father being arrested and his hands being tied up by the Khmer Rouge 
militia, I was shocked and traumatized and I could feel the pain.  
 
                                                          
35 The invocation of trauma concepts is notable here because the medical implications of 
the term do not translate neatly into a pre-existing set of terms in the Khmer language.    
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The specific incident detailed emphasises the personal dimensions of loss and suffering (as 
distinct from the broader references to the systemic and generalised suffering of the 
period), a key criteria for recognition by the ECCC as a civil party. Yim’s testimony then 
shifts to the present, where broader societal maladies in the present are linked to the KR 
period: 
 
I have been living in the society where I have had a lot of suffering. I have not been 
well educated. I have faced difficulties and all of the bad things that happened to me. I 
have been deprived of all my education, the dreams that I would like to be highly 
educated. But these dreams were destroyed by the darkest period of the Khmer 
Rouge.  
 
Lastly, an appeal is made for the ECCC to rectify this past:  
 
And before my appearance before this Court, I did not ever imagine that I would be 
given such opportunity… I am grateful to this Court and I hope that you find justice 
both for me and for the Cambodian people -- that is, those victims and civil parties.  
 
Here we can see that a vital connection is established between past suffering, present 
suffering and the ECCC as a remedial mechanism, through a specific, linear sequence of 
memory claims: there are memories of past suffering bound to present states of malady; 
these can be rectified by the ECCC as the appropriate moral agent for their amelioration. 
This is an important sequence to take because it shows how agents within the courtroom 
conform to and reproduce the overarching progressive schemas that validate the ECCC, as 
outlined in the first section about the level of detail.  
 
There are notable tensions within this process. On the one hand, victim testimony has been 
crucial for the presentation of the ECCC as a retributive mechanism that is more sensitive 
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toward the needs of its constituents. On the other, there have been occasions where 
testimony has appeared to exceed the limits of the scripts afforded to victims. On one 
occasion, a speaker had their microphone silenced, and on another, a civil party was 
explicitly told to ‘keep grief concise’ (Freeman 2012). Silencing victim testimony appears at 
odds with the restorative ambit of the ECCC, and further points to the way in which 
proceedings in the courtroom are ‘contained’ in accordance with preferred scripts.  
 
Strategies of the accused 
 
The defence teams at the ECCC have conventionally sought to undermine the prosecution 
on the basis of the credibility of its evidence. Although this is a truism within the criminal 
legal process, it has consequences when considered as a technique of memory work. For 
example, archival documents held by DC-Cam have been called into question on the basis 
of the partiality of the stewards of the repository: defence lawyers specifically probed DC-
Cam Director Youk Chhang on whether the organisation was acting in the capacity of 
human rights advocacy or of ‘neutral’ documentation,36 illustrating the way in which 
artefacts of memory (as evidence) are themselves bound to specific histories of 
conservation and preservation. This again further implicates the way in which frames of 
representation, or ‘knowing’, tend to be bound to appeals for action within the production 
of knowledge on human rights problems (Moon 2012a). In a similar vein, the testimony and 
research of expert witnesses such as Philip Shaw37 (Pol Pot’s biographer) or David 
Chandler38 (a historian of Cambodia) have been attacked on the basis of their academic 
credibility, or their ‘poetic license’, attempting to undermine their ‘validity’. Moreover, 
memory is further invoked in the way that more performative acts of remembrance are 
                                                          
36 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 2 February 2012 
(Pg. 83)  
37 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, May 8th 2013 
38 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 23 July 2012  (Pp. 
139-140) 
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contested. For example, the memory of witness Sao Sarun was specifically challenged as 
unreliable.39 Again, this implicates the way that the trial process is presented as a means of 
stabilising an objective and unequivocal account of the past. By contesting the credibility of 
the prosecution’s claims, the defence attempts to refute the substance – or ‘story’ – of the 
way in which the prosecutorial strategy seeks to stabilise an objective account of the past. 
At the same time, it is important to note that it does so on the terms offered by the trial, 
i.e. through refuting or corroborating proof and evidence. As a form of memory work, this 
constitutes the trial as deliberative exercise, on the basis of which the trial is bound to 
broader progressive agendas underpinning the ECCC as an exercise that is meant to 
establish the rule of law and promote democratisation.  
 
Two further, more complex strategies are afforded to defence teams in the way that 
memory is contested: firstly, again on the terms offered by the trial, by acquiescing to or 
denying the memory claims of the prosecution; and secondly, by contesting the legitimacy 
of the trial as an adjudicative exercise, or through strategies of ‘rupture’. The substantive 
hearing against Duch in case 001, and Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan in case 002 provide 
useful, mixed examples in these regards.  
  
The case against Duch  principally focused on his role at the S-21 interrogation centre. 
Duch’s contribution to the proceedings was notable for his public displays of remorse, 
admittance, and inculpation. At the same time, Duch’s gestures of contrition tended to be 
                                                          
39 One interesting example of ‘memory work’ within legal proceedings is offered by the 
appearance of Sao Sarun as a witness for the prosecution. Throughout proceedings, Sao 
Sarun confessed to problems of ‘recollection’, as the prosecution sought to corroborate 
proof of conversations implicating the accused in plans to purge Vietnamese minorities 
within Cambodia. As the defence counsel pointed out, to probe a witness by presupposing 
the existence and nature of such conversations can be objected to as a ‘leading question’, 
or, in other words, a memory cue or invitation. Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 6 June 2012  (pp. 35-36)    
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balanced against his accounts of hierarchy and blame within the KR apparatus, locating 
responsibility firmly at the hands of ‘senior leaders’:  
 
One, I would like to give analysis on the crimes across the country from the 17th of 
April 1975 to 6th of January 1979. After the 17th of April 1975, Pol Pot was wild... 
Mainly, Pol Pot had thousands of candidates in his hands. The crimes in that period 
was huge. In addition, the loss of life of the people is calculated as equal to one million 
people, and as a member of the CPK [Communist Party of Kampuchea] I recognise that 
I am responsible mentally for the crimes committed by the CPK in those periods of 
time. I would like to express my regretfulness and my heartfelt sorrow and loss for all 
the crimes committed by the CPK from 1975 to 1979. I would like to express separately 
about the crimes at S-21. I would like to acknowledge my responsibility through legal 
means, legally. I mean, I would like to emphasize that I am responsible for the crimes 
committed at S-21, especially the tortures and execution of the people there.
40
  
 
This statement is notable for several reasons. Firstly, it is an example of one of a range of 
Duch’s statements compiled by the ECCC as a form of ‘moral and symbolic’ reparation for 
victims.41 Secondly, the statement is notable because of the way it acquiesces neatly to the 
terms of the ECCC law: Duch accepts his role and responsibility for the killings perpetrated 
at S-21, yet locates blame for nationwide atrocities to the ‘wild’ Pol Pot (or leadership). In 
this sense, thirdly, we can see that Duch’s bid to reframe memories of his role during the KR 
involve claims that both inculpate and downplay his actions. This ambivalence is important 
as a form of memory work because it was deployed as a bid to cooperate with the ECCC 
and garner a reduction in the severity of his sentence. As a caveat, it is important to note 
that Duch reneged on the key tenets of his admissions – that he was a ‘most responsible 
                                                          
40 Transcript of Trial Proceedings ‘The Duch Trial’ Case File Nº 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC31, 
March 2009 0903H (pg. 67)  
41 ‘Compilation of statements of apology made by Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch during the 
proceedings’ available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/publications/Case001Apology_En_low_res.pdf  
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figure’ – during his closing statement, and I return to Duch’s change of strategy as an 
example of the unanticipated outcomes of the ECCC in the final section of this chapter.   
 
In situating his own role as a ‘subordinate’ within the KR hierarchy, aspects of Duch’s 
memory claims can be read as an example of (discursive) ‘denial’ at work.42 Cohen has 
suggested that the ‘discourse of official denial’ is characterised by three tendencies (2001: 
101): ‘literal’ denial (i.e. that something didn’t actually happen); ‘interpretive’ denial, where 
the significance of events are downplayed or modulated; and lastly, ‘implicatory’ denial, 
which entails the minimization or displacement of the moral implications of the events in 
question (2001: 7-9). Duch’s statement, in this sense, can be seen as an attempt to displace 
his own moral agency on the basis that, firstly, his actions were one part of a national 
pattern of abuses and, secondly, he was following the directives of malign (more 
responsible) senior leaders. The ‘upward’ displacement of moral agency by Duch’s defence 
team is mirrored by the ‘downward’ denials of responsibility by the defence teams of the 
‘senior leaders’. For example, in his opening statement, Nuon Chea remarked that:  
 
Some people were wearing black shirts and were disguised as the resistance group in 
order to liberate the country, but actually they were arresting, they were killing 
people. It was very, very complicated at that time. So it was very hard for us to 
understand, everything is chaotic.
43
 
                                                          
42 Two caveats concerning the use of Cohen’s denial framework should be noted here. 
Firstly, as Cohen himself argues, an analysis of various forms of ‘denial’ should not be 
registered against criteria of truth or falsehood, but should proceed in circumstances where 
knowledge of the past is contested and/or ambiguous (2001: 4-5). Moreover, and on this 
basis, in treating ‘denial’ as a set of discursive repertoires, we eschew analysis of the 
internal or psychoanalytic machinations of knowing and not knowing memory. For the 
purposes of this research, ‘denial’ operates allegorically to signify types of ‘script’ adopted 
in the process of reconstructing the past.    
43 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 5th December 2011 
(pg. 51) 
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Nuon Chea is here suggesting that there was no state-directed policy of internal purges, 
emphasising the ‘chaos’ of the period (and therefore denying the ability of the authorities 
to direct such policies). Moreover, on this basis, Nuon Chea’s suggestion is that any 
atrocities must have been perpetrated by rogue elements in ‘disguise’, and therefore solely 
the fault of lower-level perpetrators. Nuon Chea continued to advance more elaborate 
denials of responsibility, whilst acknowledging the occurrence of ‘crimes’ in the period:  
  
So these crimes -- war crimes and crimes against humanity -- were not -- and genocide 
-- were not for Cambodian people. It was Vietnam who killed Cambodians…. I don't 
want to misunderstand that the Khmer Rouge are bad people, are criminals. Nothing is 
true about that. There were nationalists who wished to protect the country, to liberate 
the country from Vietnam.
44
   
 
Here we can see Nuon Chea advancing the claim that the KR could not have been 
responsible for the perpetration of atrocities because of their patriotic loyalties (this is a 
recurrent belief among former KR cadre, as I identify in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’ 
and Chapter Seven, ‘The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng’). Nuon Chea is in this instance 
relying on (popular) claims about Cambodian national identity and memory that are defined 
against, and on the basis of, racial difference with Vietnam. This is an important example of 
both interpretive and implicatory ‘denial’ (Cohen 2001) because, as a memory claim, Nuon 
Chea is suggesting that something happened but is recasting the protagonists involved and, 
secondly, that the KR could not be responsible because they were moral agents operating 
in contradistinction to the Vietnamese.     
 
                                                          
44 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 5th December 2011 
(pg. 52) 
117 
 
In a similar vein, Khieu Samphan has utilised several scripts that seek to displace the moral 
implications of the suffering that occurred under DK. In one instance, Khieu Samphan 
appealed to the popular support enjoyed by the KR in their ascent to power as a bid to 
exculpate and justify his role within the KR leadership: 
 
Regardless you like or dislike it, majority of Cambodian people gave their support to us 
for our opposition against the Lon Nol regime…
45
  
 
In further comments, the key ‘paradox’ of denial scripts is visible in the way Khieu Samphan 
both knows and disavows the occurrence of atrocities: 
  
You also stated that I must have been aware of the conditions endured by Cambodians 
during the period and the examination because I visited the dam work sites. But do 
you really think, Mr. Co-Prosecutor, that, when I visited these work sites alone or 
accompanied by the King, workers were being murdered in front of us with hoes or 
bullets in the back of the neck?
46
 
 
As Stan Cohen notes, one can only ‘deny’ what one is already aware of (1993). In this 
example, Khieu Samphan is promoting his apparent ignorance of atrocities that he 
simultaneously depicts in detail. As a memory claim, the statement works to deny his 
knowledge of atrocities of the period by appealing to the gravity and exceptionality of the 
crimes at hand, implying that such actions could not have been ‘routine’. 
 
                                                          
45 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 23 November 2011 
(pg. 12) 
46 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 23 November 2011 
(pg. 16) 
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A final technique that has been employed by Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan at the ECCC 
more explicitly resists the legitimacy of the court as an adjudicative process. Strategies of 
‘rupture’ represent challenges to the legitimacy of the court that are not reducible to its 
terms (Christodoulidis 2009). These strategies, most famously invoked by Jacques Verges, 
essentially pivot on a ‘tu quoque’ question (or ‘who are you to judge?’) focusing on 
inconsistencies in the application of the moral imperative to punish. Several examples from 
the ECCC are illuminating on these terms:   
 
Mr. Co-Prosecutor, you seem to forget that, between January 1970 and August 1973, 
that is the period of two and a half years, the United States carpeted the small 
Kampuchean territory with bombs, outnumbered those numbers of bombs the alliance 
used during the Second World War everywhere, including the two big bombs dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Could you imagine what my country faced after such a 
bloody killing and war? You may assist in thinking what the future is and what's like for 
Cambodian people and the country as a whole during such carpet bombing. No, I can 
see you cannot make such an imagination.
47
 pg 12 
 
In the first instance, Khieu Samphan again employs a form of ‘implicatory’ denial by 
suggesting that the destruction wrought through carpet bombing either determined or 
constrained the range of options available to the KR on taking power. At the same time, by 
pointing to patterns of political violence that are unexamined by the ECCC, Khieu Samphan 
is probing an inconsistency in the way that punishments for perpetrators of human rights 
abuses are applied. As Koskenniemi suggests, such strategies of ‘rupture’ haunt 
international tribunals because, as purportedly deliberative exercises that seek to 
adjudicate over and authorise an account of past political violence, defence teams can 
reach for the wider historical context in order to exploit the necessarily equivocal 
                                                          
47 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 23 November 2011 
(pg. 12) 
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reconstruction of ‘historical truth’ (2002: 33). This strategy of highlighting inconsistency is 
again visible in the way Khieu Samphan questions why other individuals that occupied roles 
in the DK hierarchy are not being prosecuted (controversially, in this instance, with regard 
to the late King Sihanouk):   
 
Mr. Co-Prosecutor, you will also say that the fact that I was appointed the President of 
the State Presidium of the Democratic Kampuchea committed me to a joint criminal 
enterprise; in which case, why are you not prosecuting King Norodom Sihanouk?48  
 
The strategies of ‘rupture’ employed by defence teams have met notable resistance by 
judicial staff. On one occasion, the defence team sought to question Nuon Chea on the role 
of members of the current during within the KR:  
 
BY MR. PESTMAN:  
I have almost finished. One last question: Do you know what Heng Samrin's [current 
Chairman of the National Assembly] other position was? He was your messenger, he 
was your guide; but what was his official function within the Party? And I'm talking 
about the period shortly before 1975 -- April 1975, the liberation of Phnom Penh.  
 
MR. NUON CHEA:  
A. (Microphone not activated)  
 
MR. PRESIDENT:  
                                                          
48 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 23 November 2011 
(pg. 16) 
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Nuon Chea, you are instructed not to respond to the question, since it is irrelevant to 
the historical background of the Democratic Kampuchea.
49
  
 
Again, this example begins with a strategy of ‘rupture’ seeking to outflank and destabilise 
the ECCC jurisdiction over “senior leaders” that is (figuratively and literally) silenced here. 
This is important because it shows that, as a site of memory work, the ECCC judges 
maintain an active involvement in containing the scope of concealment and disclosure of 
the past at the same time as the defence teams seek to contest it.  
   
Resistance to the ECCC as a form of memory work is therefore typified by two tendencies. 
Firstly, defence teams resist engagement with the ECCC account of past political violence on 
the terms authorised by the ECCC; that is, they attempt to refute the ‘veracity’ of evidence 
presented by the prosecution, or employ codes of ‘denial’ to disavow, or work to minimise, 
their responsibility for the crimes in question. The second tendency works against the 
terms authorised by the ECCC, through strategies of ‘rupture’ that call into question the 
legitimacy of the court as a neutral arbiter over competing memory claims. In the first 
instance, it seems that the performance of resistance is necessary for the legitimacy of the 
court because it constitutes a process of contested deliberation, and that resistance 
therefore mutually constitutes the power of the court. The second form of memory work is 
far more ambivalent in its relation to the ECCC. It challenges the terms and moral authority 
of the court by calling attention to competing accounts of violence and perpetration, and 
yet can be subsumed within seemingly trivial strategies of shutdown, such as the silencing 
of microphones within the courtroom.  
 
Unanticipated outcomes of the ECCC 
                                                          
49 Transcript of Trial Proceedings Case File Nº 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 9 February 2012 
(pp. 48-49) 
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The ECCC process has been characterised by bids to ‘contain’ the account of the past that it 
sanctions. As the preceding sections have sought to show, this occurs at the level of the 
mandates of the court (as determined by the ECCC law) and also within the minutiae of the 
courtroom (through active processes of disclosure and concealment by victims, 
perpetrators and the arbiters of the court). At the same time, it is important to consider 
examples of how the ECCC remains an unresolved site of memory work that continues to 
reveal unanticipated and uneven outcomes, beyond ‘scripts’ that can be neatly 
characterised as resistant or contested. For example, the winnowing of case 002 into 
shortened ‘mini’ trials was spurred by the severance of Ieng Thirith (former Minister of 
Social Affairs under DK) in October 2011, and then the subsequent death of Ieng Sary 
(former Foreign Minister of DK) in March 2013.  
 
Another useful example that brings into question the capacity of the ECCC in stabilising an 
account of past political violence is visible in Duch’s closing statement (and the responses to 
it). As noted, the trial of Duch was characterised by the defendant’s admissions of 
responsibility and remorse (though these were mixed alongside more subtle forms of 
‘upward’ denial, as noted). On this basis, the defence team embarked on a peculiar change 
of direction in their closing statements, requesting release for Duch and hardening their 
stance in relation to Duch’s subordinate role. This raises unresolved questions about the 
process of memory work that operates according to ‘scripts’: why self-incriminate and then 
deny one’s role in within the perpetration of atrocity? 
 
I clearly understand that any theory or ideology which mentions love for the people in 
a class-based concept and class struggle is definitely driving us into endless tragedy 
and misery… I still maintain that a decision to choose which path to walk is made in a 
matter of seconds. However, its repercussions, if it is a wrong choice, will result in 
lifelong remorse.  
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All santebal offices were equal before the party. Each prison used the same torture, 
the same murder, under the same order from Angkar.
50
 
 
Duch here attempts to downplay both his own moral agency by the ‘accidence’ of path, 
before denying the significance of his role at S-21 and drawing equivalences with other sites 
of killing. This is notable because it is so at odds with his earlier acquiescence to the 
preferred ‘scripts’ of the prosecution. Moreover, it is problematic for the ECCC’s preferred 
reading of violence under DK that works to centre S-21 and the evacuation of Phnom Penh 
(the focus of Case 002/01) as synecdoches for a national experience of violence and 
suffering under the KR.  
 
Duch was initially sentenced to 19 years imprisonment, based on a 16 year reduction for 
time already served, cooperation, and violations of rights specifying unlawful pre-trial 
detention. Research by DC-Cam at the time documented ‘confusion’ and ‘disappointment’ 
of victim organisations. 
 
One audience member queried: 
 
“The sentencing was unclear, so just how many years will Duch serve in prison?” 
 (2010: 87) 
 
Another suggested that:  
                                                          
50 Transcript of Trial Proceedings ‘Duch Trial’ Case File Nº 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC 25 
November 2009, 0901H (pg. 68) 
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“If I were the judge, I would torture Duch in the same way he tortured others.” 
(2010: 91) 
 
The dissatisfaction of these responses is illuminating for two reasons. Firstly, the reception 
of interventions that are designed to satisfy memories of political violence is uneven, and 
can sometimes actually disappoint and provoke those invested in such processes in 
problematic ways (see, for example, Moon 2012b on initiatives to materially compensate 
families of the disappeared in Argentina). Secondly, as a form of memory work, the 
adjudication of guilt or innocence operates to stabilise a ‘story’ of past political violence 
and, inseparably, recast the moral meaning of those events through the technique of 
sentencing as a form of denunciation. In this sense, even when parties are in agreement of 
the events under question, the efficacy of the techniques of memory that denounce those 
events can themselves be contested as appropriate responses to memory.   
 
Both the prosecution and defence appealed against the initial 2010 sentencing and, two 
years later, Duch’s term was increased to life imprisonment. The recalibration of Duch’s 
sentence to reflect ‘the gravity of the crimes at hand’51 cannot be traced directly to be a 
consequence of the disappointment felt toward the initial term; at the same time, it 
illuminates again an imminent tension in the work of the court between satisfying due legal 
process and the popular demands of its key constituents.  
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
51 ECCC ‘Case 001’ summary. Available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/1 
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This chapter has examined how the ECCC works on memory at several different levels: 
through the invocation of collective memory frameworks in the presentation of justice and 
reconciliation (as socio-political strategies); through the formal construction a ‘universe’ of 
memorable events and the concomitant (uneven) animation of perpetrators and victims 
therein; and at the level of detail, through specific ‘scripts’ that advance competing memory 
claims and the unanticipated outcomes and responses to ECCC memory work. The ECCC 
must be understood as a bid to stabilise an account of past political violence in Cambodia in 
the name of justice and reconciliation. As I have shown, it enjoys highly mixed successes to 
these ends.   
  
The varying claims advanced for the ECCC in the name of justice and reconciliation are 
illuminating because they reveal that neither term operates with a permanently fixed, 
stabilised meaning. Rethinking the contingency of these claims is important within 
transitional justice specifically because, within the context of a particular intervention, as 
much tends to be omitted, ignored and neglected as acknowledged.  At the same time, in 
noting the ‘loose’ uniformity of justice and reconciliation, defined around the scope of 
culpability for past human rights violations, we are again reminded of the way in which 
transitional justice mechanisms emerge subject to hierarchies of power. The claims for 
justice and reconciliation have further consequences in the way memory is invoked. Firstly, 
the ECCC is presented in a way that invokes and naturalises a ‘national’ memory, relying on 
cruder, reified collective frameworks. As I have suggested, this poses problems for the way 
it assumes that the national community, as collective memory, has a uniform and passive 
relationship to past political violence that must be intervened upon. These assumptions 
structure the basic, managerial tendencies visible in the treatment of (non-Western) 
countries that have suffered past political violence.   
 
The ECCC is notable as an exercise in disclosure and concealment. The ECCC law is 
particularly pivotal in the way in which the ECCC has been constrained as a site of memory-
making. The temporal jurisdiction of the court omits important human rights abuses from 
scrutiny as it calls attention to others. Moreover, the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC 
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narrows the focus of the court to a highly personalised ‘clique’ of senior leaders, necessarily 
enacting a de facto amnesty for lower-level KR. It is on this basis that the ECCC must be 
understood as ‘reactivating’ a longstanding politics of reconciliation staked out by the 
Cambodian government(s) since 1979. Lastly, we can equally see that the recognition of 
formal victims within the ECCC process is a contingent and, at points, contested process. 
The effects of this process are powerful: there exists a hierarchy of entitlements and 
acknowledgement rooted in the recognition of civil parties, and as exemplified by the 
Kampuchea Krom omission (or the universe of victims that might have suffered beyond the 
1975-1979 period); to reject the legitimacy of a claim is necessarily an act to deny (the 
validity or worthiness of) particular groups’ memories. This is dangerous because it 
potentially inflicts a secondary violence on memory. Finally, to reiterate, the narrow 
universe of formally recognised civil parties presents an important irregularity between 
victims within and outside of the courtroom: the ECCC is validated as an intervention in the 
name of a wounded nation but the politics of formal acknowledgement within the court 
process shows us that not all members of the national community are afforded the same 
entitlements within this endeavour. 
 
As I have argued, there are two tendencies that characterise the way in which the ECCC 
allows memory work at the level of detail. The first tendency occurs on the terms afforded 
by the court. The prosecution and defence teams contest memory against criteria of 
accuracy, reliability, and validity. This is important for our understanding of legal 
mechanisms within transitional justice because it specifically presupposes that the past can 
be resolved and stabilised. Moreover, appeals to registers of ‘objectivity’ can be 
complemented by the testimony of (some) victims that (must operate according to scripts 
that) allow expressions of suffering, emphasising the gravity of the memories at hand. 
These moments are highly performative gestures of memory claims making. Against these 
attacks, the defence teams can employ more elaborate codes of ‘denial’ that work to 
disavow or to minimise their responsibility for the crimes in question. As I have suggested, 
these strategies actually have the effect of constituting the legitimacy and power of the trial 
as a deliberative exercise.  
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A second tendency works against the terms authorised by the ECCC, through strategies of 
‘rupture’. These strategies attack the legitimacy of the court as an arbiter over competing 
memory claims, probing double standards, and relying on equivocation in the 
reconstruction of the past. This second form of memory work is far more ambivalent in its 
relation to the ECCC. It challenges the terms and moral authority of the court by calling 
attention to competing accounts of violence and perpetration, and yet can be subsumed 
within seemingly trivial strategies of shutdown, such as the silencing of microphones within 
the courtroom, that again reinforce the way in which the ECCC operates as a mechanism of 
containment, disclosure and concealment.  
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Chapter Four 
Mediating Memory 
 
This chapter explores how outreach and public education work for the ECCC acted to 
shape and reframe potentially ambivalent and conflicting memories of political violence 
through the use of particular technologies of memory: existing memorial and museum sites, 
educational seminars and provincially held public forums on ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’. This 
chapter is based on participant observation data yielded from working with the Centre for 
Social Development (CSD) during the build up to, and day of, the ‘Pailin’ public forum. The 
forum is important because it involves the targeting of a community comprised of former 
lower-level KR (and the home of a number of ‘senior leaders’ facing prosecution at the ECCC). 
This group has been situated as a key party within wider processes of ‘justice’ and 
‘reconciliation’, a central feature of which is the articulation of lower-level KR as victims of the 
regime. The chapter begins with a discussion of the role of civil society groups in the provision 
of public education about the ECCC, and the way that such groups bring complementary 
expertise to support supplementary outcomes of the work of the ECCC. The chapter then 
explores the Pailin residents’ encounters with the sites and crucibles of memory that outreach 
work for the ECCC utilises in licensing its reading of Cambodia’s experiences of war and 
genocide. Specifically, the chapter shows how existing museum and memorial sites are 
‘reactivated’ to work as technologies of memory. I show how these can produce acquiescent, 
ambivalent and resistant effects among the former KR visitors. I then consider the 
consolidation and contestation of memory at a public forum event, noting the ways in which 
the forum attempts to disarm and reconstitute memory in ways that conflict with the ECCC’s 
interpretation of Cambodia’s past political violence. The outreach exercise enjoys mixed 
successes in reframing memory as a practical, programmatic task: this raises important 
questions about the possibility of producing a unified and shared understanding about 
Cambodia’s past, but also the contexts in which resistance or ambivalence is manifested and 
provoked. I argue that the forum is instructive about regimes of memory that make counter-
claims about political violence and may potentially remain incongruous to that enacted by the 
ECCC. Moreover, I suggest that the forum reveals persisting regimes of memory that, when 
‘reactivated’, challenge the terms of two of the ECCC’s wider aims: providing a sense of 
‘justice’ and enabling ‘reconciliation’.  
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4.1 ECCC Outreach and Centre for Social Development public forums 
 
The ECCC has attracted criticism on the basis of its perceived failure to provide 
comprehensive public education on its work. In 2009, the nationwide Berkley Human Rights 
Centre study, ‘So We Will Never Forget’, found that 85% of Cambodians had little or no 
knowledge of the ECCC and improving outreach in order to maximise domestic legitimacy in 
the public mind was one of the key recommendations of the report (Pham, Vinck et al. 2009: 
5). NGOs have increasingly taken the lead in conducting public education on the work of the 
court, and the ECCC has now come to rely on civil society “partner” groups to supply its 
outreach. As a result of this, and depending on the focus of the particular NGO, outreach work 
extends beyond the specific remit of public education on the ECCC mechanism, but is generally 
directed around four combined aims (although the balance of these vary).52 Firstly, as noted, 
outreach work has been concerned with disseminating information on the work of the court 
itself and updating provincial groups on judicial proceedings. Secondly, outreach focuses on 
encouraging and enabling participation in ECCC proceedings as witnesses, complainants, or as 
‘civil parties’ seeking reparation. Thirdly, extending beyond information on the detail of the 
ECCC mechanism, some groups involved in ECCC outreach have conducted public education 
and seminars on the history and detail of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime itself. Lastly, 
some civil society groups look to provide information on mental health issues and trauma, as 
well as providing psychotherapeutic support services where possible.  
 
Each of these four features of ECCC outreach can be understood as mutually validating in 
presenting the ECCC as a necessary form of intervention on memory: we can see how each can 
be combined as a form of ‘program’ to  balance processes of presenting ‘what is to be known’ 
about the past (effects of ‘veridiction’) and ‘what is to be done’ about the past (effects of 
‘jurisdiction’) (Foucault 1991b: 75). In other words, frameworks through which we know social 
problems tend to obviate and oblige what is to be done about them. For example, the 
Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam) has held provincial film screenings that are 
intended to educate the population about the atrocities of the DK regime, eliciting public 
testimony from survivors and, at the same time, soliciting legal applications for participation in 
ECCC proceedings (Ly 2008: 24-27). More recently, DC-Cam has been actively promoting the 
education of younger Cambodians about the DK period, attempting to further enhance youth 
                                                          
52 The ECCC published monthly ‘Court Report’ has a dedicated section in each issue to NGO 
and civil society “partner” outreach that details ECCC-endorsed initiatives. The Court Report is 
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/publications.courtReport.aspx   
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engagement with the ECCC, and ‘dignifying’ the experiences of DK survivors on this basis. The 
‘dignification’ of memory is an emergent outcome that is believed by DC-Cam to flow from the 
work of the ECCC and is an example of the way new socio-cultural effects and outcomes are 
authored onto transitional justice projects more broadly (see the ICTJ guidance report, 
Ramírez-Barat 2012: 19). Alternatively, the Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO) 
works in partnership with both the ECCC and other civil society groups at outreach events to 
“raise awareness about trauma”, advocating testimonial techniques in order to document and 
recover memories of DK, whilst positioning (participation in and observation of) the ECCC as 
one means of empowering victims in overcoming trauma.53 These approaches therefore 
conceptualise DK as a problematic site of memory (be it through historical, legal, or medical 
lenses), specifically in relation to its purported remedy and amelioration through the ECCC 
process. In this sense, outreach hinges upon techniques for rendering ‘knowable’ a problem 
that simultaneously implies and validates its solution. 
 
CSD initially ran a series of provincial public forum programs on issues of ‘justice and national 
reconciliation’ in 2000, whilst negotiations over the formation of the ECCC were ongoing. As 
Chea Vannath (then CSD Director) notes on the initial three forums ‘…the idea was to ask 
whether a trial of former KR leaders should or should not be held’ (Vannath 2002: 304). After a 
gap of six years, following the establishment of the ECCC, the CSD forums were re-launched 
under the direction of Theary Seng, a prominent American-Khmer activist, and following the 
establishment of the ECCC in 2006 CSD provincial public forums became an important 
component in the courts outreach strategy. The recent forums have conducted outreach 
principally through a combination of public education on the court mechanism, encouraging 
participation in the court process, and holding seminars and forums on the history of DK that 
ran alongside attempts to raise awareness of mental health issues and trauma stemming from 
conflict.54  The provincially-held forums were organised to include a preparatory visit to Phnom 
Penh to tour the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes, the Choeung Ek Killing Field 
                                                          
53 Details of the TPO outreach initiatives can be found on their website at 
http://www.tpocambodia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=6
0 (accessed 2 September 2010) 
54 In July 2009 CSD underwent significant restructuring and a change of leadership as a result 
of an internal dispute. Parts of the projects related to ECCC outreach on victim participation 
and a ‘National Dialogue on Justice and Reconciliation’ have been taken up by the Centre for 
Justice and Reconciliation (led by many former CSD staff) – now incorporated under 
http://www.cjr-cam.org/.   
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genocide memorial, and the ECCC court buildings by a section of the forum participants.55 The 
visits were therefore structured in such a way as to 1) reveal the factual evidence of KR 
atrocities (the ‘truth’), 2) encounter a site that is of significant symbolic and iconic memorial 
importance dedicated to those atrocities (rendering central ideas of the ‘nation’), and 3) 
demonstrate the ECCC as the now authoritative moral response to those atrocities (justice and 
reconciliation through the ECCC).  
 
The forums were intended to ‘facilitate dialogue on issues of justice and reconciliation’ but the 
creation of the ECCC in 2006 meant that the forums became less able to accommodate debate 
about whether a court mechanism is or is not necessary or desirable. The ECCC prosecutions 
and the increasing pronunciation of justice and reconciliation as broader socio-political 
processes have provided the dominant frames that lend themselves to the delimitation of 
what can and cannot be said about the KR period (and the protracted 1945-1998 civil conflict 
altogether). For example, the forum leader discouraged discussion of political violence that 
occurred after 1979, but accepted discussion and comparisons between the Cambodian 
experience and other episodes of genocide. Rather, following the establishment of the ECCC in 
2006, the CSD forums became predisposed to disseminate information about how justice will 
be administered and how reconciliation follows from this. In this vein, the forums were 
explicitly intended to spread information about the work of the ECCC, broadcasting 
proceedings on television and radio, and encouraging participants to act as:  
 
‘…ambassadors for their village or commune by returning with printed materials and 
resources, and by retelling their experiences of the forum at a local level. Participants 
therefore work as multipliers by spreading high quality information about justice and 
reconciliation within their communities more broadly. Public forums are further broadcast 
on provincial television and local radio in order to ensure the widest possible 
dissemination of information on the topics of justice and national reconciliation.’
56
 
Notably, like TPO, the more recent CSD public forums drew heavily on a therapeutic 
conception of memory in an attempt to reconfigure the stigmatised notion of ‘national 
                                                          
55 The Tuol Sleng and Cheoung Ek sites have specific histories, playing a key role as evidential 
sites  – in terms of legal and public ‘proof’ of KR atrocities – within the post 1979 Cambodian 
state’s master narrative about the DK era. In the subsequent sections, I return to these 
histories and explain why they lend themselves to ‘reactivation’ under ECCC outreach work. 
56 Excerpt from “Justice and National Reconciliation” A summary report of the public forum 
series held in 2008’ distributed at the 2nd Annual Conference on Justice and Reconciliation, 5th 
November 2008, Centre for Social Development, Phnom Penh. 
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reconciliation’ – associated with the Royal Government of Cambodia-sponsored amnesty and 
pardon policies launched in the 1990s that are purportedly in conflict with the ECCC’s 
prosecutions – to an understanding of reconciliation that includes a therapeutic transformative 
lens: that reconciliation begins with individual ‘healing’, understanding personal and 
community trauma (a reconciliation of ‘self’ to ‘self’ and ‘self’ to others) and, by virtue of this, 
the generation of broader catharsis for Cambodia’s social ‘wounds’. This follows from the 
increasing influence of international psychological and therapeutic assumptions about the 
nature and role of memory that now govern transitional justice strategies :that memory is a 
site of renewal and malady if ‘untreated’ (Moon 2009: 76). These therapeutic assumptions are 
applied by civil society groups within Cambodia’s attempts to reckon with its history of political 
violence, and the CSD public forums were specifically organised into two sessions; in the 
morning emphasis was placed on ‘justice and history’, and in the afternoon the discussion 
shifted to focus upon ‘reconciliation and healing’.  
 
It is worth briefly considering two documentary examples of the way that CSD provided 
information about mental health and trauma, because it is not neutral in its communication or 
effects: the trauma paradigm tends to pathologise post conflict communities, whilst the 
‘medicalisation’ of memory can have implications for the construction of categories of victims. 
The two examples are central features of the ‘Understanding Trauma in Cambodia Handbook’, 
funded by the German Development Service (DED), written in both English and Khmer, and 
distributed across Cambodia at provincial public forums (dissemination aside, the handbook is 
equally important for understanding the types of ‘thinking’ behind reconciliatory ‘healing’ 
initiatives and the way these have been ‘grafted’ onto the ECCC process) (CSD 2008). The 
‘Trauma Tree’ image provides a pictorial ‘map’ of the way that trauma is ‘rooted’ (invisible, 
hidden) in a specific set of events or experiences. The patterning of (observable) behaviours 
through the ‘branches’ illustrates the “physical”, “emotional”, “rational” and “behavioural” 
effects of being traumatised. Cambodians encountering the image are invited to ‘code’ their 
own ongoing ‘symptoms’ as consequences of traumatic events. Summerfield has pointed out 
how the sequencing of such communication – the necessary and inevitable translation of 
experiences of suffering into traumatic states – serves to situate ‘trauma’ as biologically 
automated, objectively locatable (across cultural contexts), and amenable to ‘technical’ 
intervention (1999: 1452). Summerfield further stresses that an effect of this sequence is the 
situation of suffering people as pathologically passive entities that must be supervised and 
managed by authoritative psychotherapeutic responses and techniques (in this case, specific 
invitations to self-disclose, testify and engage with the ECCC process). Moreover, we can 
(tentatively) see how the representation of traumatic experiences and symptoms in cartoon 
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form (which occurs throughout the text) could be interpreted as infantilising its audience. 
Conversely, this could be read to implicitly elevate the authority and supervisory role of 
‘medicalised’ arbiters of reconciliation because it subordinates the agency of its audience.  
 
Figure 5 The 'Trauma Tree' in the CSD Trauma Handbook 
 
One important aspect of both the ‘Trauma Tree’ and the diagnostic checklist (below) are the 
way in which they act as means of self-identification as traumatised. They are, in this sense, 
examples of technologies of power and memory that are ‘self-subjectifying’ (Foucault and 
Rabinow 1997; Foucault 1998). The subject encounters and ‘knows’ themselves as traumatised 
through specific templates and categories of self-understanding. In post-conflict settings, this 
can have important consequences. As Moon suggests, the trauma paradigm has an influential 
role to play in discourses of reconciliation because it is powerfully exculpatory – dislodging 
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‘retributive’ moral orders – and opens up space for subjects’ self-understanding as ‘victims’ of 
conflict and atrocity (2009: 80-81). In this sense, we can begin to see how these examples of 
medicalised, therapeutic reconciliation – of ‘self’ to ‘self’ or ‘self’ to ‘past’ – are very 
compatible with the ongoing ECCC prosecutions, and therefore permitted and increasingly 
prominent in ECCC outreach in general. Three issues are pertinent in this regard. Firstly, the 
diagnostic self-checklist works by inviting subjects to locate their ‘symptoms’ of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the broad period of ‘events during the Khmer Rouge years’. This is a 
vague periodisation that works with the jurisdiction of the ECCC, to the extent that it 
obfuscates the specific origin of trauma or traumatic events (as arising from 1975-1979 
specifically or the decades long war more generally). The consequence is to make the ECCC 
appear to redress broader periods of political violence than it is actually tasked to. Secondly, in 
locating trauma in the ‘frightening and dangerous events during the Khmer Rouge years’, the 
checklist further obscures questions of agency, culpability and responsibility (in line with 
Moon’s suggestion that a therapeutic ethos undermines retributive moral orders). Moreover, 
as Moon suggests, the trauma paradigm effects a denial of the agency of victims, positioning 
those affected by trauma as requiring supervision and management. Lastly, it is important to 
note that these materials are disseminated across Cambodia, to both former and non-KR 
communities. In this sense, we can see an example of how therapeutic knowledge is licensed 
to help sustain the ECCC’s reconciliatory claim that lower-level KR are also victims of DK. 
 
Figure 6 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder checklist in the CSD Trauma Handbook 
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The CSD forums were endorsed by the ECCC, as evidenced by the attendance of at least two 
ECCC staff at each event. ECCC attendees have included staff from the co-prosecutors office, 
defence, judges, and the Victims Unit, as well as the ECCC’s own media and outreach 
personnel. Whilst ECCC and CSD staff have suggested that the forums could act as a space 
within which the attending ECCC staff could listen to the ideas and perspectives of local 
communities to take back to the ECCC’s stakeholders, in reality, the attendance of individuals 
occupying authoritative positions within the ‘justice’ process means that large periods of each 
forum often resemble more of a ‘question and answer’ session than a forum for open 
dialogue. There are clear structures in operation that circumscribe what can be said and at 
exactly which points, with the forum leader formally arbitrating this process. 
 
The forums worked to centre personal testimony and experience in the discussion (within 
particular constraints), pointing to the importance of testimonial techniques as a key 
technology of memory: self-disclosure is foregrounded at the forum as a technique for 
personal and collective renewal. It was evident that, by retelling or stating experiences of the 
DK regime, participants were legitimised to speak further on the broader topics of justice and 
reconciliation. Nevertheless, the divided format of the public forums since 2006, between 
history and justice on the one hand, and reconciliation and healing on the other, delimits clear 
fields which both enable and constrain what is spoken about the KR period (and the protracted 
1945-1998 conflict more broadly) and how and when it is spoken. As I will illustrate in the 
coming sections, the ECCC reading of the past is contested at points. Whilst the public forums 
operate in such a way as to marginalise and reframe possible alternative readings and 
responses to the KR period, the forum is not entirely successful as a space that reframes 
memory in accordance with the memorial account sanctioned by the ECCC.      
 
Having introduced the CSD public forums in the context of ECCC outreach, I now turn to 
explore the experiences of the Pailin residents as they encountered the three key components 
of the outreach exercise: guided visits to memorial and museum sites, public seminars at the 
ECCC court building, and the provincially-held public forum. 
 
4.2 Outreach through the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes 
 
Tuol Sleng (along with the ‘killing field’ at Choeung Ek) is today the principal Cambodian 
museum site dedicated to the atrocities of the KR. The museum building is a former high 
school in Phnom Penh, though during DK the site was put to use as an incarceration centre, 
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dubbed ‘S-21’. At that time it was the largest of a network of prisons operated by the KR 
security apparatus. Chandler’s approximation of the numbers interred at S-21 indicates that 
around 14,000 people were held at the centre, the overwhelming majority of whom were 
killed (1999: 36).  
 
The site was discovered by the Vietnamese after the capture of Phnom Penh in January 1979 
and the founding of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The PRK government quickly 
recognised the potential of the site in purchasing popular support and legitimacy on a 
domestic footing. The site was thus projected within Cambodia as proof of the atrocities of the 
KR and, in the context of an ongoing civil war, to legitimate the new PRK state (Hughes 2003b: 
176-178). As Ledgerwood notes, the curation of Tuol Sleng revolved around a state master-
narrative that told of a ‘glorious revolution’ in 1975 that was stolen and hijacked by a small 
number of ‘murderous criminals’ (1997: 91). This highly personalised attribution of guilt for the 
DK period also materialised in particular significance at the 1979 ‘People’s Revolutionary 
Tribunal’ (PRT, the only formal retributive response to the DK period prior to the ECCC). The 
court was dismissed as a ‘show trial’ by the West, but this particular construction of culpability 
around the ‘Ieng Sary – Pol Pot’ clique was an important step in the deployment of the 
reconciliatory politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s in Cambodia. With the blame for the DK 
period focused upon two individuals, the PRT remained highly ambivalent about the 
responsibility of lower-level KR , playing to absolve the guilt of lower-level KR under a de facto 
amnesty (Gottesman 2003: 60-62), and leaving enough room to entice defections of other 
senior KR leaders (Fawthrop and Jarvis 2004: 42). As Fawthrop and Jarvis have noted, the fact 
that the court provided a formal space for Cambodians to express their experiences of DK has 
largely been neglected (2004: 49). 
 
Today Tuol Sleng operates principally as a tourist attraction, with non-Cambodians comprising 
the majority of visitors to the site (Williams 2004; Hughes 2008).57 However the site and its 
documentation are considered to constitute important evidence in the legal prosecutions at 
the ECCC, and the recent trial of Duch even involved a ‘re-enactment’ of his role at the site.58 
More importantly, Tuol Sleng attributes blame for the atrocities of DK to senior KR leaders 
(and ambivalence about the role of lower-level KR) which represents a construction of 
culpability that corresponds neatly to the restricted prosecutions at the ECCC today. In this 
                                                          
57 See Hughes (2008) on practices of visitation at Tuol Sleng by non-Cambodians 
58 See BBC News (2008). Khmer Rouge Leader ‘enacts role’ 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7264203.stm. Accessed 31 August 2010 
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sense, Tuol Sleng today serves to mirror both the reconciliatory politics of the 1980s and the 
politics of personal jurisdiction surrounding the current ECCC prosecutions: we can see that 
ECCC outreach ‘reactivates’ Tuol Sleng as a technology of memory because of its 
correspondence in this regard. As I will discuss below, civil society organisations such as CSD 
have utilised the site (and Choeung Ek) as a form of public proof about the KR regime in order 
to show the need for the ECCC. Much as in 1979, Tuol Sleng today plays a double role in 
promoting and licensing a ‘factual/forensic’ and ‘public/historical’ ‘truth’ about the DK period, 
serving to buttress the regime of memory formalised by the ECCC. In 1979 this entailed the 
legitimation of the new state; in 2008 this entailed the legitimation of the ECCC.  
   
On 7 October 2008, a group of around sixty residents of the Pailin region59 of Western 
Cambodia were brought to Phnom Penh to tour Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek and the ECCC. CSD 
staff intended the visit to Phnom Penh to be principally pedagogic, designed to enhance 
participation at the ensuing public forum. As Sok Leang, head of CSD Public Education, 
remarked: 
 
…it is about building their schema, their existing knowledge. Even though they may have 
experienced those four years [of DK] they have never been to these two or three places. In 
their imagination Tuol Sleng is like this, or like this – they have absolutely no information. 
We want people to get more active and involved on public forum day. We want to activate 
their memory.  On the road from the province to Tuol Sleng, we don’t see emotion [in the 
participants]. But when they come to Tuol Sleng they start to remember whatever 
happened at that time
60
 
 
In the absence of comprehensive textual supporting information, it is the ‘untouched’ 
appearance of the artefacts on display that make Tuol Sleng persuasive (Hughes 2003b: 176-
178; Williams 2004: 242). In this sense, the technologies of memory at work are authenticated 
by their visual presentation and organisation alone, on the basis of their role as ‘primary’ 
artefacts of atrocity. The museum includes photographs of corpses found in cells when the site 
was first discovered; torture implements and shackles remain in place as they were left in 
1979; blood stains remain unwashed on some of the walls; and in building B displays include 
                                                          
59 A large number of this group were former KR and their families, although one resident of 
Phnom Penh was invited exceptionally as a former student of Tuol Sleng High School. 
60 Personal interview, Phnom Penh, 7 October 2008 
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the iconic portrait photos taken upon entry of those interred at the centre. The little textual 
information that is available at Tuol Sleng communicates culpability for the atrocities 
committed at the site around the Pol-Pot - Ieng Sary clique.61 A board at the entrance to the 
museum complex notes the transformation of the site from high school to prison on the orders 
of the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique. Whilst the museum attributes guilt to senior KR leaders that 
were intent on genocide, and is silent about the role of lower-level KR (a construction of 
culpability that corresponds to the prosecutions at the ECCC today), it communicates suffering 
as nationally generalised (Ledgerwood 1997), the entrance board noting that S-21 was the 
largest of a nationwide prison system.            
 
Ledgerwood has suggested that ‘…Cambodians generally accept the story of the museum as 
true to their experiences’ (1997:82). As I toured the site with the CSD staff and Pailin residents, 
the reactions and responses of the public forum attendees did not necessarily refute or 
corroborate Ledgerwood’s claim. Rather, their responses provide insight into the importance 
of the ‘knowledge’ that visitors bring to bear on a site, and how meaning emerges through a 
relationship between site, audience, and (particularly) the context of visitation. One resident 
of Pailin, when viewing the shackles left in a cell, recalled in detail the types of punishment he 
had witnessed during DK. Upon entering a cell in ‘Block A’ of Tuol Sleng, another former KR 
soldier asked ‘who gave these orders?’ On the one hand this shows that the visitors were 
highly attuned to issues of culpability represented at the site, possibly in part as a result of the 
fact the tour was organised directly as a means of understanding the current ECCC 
prosecutions. On the other hand, what was occurring during the visit was a struggle by the 
visitors to situate their own experiences of KR rule within the regime of memory propagated at 
Tuol Sleng.    
 
The pedagogical aims of the tour reflect the assumption by CSD staff that many attendees did 
not know, or have information, about Tuol Sleng prior to their visit. Moreover, their struggle 
(and at points disbelief) in rationalising what was witnessed is evidence that members of 
communities like Pailin largely experienced KR rule in a setting of agrarian cooperativism 
receiving more favourable treatment, rather than in the exceptional spaces through which DK 
images of DK are principally reproduced (portrait photos from incarceration and torture 
                                                          
61 All information at the site is in Khmer, English and French 
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facilities in an urban setting; or organised human remains). Importantly, though, it also reveals 
the dissonance that existed between the localised memories of the group and a projection of 
blame – as substantiated and exemplified by Tuol Sleng – prior to the CSD visit.   
 
The visit to Tuol Sleng provoked very mixed responses among the visitors. A former student of 
the Tuol Sleng school prior to 1975, who was invited onto the tour exceptionally by Theary 
Seng, had not returned to the site since the DK era, despite awareness of its existence. For 
him, returning to Tuol Sleng had simply been too painful to contemplate. By the time the tour 
had reached the last block of the museum he began to publicly denounce the trial (despite his 
self-identification as a ‘victim that lost many relatives; when I am here, I am shaking with 
anger’). The rest of the Pailin attendees remained impassive as the former student proclaimed 
that the ECCC is a ‘theatre’, that he felt hopeless about ‘justice’, and that he would not file a 
complaint with the court.    
 
The former student’s reaction to Tuol Sleng is instructive about the diversity of lenses through 
which Cambodians can question the legitimacy or are critical of the ECCC. His dismissal of the 
ECCC as an effective enterprise arose in the first instance from his feeling that the evidence 
presented at Tuol Sleng was, in itself, so overwhelming he could not understand the delay in 
prosecutions. In his eyes, the ECCC proceedings were suffering set-backs because of political 
influences: ‘I bet my life that this court will not have a fair trial. If it was a pure international 
tribunal, justice would be satisfied’. This remark could be understood in part as an anxiety 
about the influence of the Government on proceedings. This view is pervasive among 
international and domestic Cambodian civil society groups, but also among those ordinary 
Cambodians that question the legitimacy of the current Cambodian government. In this sense, 
he accepted and approved of Tuol Sleng as a site of historical and factual evidence but 
simultaneously dislocated the appropriateness of the ECCC institution as the authoritative 
moral response to those truths.   
 
In a change of tack, the former student continued to note that ‘…the revolution began in 1954, 
but the jurisdiction is only four years [1975-1979]. Where there is smoke there is fire. The 
ECCC is not interested in the root causes’. The interest in publicly disinterring aspects of the 
broader conflict outside of the 1975-1979 period is indicative of a desire in some sections of 
Cambodian society to address a broader historical and contextual truth about the KR period. 
This appears to reflect a frustration with the temporally delimited factual and forensic truth 
licensed by the ECCC’s jurisdiction. As became evident during the visit to the Choeung Ek 
‘Killing Field’, the ECCC, and at the public forum, many of the former KR shared this concern. 
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4.3 Outreach through Choeung Ek ‘Killing Field’ memorial 
 
Choeung Ek ‘killing field’, roughly 15km South of Phnom Penh, was the site of execution for 
many of those held at S-21. The site is comprised of 129 mass graves, around 40 of which have 
not been disinterred. Alongside Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek became pivotal in the PRK’s 
construction of a coherent reading of the DK period. As Rachel Hughes has noted, following 
discovery, Choeung Ek was cast as ‘a centre for typical evidences’ (2005: 258-259), providing 
further ‘proof’ about the ‘genocidal’ intentions of Pol Pot, thus attributing culpability for DK to 
senior KR leaders. Again, the construction of the memorial around this attribution of 
responsibility is important because it corresponds neatly to the prosecutions currently 
administered by the ECCC. In this sense, we can see how the Choeung Ek site promises itself 
for ‘reactivation’ under ECCC outreach exercises as a form of ‘proof’ and legitimation.   
 
Figure 7 The Choeung Ek stupa 
 
Today clothing and shards of human bone can often be found whilst walking between the 
disinterred mass graves, contributing to the “shocking” and “raw” impression the site offers 
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(Bickford 2009: 8). The central focus of the site is a memorial Buddhist stupa constructed in 
1988 to display the remains of some 9000 of those killed there.   
 
The memorial stupa at Choeung Ek evidences a tension between a secular politics of nation 
building and the imperative to create forums that could memorialise the loss of life during DK 
in accordance with Buddhist practice. As Hughes suggests, the public display of human remains 
within a memorial stupa represented an attempt to nationally reclaim, memorialise, or re-
‘know’ victims that cannot be understood as having been ‘sacrificed’ (2006: 259). Hughes’ 
analysis of Choeung EK reflects the concern that some Cambodians struggle to comprehend DK 
as Khmer-on-Khmer violence. Traditionally memorial stupa forms act as sacred spaces 
containing the cremated remains of one person, usually of venerable status (Hughes 2006: 
105). In contrast, the Choeung Ek memorial visibly interred the remains of many victims of the 
KR, the large numbers of unidentifiable skulls reinforcing the general and anonymous image of 
suffering under the KR. The tension between the Choeung Ek’s role as a religious and political 
site is further evidenced by the fact that, in Buddhist tradition, deaths from inauspicious 
circumstance (like murder) require urgent cremation (Hughes 2006: 105-6). The continued 
display of mass-human remains therefore contravenes Buddhist funerary practice, but 
moreover makes some Cambodians uneasy and fearful about visiting the site (Hughes 2006: 
106). Indeed, as I show in Chapter Five, ‘The Wat Thmey Genocide Memorial’, fear of human 
remains (and the attendant presence of spirits) can make Cambodians suspicious and wary of 
the meanings conveyed at memorial sites. Compounding the tension in enmeshing religious 
and political meaning at the Choeung Ek installation is the problematic issue of ‘ownership’. 
Today, the overwhelming majority of visitors to the site are non-Cambodian, and the site’s 
ticket concession has been awarded to a Japanese-Korean firm. As Youk Chhang, head of DC-
Cam, has argued, ‘memories cannot be contracted, cannot be sold, cannot be purchased’.62 
The site must be understood to exist through conflicting positions in the Cambodian moral 
imagination because the site implies both reverence for the memories of victims of the KR, and 
the possibility that those memories can be deployed to generate revenue.  
 
Following the visit to Tuol Sleng, the Pailin residents were taken to tour Choeung Ek ‘killing 
field’. Hughes’ analysis of Choeung Ek as a site depicting ‘unsacrificed’ victims was 
corroborated when commencing the tour. Whilst walking around the graves, one participant 
questioned how Khmers could commit such violence against Khmers. This is important 
                                                          
62 See BBC News (2005) ‘Killing Fields Deal Sparks Anger’ 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4415873.stm 
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because it reflects a view that characterises the Cambodian conflict and KR period as a crisis of 
national solidarity. He compared the KR period of rule to Nazi Germany, whereby he 
rationalised the violence perpetrated there in the name of territory and sovereignty. In 
Cambodia, he could not understand how a government could ‘undercut’ its own people, in 
what he considered ‘non-sensical’ violence. 
 
The difficulty the participants had in encountering the display of victims of Cambodian mass 
violence manifested itself through the lens of an offence to the Khmer ‘nation’.  Yet this did 
not necessarily translate into anti-KR responses to the Choeung Ek displays. Whilst the 
Choeung Ek site references a narrative of generalised suffering of the Cambodian nation at the 
hands of the KR leadership, counter-claims resisting this narrative emerged on the tour. For 
example, one participant, claimed that ‘if only the KR had fed the people better and asked the 
people to join the army, we could have fought the Vietnamese invaders and won the battle’, 
contradicting the claims made at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek about the nature of the 
Vietnamese intervention as salvation  for the Cambodian people. This response eschews the 
narrative of the guilt of the ‘Pol Pot – Ieng Sary clique’ referenced at Choeung EK, but also 
disrupts a conceptualisation of the memorial as means of deterring future violence (an 
expectation of many international visitors to the site) (Bickford 2009: 12).  
 
As one former KR soldier remarked: 
‘Something happened here that I cannot understand. I was a soldier for the Khmer Rouge. 
The battle [Khmer Rouge attacks against the Vietnamese border before the 1979 
Vietnamese intervention] should have been taken to Ho Chi Minh city already, and I can’t 
understand why the army was ordered back. This site, this place – it’s politics. There are 
lots of things I cannot understand, this violence was political. 
 
On the one hand, the former soldier was not necessarily denying the immediate truth 
presented by the site (that Cambodians died there). However, aligning his personal 
understanding of DK to the collective violence represented was problematic. This type of 
reaction is again dislocated from the ECCC as an authoritative moral response to the DK 
period, because the reading of violence as ‘political’ could be seen as ambivalent toward 
culpability for the 1975-1979 period when the claims made at Choeung Ek (and the context of 
visitation) explicitly link the ‘proof’ and nature of mass violence to the guilt and ‘cruel’ 
intentions of senior KR leaders. Instead, the former soldier eschews the dominant meanings of 
the site and purposes of visitation to state a competing claim about nationhood and memory: 
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that the ‘real’ threat to Cambodia was from Vietnam (rather than the KR leadership). 
Moreover, by linking the existence (and display) of mass remains to the conflict with Vietnam, 
and ‘politics’ more broadly, the soldier’s remarks can be read to question the legitimacy (and 
authenticity) of the site.  The former soldier expressed further scepticism concerning the 
function of the Choeung Ek memorial. In his eyes, the site was ‘well established’, ‘…good for 
attracting tourists and helping to develop the country, but it is very superficial’. This reflected 
his perception that Choeung Ek did not represent ‘…the essence of the problem. The memorial 
is planned, made for a vision.’ These comments appear to show important relationships 
between the role and function of a memorial space, contexts of visitation, and the ways in 
which these feed into the multiple ‘meanings’ negotiated (or resisted) between visitors and 
the technologies of memory at play. Moreover, it is evidence of the imperfections in 
correspondence between a program (outreach exercise) that seeks recourse to a technology of 
memory (memorial site) in order to bring about particular effects on the social body 
(evidencing the need for the ECCC).   
 
The contested meaning and function of the Choeung Ek site is noteworthy because the 
Choeung Ek centre invites particular practices of observance, religious and otherwise. The 
display of mass graves and visible shards of bone and clothing littering the pathways between 
unfenced walkways provides an intimate and immediate encounter with a legacy of mass 
killing. The Pailin residents were very subdued whilst traversing between the pits, as the tour 
guide explained the role and scope of each section of the extermination centre. The circuit 
then looped back to the central memorial where human remains are displayed within a stupa, 
therefore as sacred. Yet these remains are organised in glass cases by age and gender, 
reflecting an imperative to classify and categorise the remains as evidence. Overlapping (but 
not necessarily complimentary) meanings around nation, religion, and forensic truth or ‘proof’ 
played into the construction of the site (Hughes 2006: chapter four). Arguably these translated 
in turn into particular responses from the Pailin residents; the younger attendees ascended the 
stupa before a sign reading ‘Please pay your respects to the millions of victims of the Pol Pot 
regime’, then knelt in prayer, before burning incense. The older attendees were not inclined to 
participate in religious observance at the site, but then would peer inquisitively at the human 
skulls in the display.  
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4.4 Outreach at the ECCC building 
 
Following the tours of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, the Pailin residents were taken by bus to 
visit the ECCC court building and attend a seminar with Reach Sambath, at the time an ECCC 
press officer (and subsequent head of ECCC Public Affairs). As noted above, the tours to Tuol 
Sleng and Choeung Ek in part evidenced some dislocation between acceptance of the proof of 
KR atrocities and the perceived necessity and efficacy of the ECCC as the appropriate moral 
response to those atrocities. The seminar at the ECCC was framed in such a way as to 
consolidate this ‘proof’ and obviate the necessity of the ECCC as the only moral response to 
those atrocities. In this sense, outreach exercises at the court can be understood as a way of 
acting upon and reframing otherwise ambivalent or conflicting regimes of memory. 
 
The seminar opened with a discussion of the displays at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, with 
Reach Sambath enquiring, ‘Those objects [at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek] are real, everything is 
real. How closely did you watch the skulls?’ In response, one Pailin resident remarked ‘Close, 
very close, to ensure that they were real’. Such an exchange, that hinges on the accepted 
authenticity of the objects displayed, is illustrative of an anxiety held by practitioners within 
Cambodia’s transitional justice process that there are provincial groups within Cambodia that 
are not aware of Tuol Sleng or Choeung Ek, and do not trust the sites (for political or religious 
reasons). This is in conflict with the work of the ECCC because Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek have 
been cast as crucial evidential and symbolic sites for understanding the KR period and the 
ECCC response to it. Moreover, it shows again that Cambodians do not necessarily remember 
the DK era through the lens of Tuol Sleng or Choeung Ek as representations of their 
experiences, despite past and present efforts to make the sites stand for those experiences 
(Hughes 2006: 154). 
 
The problem of situating personal experience in relation to representations that generalise 
claims about the past was further broached in the seminar, with Reach Sambath asking ‘did 
you believe the killing was true?’ A woman from Pailin responded that relatives had told her 
about atrocities, but she had not witnessed anything. In reply, Sambath explained that ‘…no 
one could see the killing, the killing was kept secret. And people were afraid of the killing sites 
so they would not go near them.’ In this sense, Tuol Sleng is used here as an evidential premise 
of ‘secretive’ and ‘unfamiliar’ violence that can be extrapolated to generalise about 
experiences nationally. This locates the participant’s uncertainty about her local experience 
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within a national explanatory framework. This is evidence of the way attempts to consolidate 
particular accounts of the past must be understood as negotiated forms of practice. 
         
By attempting to reinforce and establish the truth and authenticity of Tuol Sleng and Choeung 
Ek, the seminar was able to refocus around the imperatives used to validate the ECCC. In the 
first instance, the proof of death plays to the need for justice, specifically through the lens of 
evidence and legal prosecution. As I have noted above, Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek lend 
themselves to this purpose because they portray culpability for DK crimes as being restricted 
to senior leaders only whilst remaining ambivalent about lower-level KR. This corresponds 
neatly to the current restricted ECCC prosecutions, and thus is also in keeping with the politics 
of national reconciliation because there is a de facto blanket amnesty for lower-level KR. 
Secondly, the ‘truth’ of the sites plays to an educational imperative encouraging younger 
Cambodian generations to learn about ‘their’ history (a politics of dignification that has been 
inspired by the work of groups like DC-Cam), and purportedly helping to prevent future crimes 
(a politics of deterrence). This second imperative implicitly cites the internationalised human 
rights call of ‘never again’, positioning younger Cambodian generations as obliged to take 
ownership of that history. 
 
The truth presented at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek was deployed in the seminar as justification 
for the ECCC, yet acceptance of the court’s necessity was not unanimous among attendees, 
even among those that had witnessed killings. One participant recalled that ‘I eye-witnessed 
some killing. But when I walked around Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek I felt that I didn’t want to 
see prosecutions. I wanted to see the five leaders live longer’. Another former KR soldier 
explained that he had lost relatives, including brothers and uncles. ‘The killing happened 
continuously, from one to one to one. But why do we need this trial? I want to know why the 
regime killed people.’ Apprehension toward the ECCC as a response to atrocity can be 
understood as evidence for the fact that there may be memories and perspectives lingering in 
Cambodia that remain in conflict with the ECCC project. Moreover, questions of ‘why the 
regime killed’, that are interested in more contextual histories of violence, raise concerns 
about the appropriateness of a legal mechanism as a truth-seeking exercise, given that it is 
governed by ascertaining the weight of proof to conclude only the guilt or innocence of a 
handful of individuals.  
 
The Pailin attendees further pressed questions regarding atrocities committed before and 
after the DK, challenging the limited ECCC jurisdiction. Whilst Reach Sambath stressed that the 
court’s jurisdiction could only attend to the 1975-1979 period, for some of the Pailin 
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attendees, ‘real’ history for future generations could not be documented without formal 
attention to the periods of violence outside of the ECCC mandate, which includes bombing by 
the US in the 1970s and violence perpetrated by the Vietnamese during the civil war after 
1979. In the eyes of a number of the Pailin participants, acknowledgement and reckoning with 
these issues were also important to their understanding of reconciliation.     
 
The seminar had noticeable effects in diffusing these points of conflict when explicitly 
addressing the role former lower-level KR may play within the ECCC process. In this sense, the 
seminar worked to act upon and couch potentially conflicting memory in ‘reconcilable’ frames: 
the mobilisation of the ECCC’s de facto amnesty for lower-level KR was a visibly effective 
technology of memory (exculpation).  ECCC outreach materials have been quick to emphasise 
that only senior leaders will be prosecuted and accordingly the seminar stressed that the 
restricted prosecution was  a necessary element within the process of national reconciliation. 
CSD staff were also quick to point out that former KR may have lost relatives or suffered 
themselves and may therefore be ‘victims’ that could file complaints or join as civil parties. The 
tentative offer of enfranchisement within the ECCC process, in tandem with reassurance of the 
fact that lower-level KR would not be prosecuted, appeared to assuage some of the Pailin 
attendees’ reservations about the trials. In this sense, it was clear that the stakes of 
reconciliation as defined by the ECCC – that 1975-1979 was the ‘rupture’ around which to 
reconcile, and that only senior leaders are to blame – had gone some distance in positioning 
the court as a necessary and acceptable endeavour.   
 
Large periods of the discussion focused upon the ECCC mechanism and practical problems 
facing the court; the procedural delays, uncertainty over funding, how much the trials may 
cost, what presumed innocence entailed, the ailing health of defendants, and the duration of a 
given trial. As evidenced by the number of questions fielded by the ECCC staff on these 
matters, the Pailin residents were clearly engaged by the process. At one point a resident 
quizzed ‘Why do those five detainees receive such good treatment?’ to which Reach Sambath 
jokingly asked ‘Are you jealous? We have some spare rooms’. The seminar was characterised 
by this type of convivial exchange and this contributed to a far more clement mood among the 
Pailin residents than upon leaving Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek. This shows again that analysis of 
various technologies of memory requires attention to both what is being remembered 
(meaning/message) and the specific contexts and modalities of memory that they are 
mobilised within (Tuol Sleng or Choeung Ek tours, ECCC seminars): they are at the same time 
relational, but also not necessarily mutually validating. This captures the variable imperfections 
in the correspondence of the intended and unintended effects of technologies of memory as 
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they are mobilised. On the one hand, the deployment of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek as 
evidential agents that ‘license’ the premise of the ECCC account (i.e. killing occurred, the senior 
leaders are to blame) still provoked specific types of resistance, potentially as a result of 
distrust of both their particular political histories, but also the specific artefacts through which 
they articulate meaning (human remains, the arguably ‘inauthentic’ Buddhist stupa etc). The 
attendees that were sceptical about Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek were not necessarily all 
against the ECCC; the attendees that were accepting of the ‘proof’ of Tuol Sleng and Choeung 
Ek were not necessarily in agreement that the ECCC is the appropriate moral response to that 
‘proof’. On the other hand, it should be stressed that the ECCC became less problematic for 
the Pailin residents as the day continued and they were exposed to more information about 
the court mechanism. This appears to show that individuals may resist a particular ‘story’, or 
struggle to align their experiences within a collective account of violence, but then may still 
accede to authoritative mnemonic responses to the past, such as the ECCC. The ECCC 
mobilises, and is contingent upon, a particular totalising (mono-logical) account of the DK era 
that many participants could not completely accept as ‘valid’. Yet still the power of this 
account was increasingly felt during the seminar as attempts were made to render the ECCC 
intelligible. The seminar thus proved to be a powerful crucible within which the ‘moral 
meaning’ of memory was re-forged, and undoubtedly the ordering of the day’s schedule 
played to this, demonstrating sites of atrocity, or moral ‘wrong’,  leading to the site of moral 
resolution of those ‘wrongs’.    
 
4.5 The Pailin public forum – 24
th
 October 2008 
 
“This morning we focus on the past, history, and now the ECCC. The past is important, but we 
don’t want to be stuck there. We need to look back to move forward to a peaceful and 
harmonious future. We don’t want to be trapped by the past, we must focus on peace, justice, 
reconciliation, and emotional healing.”  
Theary Seng, CSD Executive Director, opening remarks. 
 
Following the tours to Phnom Penh, the Pailin public forum was held on 24 October, with over 
150 local residents in attendance to discuss issues of ‘Justice and Reconciliation’. ECCC staff, 
including co-prosecutors, co-investigating judges, domestic and international judges, and 
outreach personnel were all present to participate in the discussion. International court 
monitoring staff and representatives from donors groups were also present, including the 
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British Ambassador, Stephen Mace. The local authorities were also represented with the 
attendance of Deputy Governor of Pailin, Mey Mak, a former KR official. 
 
The morning session of the forum was intended to focus upon issues of justice and history. 
Participants were allowed up to three minutes to ask questions of the ECCC staff, which pre-
disposed the format of the session to focus more on questions about the ECCC mechanism 
itself, rather than history (the ECCC staff were generally reluctant to speak about anything 
other than the ECCC mechanism). Moreover, whilst each participant was encouraged to 
introduce aspects of their own experiences of DK within their allotted three minutes, this did 
not provide enough time for them to elaborate in detail or greater length about either those 
experiences or their own perspectives about the ECCC. Whilst unstated, the CSD forum 
implicitly positioned questions on the history of DK to have been addressed during the visit to 
Phnom Penh at the museum and memorial sites. Moreover, the format of the dialogue 
became increasingly one of ‘question and answer’ than an exchange of ideas. In this sense, the 
ECCC staff were not (and could not be) attentive to questions outside of the framing of the 
ECCC jurisdiction. By focusing on questions about the detail of the ECCC apparatus, the 
explanations of the mechanism became indistinguishable from justifications for it: a process of 
rationalising and validating the ECCC mechanism in a circular fashion emerged (it exists 
because it is important and it is important in its existence). This was in part reinforced by the 
authoritative positions the attending ECCC staff occupied within the court: judges, 
prosecutors, witness protection staff etc.  
 
The forum was instructive about the assumptions held by ECCC staff about the processes of 
both justice and reconciliation in the Cambodian context. In the first instance, the ECCC 
outreach personnel were quick to introduce the court as a necessary form of redress for the 
victims of the KR period which could also act as an institution that would consolidate the 
government’s existing policy of ‘national reconciliation’. Further governmental rationalisations 
were then also given: the ECCC could deter such crimes occurring in the future and the court 
could act as a model example for the improvement of Cambodia’s existing judicial system. As I 
showed in Chapter Three, Trials and Tribulations, these imperatives are among the prominent 
benefits deployed by ECCC stakeholders when presenting the importance of the court. Whilst 
the imperative to confront ‘problematic pasts’ was in this sense re-hitched to a progressive 
and ameliorative narrative toward state ‘development’, the remarks of the ECCC staff also 
implicitly revealed entrenched assumptions about the capacity of Cambodia to conduct 
proceedings in accordance with international standards. As a staff from the co-investigating 
judges stated: 
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There are many countries that are friends with Cambodia and many would like to 
strengthen that. If Cambodia can show the world that they can establish the rule of law 
and hold fair trials, other governments will have more faith in Cambodia; in trade, 
information… it [the ECCC prosecutions] is an important and necessary process that will 
benefit Cambodia and the rest of the world. 
 
This statement is particularly interesting as it implies both a paternalism and mistrust in the 
way it situates the relationship of the ‘the world’ to the Cambodian body politic. The 
statement constructs a standard of international legitimacy contingent on the rule of law, as 
demonstrated by ‘fair trials’. In the first instance, this evidences the perceived authority of 
human rights standards as legitimating criteria for political governance. These forms of 
hierarchy work less, as Said explains in Orientalism, as a ‘veridical discourse’ in which claims 
should be proven or refuted, as much a means of cementing the particular power dynamics 
involved in defining those standards (1995 [1978]: 6). The possibility that ‘Cambodia can show’ 
the international community successful ‘fair trials’ suggests Cambodia has not yet done so, but 
also implicitly subordinates Cambodia’s ability (or willingness) to do so, or its capacity to judge 
whether it has done so. These types of public pronouncement constitute an active process of 
maintaining pathologising images about Cambodia as a dysfunctional space, whilst re-centring 
and maintaining the perceived efficacy of the ECCC, as a part-internationalised body, as its 
remedy. 
 
Whilst the ‘international’ imperatives to do justice were pronounced in rationalising and 
validating the work of the ECCC at the public forum, with frequent references to other cases of 
intervention following atrocity, a specifically ‘national’ imperative to reconcile also dominated 
the discussion (again particularly evident in the comments by the ECCC staff themselves). The 
Pailin residents were repeatedly encouraged to go back to their communes, tell their friends 
and spread the word that lower-level KR have nothing to fear. The emphasis on assuaging the 
anxieties of lower-level KR about the absence of lower-level prosecutions must be understood 
as a reconciliatory endeavour as it is mobilised through a de facto blanket amnesty, at the 
same time as positioning lower-level KR (Pailin residents) as key parties to the reconciliation 
process. Again, this mirrors and reproduces the reconciliatory politics deployed during the civil 
war in the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting the restriction of blame at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek to 
senior leaders only: those who would live in peace are reconciled, and therefore ‘peace’ 
equates to ‘reconciliation’.  
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Despite the ECCC’s restricted prosecutions, which tightly define the stakes of justice around 
the guilt of senior leaders whilst constructing moral lacunae for lower-level KR (thus inviting 
reconciliatory politics), there are memories and beliefs manifest in communities like Pailin that 
can be understood to remain in conflict with the ECCC project. As one former cadre remarked 
during the morning session on his own self-understanding as ‘Khmer Rouge’: 
  
When people hear the name ‘Khmer Rouge’ they are scared. I am proud of what I went 
through but I am also sorry for the destruction in the period. These people [Khmer Rouge] 
were true nationalists, they protected the territory. No matter what the perception of the 
KR, we know there was destruction. We are not ashamed, we did not do any bad things. 
Some people, when they think of the KR, they think they have red eyes and eat human 
flesh. We tried to struggle, we made sacrifices for Cambodia. 
 
The nation/patriot lens through which this former cadre understood his own experiences of 
the Cambodian conflict is at odds with the ECCC reading of the past, because on the one hand 
it acknowledges the suffering of the conflict but denies KR responsibility for ‘any bad things’. 
Moreover, the valorisation of the KR as ‘true nationalists’, or martyrs would not seem 
congruous to the ECCC explanation of the DK period, or that articulated at Tuol Sleng or 
Choeung Ek, despite the court’s ambivalence about the moral status of lower-level KR. Another 
resident of Pailin remarked further that ‘…the KR leaders did good things. Without the leaders 
there would have been no agreement in Paris [1991 Peace Accords]. The KR leaders did not 
intend to kill people, this is our belief.’ Clearly this type of remark is a notable incongruity to 
the central ECCC reading of DK.     
 
The afternoon session on ‘healing and reconciliation’ attempted to adopt a marked re-
conceptualisation of what reconciliation entails. As the host declared: 
  
 These people are former KR. They are victims and they lost family. We need reconciliation. 
We don’t want to point the finger at anybody. We just want to look back to the past, and 
we need joint participation… You can contribute to justice, peace, and emotional healing. 
 
The refocus upon individual trauma healing as a criterion of reconciliation – as opposed to 
peace equals reconciliation – shows the encroachment of psychological therapeutic 
assumptions into Cambodia’s transitional justice strategy. The casting of lower-level KR as 
‘victims’, that must also know their own trauma in order to facilitate individual and community 
healing, borrows from an increasingly authoritative set of international therapeutic norms that 
are applied to transitional justice problems. Moreover, as noted, it plays as a powerful 
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reconciliation strategy because the construction of former soldiers and communities party to a 
conflict as ‘victims’ that require healing is exculpatory (Moon 2009). Approaches that use a 
more ‘therapeutic’ understanding of reconciliation, borrowing from medicalised trauma 
concepts, could still comfortably operate in tandem with the construction of culpability 
mobilised by the ECCC (senior leaders are guilty) and alongside the existing politics of ‘national’ 
reconciliation mobilised by the Cambodian state (de facto blanket amnesties for lower-level 
KR).     
 
The afternoon session allowed greater license for the attendees to speak at length about the 
issues they felt important for reconciliation and ‘healing’. What became evident was a notion 
among the participants that ‘truth’ was at stake. This did not consistently manifest itself 
around contestation over what had taken place during the DK period, but was more centrally 
concerned with ‘why violence had occurred?’ As one female resident of Pailin asked:   
 
During the KR I lost all my family members, I saw this with my own eyes. I saw people 
taken on trucks and then shot on the hillside. During the Pol Pot regime, why did they kill 
people, what was the purpose of the massacre, who backed the massacre, which 
countries? 
 
The attendee’s memory of violence is attended by a contextual question about the origins of 
generalised violence. Moreover, the struggle to rationalise Khmer-on-Khmer violence is again 
manifest, evidenced in that she seeks to locate culpability outside of Cambodia. This type of 
concern seems to point again to a tension between a legal mechanism, such as the ECCC, that 
relies on types of knowledge/memory that are factual/forensic, with a desire among sections 
of the Cambodian public to explore contextual questions about the nature of Cambodia’s 
history of political violence. 
 
The demand for the recognition of ‘unacknowledged’ memory also emerged among former KR 
cadre too: 
 
I want those who are scared of Khmer Rouge to understand the Khmer Rouge. They 
assume [that the] Khmer Rouge is the most responsible offender. Pol Pot died, but people 
still respect his grave. Because they know him, and they know he was not bad. People 
need to understand the Khmer Rouge in order to not be scared of them. We have to 
understand what Pol Pot did. Of course they are responsible for the massacre and they 
must be held responsible. But why did they have so many followers? I was a willing 
follower. They need to understand us. 
151 
 
 
For a number of the former soldiers, the civil war and violence perpetrated before and after 
the 1975-1979 period was central to this ‘truth’, reflecting their concern that ‘legitimate’ 
memorial narratives in the national biography were being subordinated within a picture that 
did not address the ‘whole story’. Reconciliation and justice were considered problematic 
without acknowledgement of these broader periods of conflict. One exchange between Theary 
Seng, the forum leader and a former-KR encapsulated this well:  
 
KR: I went through the regime, and each regime up to now. The killings happened in every 
regime.  During the Pol Pot regime there was a massacre, and during the PRK, so the ECCC 
doesn’t bring real reconciliation, with those who commit crimes outside the regime. After 
1979 a lot of people were killed too. People were killed by hunger, foreigners, and KR.  If 
the trial cannot bring justice for people, we should give pardons, join hands and work for 
the people. Justice does not exist at the court – there is still injustice. There are problems 
today with injustice, the equality of poor and rich. We should concentrate on this not the 
trial. 
 
Forum Leader: The size of the crimes was big and cruel. This court will not convict 
ideology. It will convict criminals. Now we have a lot of evidence to prove the massacres 
did happen. 
 
KR: I am not worried that I will be convicted. The criminals should get real punishment. 
They are nationalists, but are responsible for the loss of life during that period. But you 
left after the regime, you didn’t suffer. Or see the suffering after that period, all my family 
were imprisoned. What we need is real reconciliation. The trial of senior leaders will not 
cause insecurity amongst the people. But there are many victims, and those who 
committed the crimes who are now in power. 
 
This exchange is of particular interest because of the way the former KR attendee has 
disrupted the forum’s understanding of reconciliation as an ensuing and complimentary 
outcome of the ECCC. It is noteworthy that he does not deny the factual basis of the ECCC 
claims about the 1975-1979 violence (an outcome of senior leaders’ guilt). Rather, his re-
conceptualisation of victimhood as a substantive category for all of those involved in political 
violence within and outside 1975-1979 contests the legitimacy of the ECCC as a reconciliatory 
strategy because it presents alternative sets of victims and perpetrators. The court is validated 
on a universal claim that demands accountability and redress for all perpetrators and victims 
of political violence. The ECCC is then challenged when communities such as Pailin present 
claims about the occurrence of serious political violence that the ECCC will not attend to.  
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Conclusion 
The regime of memory enacted by the ECCC hinges on the prosecution of a ‘neat’ set of 
perpetrators in the name of an understanding of all Cambodians as ‘victims’ of the 1975-1979 
violence (this is notwithstanding those Cambodians formally recognised by the court as civil 
parties, who remain only a small section out of the universe of possible DK victims). The ECCC 
prosecutions formalise an account of the DK period in which blame is placed at the hands of a 
few senior KR leaders. Such restricted prosecutions play to the politics of national 
reconciliation by (re)constructing a de facto blanket amnesty for lower-level KR. Crucially, the 
ECCC prosecutions are reflective of the way blame for DK is represented at Tuol Sleng and 
Choeung Ek and, as such, they are deployed to help persuade groups that participate in ECCC 
outreach about the truth of the DK period and the need of the ECCC as a response to it. These 
sites were initially pivotal in the 1980s political construction of a national account of what 
happened under the KR, reflective of a politics of reconciliation therein, and must be 
understood as ‘reactivated’ for ECCC outreach purposes because of the correspondence in the 
way they mirror the articulation of culpability today.  
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the success of these sites in disseminating a reading of the 
past in the name of the ECCC is mixed. Some of the forum visitors attempted to contest the 
meaning of the sites and some questioned whether they accepted the ECCC as valid or 
necessary response to the suffering represented. Others among the visitors found Tuol Sleng 
and Choeung Ek to correspond to their own experiences of DK and many considered the ECCC 
otherwise important: accepting the ECCC’s preferred reading of the past articulated at the 
memorial and museum sites past did not neatly translate into accepting the normative 
legitimacy or efficacy of the ECCC and vice versa. This shows that technologies of memory can 
produce multiple, varied responses and explains imperfections in the correspondence of their 
actual and intended effects when programmatically deployed (as part of outreach exercises).   
 
The public forum evidenced complementary technologies of memory brought to bear on the 
outreach process. As noted, outreach allows license for the introduction of particular lenses 
for ‘knowing’ the DK period that at the same time implys the necessity of the ECCC as a 
response to it. A more transformative notion of reconciliation is invoked in the work of civil 
society groups that situate the ECCC within internationalised therapeutic imperatives for the 
‘healing’ of a traumatised society. The therapeutic understanding of reconciliation invoked by 
CSD, with a focus on individual healing, centred testimonial (confessional) techniques at the 
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public forum as a premise and condition of reconciliation. At the same time, this approach 
complements the construction of lower-level KR as victims of the DK period. It can still be 
understood to exculpate lower-level KR, situating them as ‘victims’ of the regime, reframing 
memory of the DK period in ‘reconcilable’ terms. In this sense, the ECCC seminar and public 
forum worked to soften potential conflicts between regimes of memory by representing DK in 
these terms. 
 
Memory must be understood as constantly contested and renegotiated. The active and 
negotiated interactions between the Pailin residents and ECCC and CSD staff show that 
regimes of memory (and their technologies) operate as fields of practical action. This suggests 
that oppositions between ‘inauthentic’ and ‘authentic’ memory present a false choice: 
memory is constantly reconstructed in ways that can produce changing (and persistent) 
interpretations of what accounts of the past mean. Crucially, we must understand this process 
to occur between differentially positioned social agents, each with shifting and varied access to 
the power and authority to speak about the past. At the ECCC public seminar and public forum, 
the demands of the regime of memory enacted by the ECCC were consolidated by the 
presence of authoritative voices and the arbiters of ‘justice and reconciliation’, but it seems 
they also ‘provoked’ resistances on this basis as they sought to make demands of memory. 
Moreover, this hints at the possibility that the personal and embodied - rather than ‘still’ – 
means of remembering violence were more strongly felt in these instances of mediating justice 
and reconciliation.       
 
 
The Pailin participants’ visit to Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek demonstrates that particular 
accounts of the past emerging, and the meanings or moral imperatives arising from them, are 
rarely singular, unified, or completely shared, even within a localised community. In the first 
instance, this suggests that the production of a unified ‘collective memory’ will remain 
problematic for institutions such as the ECCC, whose strategic aims, justice and reconciliation, 
hinge upon the acceptance of a shared understanding of both ‘what happened’ and ‘what 
must be done’. More problematically, responses from the Pailin residents indicate the 
existence of localised regimes of memory that directly conflict with and challenge the 
normative legitimacy of the regime of memory sanctioned by the ECCC. The outreach exercises 
and forum evidenced the existence of alternative regimes of memory that are silenced by the 
ECCC proceedings, particularly those based around accounts of suffering that occurred before 
and after the ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction. These are important because they can make 
counter-claims about victimhood that challenge the ECCC privileging of the 1975-1979 period. 
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They are also disruptive because they necessarily involve counter-claims about perpetration 
too, bearing in mind that the creation of the court by the UN, Cambodian government and 
international community was contingent on a 1975-1979 jurisdiction that could prosecute only 
senior leaders of the KR.    
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Chapter Five 
Cambodian Accounts of the Wat Thmey Genocide Memorial 
 
This chapter focuses on examples of ambivalent and conflicting memories of the KR that 
emerged during fieldwork in the context of a prominent genocide memorial in Siem Reap, 
Cambodia’s third largest city. As I argued in the previous chapter, ‘Mediating Memory’, 
‘counter’ memories conflict with the account of the past sanctioned by the ECCC because they 
illuminate the perpetration of political violence outside of the terms sanctioned by the court. 
The examples offered in this chapter build on this, though notably the conflicting memories 
presented here exist in a community of victims that suffered severely at the hands of the KR. 
Moreover, I argue that ambivalent memory actually renders questions of reconciling divided 
memories moot. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that ambivalent memory must be 
understood as actively renegotiated, foregrounding the importance of agency in remembering 
political violence. This contrasts with the way in which the ECCC has invoked a ‘national’ 
memory that tends to position Cambodians as passive and uniform in their relationship to 
memories of past political violence.  The chapter is based on four months of participant 
observation at the Wat Thmey genocide memorial in Siem Reap. The chapter explores the 
ways in which the memorial to victims of the KR can be understood to reproduce, ‘carry’ and 
recue memories of past political violence in uneven and conflicting ways. In the context of the 
ECCC, the Wat Thmey genocide memorial represents an important site of memory work in 
because it anchors claims about past political violence that are consistent with the ECCC 
prosecutions, specifically around the guilt of a handful of leaders. Moreover, like the ECCC, the 
Wat Thmey genocide memorial isolates aspects and experiences of the KR – specifically, 
representations of the Tuol Sleng S-21 interrogation site – to act as a synecdoche for 1975-
1979; that is the memorial depicts a particular part or aspect of DK that is made to stand for 
the whole. This is important to note because, like the ECCC, the account of the past authorised 
by the memorial is politically winnowed to suit a politics of reconciliation. On this basis, it is 
important to examine how Cambodians living and working around the site respond to the 
memory claims anchored at the memorial as a way of thinking through the resonance of the 
ECCC’s preferred reading of past political violence on an ‘everyday’ basis.   
 
The Wat Thmey genocide memorial performs several overlapping and, at points, conflicting 
roles for the local community. It is worth briefly reconsidering some of the tasks that memorial 
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sites can play for societies in the wake of political violence that are identified within the 
literature on memory. These vary between ‘formal’ state-led and informally enacted functions 
(although, as this chapter shows, this division is not exclusive; formal strategies of 
memorialisation can develop ‘lives’ of their own, and indigenous or cultural memorial codes 
can be appropriated by formal state-led commemorative strategies). In the first instance, as 
technologies of memory, memorials call our attention to absence and loss (Young 1993). In this 
sense, memorial practices (and the practice of memorialisation) may be explicitly focused 
around processes of bereavement and loss. As Winter highlights in Sites of Memory, Sites of 
Mourning, the collective confrontation with massive loss following World War I required a 
common language of bereavement, to which less formal ‘grassroots’ memorialisation was a 
key feature (1995: chapter four). At the same time, memorial and commemorative practices 
have been and continue to be subject to formal, programmatic direction (and appropriation) 
by state elites in the way that they can valorise or glorify national pasts, legitimating power 
and present interests (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Moreover, the task of memorials in 
anchoring and representing national biographies mean that they can fast become crucibles for 
the contestation of competing accounts of the past. For example, White has shown how the 
(aborted) commemorations of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in 1995 raised serious 
questions in the US public imagination over the extent to which Japanese victims of the atomic 
bombs should be acknowledged in the national narration of the 50th anniversary of the end of 
the World War II (1997). Thirdly, memorials have also performed more ‘everyday’ and 
functional roles: in the wake of World War II, the proliferation of ‘living’ memorials, such as 
hospitals, schools, or other public spaces, combined both symbolic public importance 
alongside specifically functional, community responsibilities (Barber 1949). More recently, a 
fourth role for memorials has emerged as the authority of the ‘urge to remember’ and politics 
of regret have become increasingly entrenched (Barsalou and Baxter 2009). Memorialisation 
has been foregrounded as specific technique within transitional justice approaches through 
the pedagogical, deterrent, and ‘restorative’ meanings that memorials may convey (Bickford 
2005; Hamber, Ševčenko et al. 2010). Lastly, the increasing number of (global) visitors to 
memorials to political violence and war indicates the way in which the tourism industry has 
bloomed around sites of atrocity. Various practices of visitation are invited by the curation of 
memorials and sites of atrocity, ranging from ‘dutiful’ or ‘humanitarian’ witnessing (Hughes 
2008), to more ‘transient’ experiences rooted in the practices of mass tourism (Sturken 2007). 
On the one hand, a key task of this chapter is to explore the extent to which each of these 
roles is visibly performed at the Wat Thmey genocide memorial. On the other, there are 
important conflicts between these different roles that have serious consequences for 
remembering political violence in the context of the ECCC. 
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This chapter has four sections. The first section introduces the Wat Thmey site (that hosts the 
memorial) and maps the social and political role of pagodas within Cambodian communities 
today. The second section situates the Wat Thmey memorial within a history of Cambodian 
state-sanctioned memorial initiatives that started in the 1980s. The third section 
problematises the key representational technologies at work at the memorial site: the display 
of mass human remains and the employment of an information board that opens the 
possibility of multiple ‘audiencings’ of the memorial, noting the way that the memorial 
specifically appropriates images from S-21 and depicts them ‘in situ’ as authentic to the site. 
The fourth section offers an extended discussion of Cambodian responses and perspectives 
about the Wat Thmey memorial. I outline the varied and uneven way the memorial cues and 
provokes conflicted, resistant and ambivalent memories of political violence. The final section 
contrasts these ‘everyday’ accounts of Wat Thmey to a significant state led commemorative 
initiative, the May 20th ‘Day of Remembrance’.   
 
The chapter draws three key conclusions. The first links the representational frames at play at 
the Wat Thmey memorial to local residents’ and visitors’ discomfort when encountering it. 
Local authorities and religious leaders appropriated Buddhist funerary iconographies when 
curating the Wat Thmey memorial in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the memorial is maintained by 
the monastic community at the pagoda and the location of the memorial at the heart of a 
temple compound situates the memorial as the central focus of a ‘sacred’ space. At the same 
time, the Wat Thmey memorial is not immune to the ‘profane’ field of politics in the present, 
and is bound to a history of state directed commemorative initiatives that began in the 1980s. 
Moreover, the memorial utilises ‘profane’ techniques of representation as it anchors a claim 
about political violence, such as the display of human remains. The political meanings attached 
to the memorial and the use of profane artefacts of memory stirs discomfort and suspicion 
among many Cambodians living near or visiting the site. Resistance to the memorial, on these 
terms, is important to note because the memorial does not convey the educational meanings 
about past political violence that it is intended to. Moreover, mistrust and suspicion of the 
memorial among Cambodians can actually cue and engender conflicting claims about past 
political violence that eschew and challenge the preferred reading of the past depicted by the 
memorial. These alternative claims over the past are important to note because they also exist 
in conflict with the preferred reading of political violence sanctioned by the ECCC, evidencing 
regimes of memory that appear incongruous to the central tenets of Cambodia’s bids to 
provide justice and reconciliation.          
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A second key conclusion follows from this. On the one hand, the memorial appears able to cue 
resistant and conflicting memories of the KR period that challenge the account of the past 
anchored by the memorial and sanctioned by the ECCC (that the loss of life during DK should 
focus memories of political violence in Cambodia and that only a handful of senior leaders 
were responsible). On the other, over the period of fieldwork, I found ambivalence toward the 
past that the memorial lays claim to. Ambivalent memory is important to note because it is 
dislocated from the imperatives invoked by Cambodian government and ECCC staff that 
position the ECCC as necessary as a panacea to memories of past suffering and renders the 
questions of reconciling conflicting memory moot. I contrast ‘everyday’, ambivalent 
appreciations of the memorial with a ‘spectacular’, active or ‘hot’ national commemorative 
exercise (see  Jones and Merriman 2009), the ‘Day of Remembrance’ on May 20th 2009. The 
exceptionality of the Day of Remembrance at Wat Thmey contrasts sharply with the day to day 
appreciations of the memorial within the community, which were far more passive. Moreover, 
there is a reflexive point to be made about how memory works here: in interviewing, directing 
or focusing respondents on the memorial site, the memorial (and past) is ‘activated’ in uneven 
ways. Likewise, the Day of Remembrance represents a reactivation, reassertion and imposition 
of prevailing state-sanctioned discourses of vigilance and national solidarity in the wake of 
atrocity that are elided in the more ‘everyday’ explanations of the memorial I encountered.           
 
A third key conclusion concerns the way in which the role and function of the memorial has 
been renegotiated under terms that disrupt the imperatives used to justify ECCC. The Wat 
Thmey memorial today principally caters to an international, transient tourist audience. The 
role of the memorial within the tourist economy represents, on the one hand, an 
objectification of memories of political violence. The memorial acts as a referent to a wider 
experience of political violence, through S-21 as a synecdoche, as it attempts to ‘fix’ a claim 
over the past that can be witnessed or consumed by transient tourist groups. On the other 
hand, the monastic community did not seem uncomfortable with this function of the 
memorial, and in this sense the harnessing of the memorial for the maintenance and upkeep 
of the temple more broadly should best be understood as a pragmatic initiative to ensure that 
it can continue to provide its wider functions within the community (for example, schooling, 
accommodation, or religious ritual). In this sense, although the memorial itself remained a 
source of discomfort for some, it continues to be functionally important for the community. In 
the first instance, this represents a further instrumental use of the past in the service of the 
present. More importantly, this shows that Cambodian communities are active in making the 
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past meaningful in the present in varied ways. This again has implications for justifications for 
the ECCC because, as I showed in Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, the court is 
predicated on the idea that Cambodians have been unable to deal with the past until its 
advent.        
 
 
5.1 The Wat Thmey pagoda and memorial 
 
Wat Thmey63 – translated in English as ‘new temple’ – is located roughly 3km North of Siem 
Reap on the ‘back’ road toward the UNESCO World Heritage Angkor temples (Cambodia’s 
principal tourist attraction). I first visited Wat Thmey in 2005. At the time, the surrounding 
area around the pagoda64 remained relatively ‘rural’, to the extent that the tourism boom in 
Siem Reap witnessed over the past decade (and attendant increases in land values) had not 
encroached on the area through visible property development or intensive construction work. 
To the south of the pagoda was a major local children’s hospital and, at the time, the early 
signs of some building development. To the north lay a forested area protected by the APSARA 
Angkor heritage authorities (the group charged with the management of the Angkor 
conservation area) and to the west of the compound land use remained principally 
agricultural, with the roads unpaved and the only immediately proximal public amenity a small 
children’s school.  
 
By 2008 the area had changed quite dramatically. Since the end of the war, Siem Reap has 
sprawled from its centre outward in all directions, but particularly along arterial routes, and 
the area around Wat Thmey had visibly ‘urbanised’: instead of fields, much of the ‘back’ road 
from Siem Reap to the temples was itself now lined with hotels, newly constructed properties 
and, directly opposite the Wat Thmey pagoda compound, a large development of pink 
condominiums with ground floor office and retails units. Many of these apartments were 
                                                          
63 Wat Thmey is officially called Wat Ateh Smaw Sann 
64 I use the terms ‘temple’ and ‘pagoda’ interchangeably to describe the research site. 
Specifically though, the temple is one of – but the most important amongst – a set of buildings 
inside a pagoda compound. 
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vacant, with for sale or rental signs placed in the windows, and only a few of the ground floor 
units were in use. Cambodia’s recent tourism and land value ‘booms’ has been characterised 
by the pricing out of less affluent sections of society, especially those without access to 
established patrimonial political networks, from the property and rental markets, particularly 
in ‘high end’ developments such as condominiums. As commentators such as Springer have 
noted, the marketisation of Cambodia’s post-conflict economy has afforded opportunities for 
existing elites to (often kleptocratically) consolidate, expand, and acquire capital through 
existing patronage networks; importantly, this has conterminously afforded new forms of 
political control and regulation through the distribution of capital, i.e. property titles, or 
material and economic support for social, public and religious bodies  (Springer 2009; Springer 
2011). Monastic institutions (and Wat Thmey in particular) are not exempt from or 
insusceptible to the political and economic interests that are bound to those patronage 
networks, which is at odds with their purported apolitical and market exempt role within 
Cambodian public life (Kent 2007). This has important implications for the imperatives to 
remember past violence because memorials erected at religious sites exist within locally 
embedded political networks, but are also subject to economic demands that can entail the 
‘commoditisation’ of memories of violence. The politicisation and ‘marketisation’ of memory 
challenges the injunction to remember the past underpinning the ECCC because the court is 
predicated on affording a sense of justice and dignity for victims of the regime, rather than 
through generating revenue or political capital.                      
 
As Kent has noted, the proliferation of newly constructed pagodas and the re-assertion of 
Buddhism as central component of public life has been a hallmark of Cambodia’s transition to 
peace and its attempts to re-establish social and moral order (Kent 2007). At the same time, 
because Cambodia’s economic fortunes have blossomed in uneven ways – principally in favour 
of existing political patronage networks – pagodas are increasingly embedded within the 
demands of localised political and economic environments. Traditionally, pagodas were 
maintained and funded by donations from members of the local community. As a result of the 
uneven distribution of the fruits of economic expansion, pagodas increasingly must seek 
recourse to political support and patronage – which in turn confers religious authority, ‘merit’ 
and political capital to the patron – or seek alternative means of generating revenue. As I will 
outline, the negotiation of a role as a ‘sacred space’ within both political networks and 
relations of economic exchange remains a vexed issue for pagodas and their perception by 
Cambodians, specifically in this case because religious leaders have put representations of the 
KR period to use in ways that are ‘inauthentic’ to the ‘in situ’ history of the site.  
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In accordance with Buddhist practice in Cambodia, the pagoda site is comprised of and 
structured around a central vihear (temple), the focus of daily ritual activity (Chouléan 1988; 
Marston 2006), although the pagoda also houses a community of around forty monks and 
includes a school facility that teaches basic general education and pali65. To the rear of a 
pagoda compound are usually a set of memorial chedais (stupas), dedicated to and preserving 
the remains of deceased venerable monks and abbots. Crucially the central vihear is the 
lynchpin from which the outer perimeter boundaries of the pagoda compound are 
demarcated. Drawing on Mary Douglas’ seminal ‘Purity and Danger’ (1991), Kent explains how 
the perimeter limits of any pagoda are important for the wider community because they also 
designate the boundaries of a key set of distinctions and dichotomies that are crucial for the 
maintenance of social order, namely: sacred and profane; religious and secular; but also, 
importantly, the designation of a purified space that is intended to be ‘immune’ from the 
realm of politics and economic exchange (Kent 2007: 337-338).  
 
As the point of mediation between spiritual and secular realms, pagodas are also the focus of 
exceptional religious observances and holy days. These include Visaka Bochea (honouring the 
birth, enlightenment and passing of Buddha); Meak Bochea (venerating the teachings of 
Buddha); and whilst the Khmer New remains a largely secular observance, traditionally falling 
to mark the end of the harvest season, offerings and rites are performed at pagodas to ‘make 
merit’66 for the new year ahead. One of the most important annual Buddhist observances is 
P’Chum Ben, or the ‘ancestors festival’. P’Chum Ben usually falls in September or October and 
is observed over two weeks to honour and pacify the spiritual realm of past ancestors. During 
P’Chum Ben, the monks and the pagoda act as the key points of mediation between the living 
and the dead. Cambodian communities provide offerings of rice balls, representing ‘merit’ 
transfer and the thus the spiritual rejuvenation of community and country. Notably, Kent has 
suggested that the ‘…rapid revival of P’Chum Ben since the end of the war may be understood 
in part as an attempt to reassert the distinction between the realm of the dead and the living, 
and thus to mollify the country’s traumatic history’ (2007: 342). This is an important point to 
                                                          
65 Pali is the language through which the majority of Therrevada Buddhist scripts are written 
and ceremonies performed. 
66 Making merit refers to a specific set of Buddhist/animistic ceremonies that were intended to 
ward off inauspicious spiritual forces (or spirits). As one monk explained to me, these are 
essentially ‘good luck’ or ‘good fortune’ rituals. 
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bear in mind, as the state directed memorialisation and commemoration of the KR period – 
practices that do not originate in religious or theological tradition – have increasingly 
appropriated religious elements, rites and iconographies in order to convey authority.    
 
In the centre of the Wat Thmey pagoda compound is a memorial stupa to victims of the DK KR 
period. The centrality, size and form of the stupa immediately set it aside as exceptional from 
the other stupas at the rear of the 
compound (that, notably, only 
memorialise individuals: revered 
religious leaders and abbots). The 
local authorities and religious 
leaders ordered the construction 
of the memorial stupa in 1996, in 
accordance with the design of 
Cambodia’s ‘principal’ national 
memorial site outside Phnom Penh 
at Cheoung Ek (examined in 
Chapter Four, ‘Mediating 
Memory’): there is an elevated 
pavilion and awnings decorated 
according to Buddhist 
iconographies and a lower half 
devoted to the public display of 
human remains – ‘primary 
artefacts’ – of victims of the KR. As Hughes has suggested, the deployment of pavilion 
structures at such memorial sites is intended to indicate both a place of ‘cultural learning’, 
whilst the use of traditional Buddhist funerary colouration around the lower half of the stupa 
(white) infers meanings of death and impermanence, alongside the availability of incense 
sticks for prayer to those deceased. Against this, as noted in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating 
Memory’, the mass display of human remains runs counter to traditional funerary practice, 
with the preservation of human remains usually reserved only for individuals of venerable 
status (Hughes 2005: 274-275). The memorial is, in this sense, conflicted in its religious and 
political meanings because it is laden with both ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ associations, 
complicating its role as a carrier and cue of memories of atrocity. This means that the Wat 
Figure 8 The Wat Thmey Memorial stupa 
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Thmey stupa potentially stirs similar discomfort for Khmer audiences, a recurring response I 
encountered during fieldwork at the memorial.   
 
5.2 The memorial in context 
 
It is important to situate the memorial within the broader use of memorial practices in post-KR 
Cambodia before considering its role within the community today. The Wat Thmey site has its 
own history that must be traced back to the state directed practices of memorialisation 
conducted in the 1980s. Local authorities and religious leaders ordered the construction of the 
current stupa (in its religious form) in 1996, though importantly the site hosted and is haunted 
by earlier memorial initiatives launched under the Vietnamese backed PRK government (1979-
1989). The PRK fought a protracted civil war against KR and anti-Vietnamese forces throughout 
the 1980s. During this period, the PRK needed to find ways to secure support from the 
domestic population, justifying the Vietnamese intervention and presence in Cambodia, as 
well as enticing defections from the KR insurgency (a reconciliatory endeavour), despite the 
widespread evidence of KR atrocities under the DK regime. From 1983, the PRK established a 
‘Genocide Research Committee’ tasked with disinterring provincial mass graves across the 
country. The PRK state instructed local and district authorities to display anonymous human 
remains in public – often simply in wooden display boxes – in order to provide public evidence 
of the atrocities of the ‘Pol Pot – Ieng Sary clique’, cautioning the population against their 
return to power (Hughes 2006: 109-111). The PRK’s linking of human remains with a depiction 
of blame around the ‘Pol Pot – Ieng Sary clique’ in the 1980s is important to note because it 
corresponds neatly with the narrow reading of responsibility – to ‘senior leaders’ – at play at 
the ECCC today. Moreover, as this chapter documents, local authorities have more recently 
made explicit connections between the memorial and the ECCC by publicising ECCC outreach 
materials in display cases at Wat Thmey. This is important because it shows both the 
persistence, reactivation and reframing of memories of atrocity, specifically around the 
question of blame.   
 
The Wat Thmey case evidences the international mobility of ‘national’ memorial practices in 
two senses. Firstly, Anderson’s writing on the rise of the ‘tomb of the unknown soldier’ 
reminds us of the incongruity of anonymous, mass memorialisation as a technique for 
remembering anything but the sacrifice of national subjects: one cannot imagine “…a Tomb of 
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the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph of fallen liberals” (2006: 10-11). The possibilities of a 
national subject and national sacrifice are mutually authorising. This is important because it 
animates and reinforces the idea of a wounded national community in the same way that the 
ECCC purports to remedy a national injustice. Moreover, anonymity in memorial practices – 
beyond allowing the memory of ‘everyone but no one in particular’ (Gillis 1994: 11) - emerged 
as way of capturing the arbitrariness of mass violence afflicting ‘national’ populations, a 
defining feature of ‘total warfare’ during World War II. This is an important bridging point for 
the case at hand because it begins to blur the memorialisation of combatants and civilians. In 
Cambodia, Hughes has noted how state-led memorial practices in the 1980s, employing 
anonymous human remains, represented a bid to nationally reclaim, or re-‘know’ victims that 
cannot be understood as having been ‘sacrificed’ (Hughes 2006: 259). As a technology of 
memory, the power of the display of anonymous remains hinges on the possibility that, for the 
audience, one of those persons could have been a lost mother, father, brother, sister, friend or  
other relative (Blair, Balthrop et al. 2011).  
 
 
The Wat Thmey memorial was one of many memorials erected across Cambodia’s provinces in 
the wake of the KR in the 1980s. The PRK intended these memorials to address Cambodians 
through the possibility of personal bereavement and a prevailing national narrative about loss 
and salvation from the KR. This is a powerful platform from which to generate claims about 
blame for political violence: the PRK built the provincial memorials to represent culpability 
around a narrow number of senior KR figures, cautioning against the return of the KR, and thus 
to legitimate the 1980s PRK state as the saviour of the Khmer nation (Hughes 2000; 2005; 
2006). Moreover, because the PRK built the memorials to focus on the guilt of the few, these 
local-level memorials remained silent about the role of the ‘many’ (thus maintaining 
compatibility with continuous de facto amnesty policies directed toward lower-level KR by the 
Cambodian state). Again, this initial anchoring meaning remains important today because it 
corresponds neatly to the ECCC prosecutions of ‘senior leaders’. These are the conditions that 
make possible the ‘reactivation’ of such memorials for the purposes of the ECCC, as indicated 
in the previous chapter, ‘Mediating Memory’.      
 
Provincial memorial sites also provided the foci for a key state-led commemorative activity 
that began in the 1983 but continues today (in a differing guise): ‘Tivea Chang Khmaeng’, or 
‘The Day of Maintaining Anger’ (Hughes 2006: 33). From 1983, local communities were 
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encouraged by their authorities to attend mass grave sites every May 20th67 in order to 
denounce the atrocities of ‘Pol Pot’. ‘Victims representatives’ were asked to testify about their 
experiences under the KR; prominent figures from the local authorities would offer speeches 
condemning the Pol Pot regime; and vigilance was urged against a return of the KR. Hughes 
has suggested that although ‘The Day of Maintaining Anger’ was an explicitly state 
choreographed commemoration, the ceremony still at least resonated with Cambodian 
peoples’ experiences of the KR (2000).68 Observance of the May 20th commemoration has 
varied since then, essentially depending on political currents and the Cambodian state’s 
military and political strategy toward the KR resistance. The commemoration was observed at 
memorial sites through the late 1980s while the insurgency continued; with the advent of 
peace negotiations in 1991, the UN intervention during the UNTAC period (1992-3), and the 
RGC’s explicit aim of reconciling former KR from 1994 onwards, ‘maintaining’ public ‘anger’ 
became less of a political priority. The RGC resumed the ceremonies in 1999 as negotiations 
with the UN for the establishment of the ECCC began, demonstrating their commitment to 
pursuing accountability. The ‘The Day of Maintaining Anger’ continues to be subject to state 
direction today: the commemoration has continued to be observed since the establishment of 
the ECCC, though today under the guise of the ‘Day of Remembrance’. The renaming of the 
commemoration can be read as reflecting the end of the civil war: the Cambodian state no 
longer needed to ‘maintain’ an active public grievance or resoluteness, but could still garner 
political legitimacy from promoting the memory of its victory over the KR. In the final section 
of this chapter, I discuss my attendance at this event at Wat Thmey in 2009. 
 
5.3 The information board and audience(s)  
 
Alongside the display of bones in the stupa casing at the Wat Thmey memorial is an 
information board. The way that memorials generate meaning operates through a relationship 
between the representation of objects alongside supporting text; the audiences these invite; 
                                                          
67 May 20th is observed as the anniversary of the KR’s embracing of full scale collectivisation of 
agricultural production and communal eating in 1973. 
68 This argument is advanced along similar lines to Ledgerwood’s (1997) account of the 
curation of the Tuol Sleng Museum in Phnom Penh: that although deployed for explicitly 
political purposes, the representation of life under the KR visible at Tuol Sleng still rang ‘true’ 
with many Cambodians experiences of DK.  
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and the knowledge that audiences bring to bear when encountering them. The accompanying 
information board at Wat Thmey is important in this regard.  
 
At Wat Thmey in 2008, the headline text on the display board reads: 
 
DEAR TOURIST THE COLLECTION OF BONES THAT YOU SEE IN THIS STUPA WHERE BONES 
HAVE BEEN COLLECTED FROM NEAR BY THE FIELD. THESE WERE FROM THE INNOCENT 
PEOPLE WHO DIED AT THE HANDS OF THE SAVAGE POL POT REGIME IN 1975 – 1979. 
 
The lower half of the board was covered over69 to display photographs of former KR leaders 
(those still under detention at the ECCC, as well as the deceased Ieng Sary, Ta Mok and Pol 
Pot); public education materials from the ECCC (absent in 2005); and, notably, 
(unqualified/unexplained) images from S-21. I return to each of these issues in turn.        
                                                          
69 Hughes’ (2006) fieldwork includes a photograph of the Wat Thmey information board in 
2000 which featured text now seemingly plastered over. Additionally, the board read:  
 
“WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH MONEY TO BUILD A DIGNIFIED AND PROPER MEMORIAL 
TO HONOUR THESE INNOCENT PEOPLE. THE WORLD STOOD BY AND LET ANOTHER 
DICTATOR MURDER 3,000,000 IN FOUR YEARS. NOW WE CAN HELP PROVIDE COMFORT 
TO THESE DEAR DEPARTED SOULS WITH DONATION.  THANK YOU.”  
 
Frustratingly, I became aware of this amendment to the board following the completion of my 
fieldwork in 2009 (it could otherwise have been pursued as a line of interview enquiry). In the 
first instance, it is a basic indication of the way that memorials change and are changed, or 
develop ‘lives of their own’, potentially beyond their initially intended function. I return to 
discuss issues of witnessing and the commodification of memory later in the chapter; but the 
explicit appeal for donations in English shows that the site has functioned within an 
internationalised ‘tourist’ economy for over a decade: local donations through ‘merit making’ 
tend to be mediated through performative rites by monks. It remains important to question 
the possible reasons for the excision of the lower text. There are several possible reasons for 
this. Firstly, the implication that the memorial was ‘undignified’ might have been deemed 
problematic in the context of increased tourism. Secondly, the implication of international 
complicity in the KR atrocities could be in tension with the appeal (to tourists) to donate. 
Thirdly, the (inaccurate) 3,000,000 death toll cited is increasingly recognised as an 
overstatement (though leading government figures still invoke it on occasion). Lastly, the 
establishment of the ECCC in 2006 could have taken precedence as a topically resonant issue 
to be displayed alongside the remains of KR victims. Unfortunately, this cannot be answered 
conclusively here.        
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The text on the information board raises the immediate question of to whom the memorial is 
addressed. Because the memorial appropriates both religious and national iconographies, it is 
laden with potential meanings for a Khmer audience and, as I will show in this chapter, it 
conveys these meanings for Cambodians in complicated ways. At the same time, ‘DEAR 
TOURIST’ immediately repositions the memorial to an international (and transient) audience, 
and a box marked ‘donation’ is located alongside incense sticks that may be burned as 
offerings to the dead. The implications for a sense of ‘ownership’ are significant: the 
promotion of Cambodia’s memorial sites as tourist attractions, or sites of consumption or 
witnessing, can be problematic for many Khmers, and as noted in the previous chapter, the 
location of memorials within the tourist economy complicates Cambodian encounters with 
such sites. Perhaps most prominently (commenting on the deal to ‘franchise’ the ticket 
concession at the Cheoung Ek memorial site to a Japanese/Korean firm) Youk Chhang, head of 
DC-Cam, remarked that “…This is about the memory of a country, of a nation - and that's 
something important for the survivors. Memories cannot be contracted, cannot be sold, 
cannot be purchased - and therefore it should be in the hands of Cambodian survivors to 
maintain the place” (BBC 2005). Wat Thmey is ‘owned’ by the local monastic community, in a 
proprietorial sense, but it relies on tourist donations for its maintenance and upkeep. The role 
of the memorial is therefore complicated for Cambodians living and working around the site.  
 
Williams has suggested that particular memorial and museum sites organise objects, artefacts 
and displays to communicate a ‘cluster’ of meanings about victimhood and responsibility 
(2007: 25). The text on the board, in conjunction with the stupa, is complicated in this regard 
because new meanings have been ‘layered’ over the display (through the addition of 
photographs of Khmer Rouge leaders and ECCC education materials). Importantly, the 
category of victimhood is not elaborated or explained. The board provides no information, in 
either Khmer or English, about who died at the site (or nearby): the board is silent about 
origins of the unnamed victims; the gender and ages are unstipulated; the specific reasons for 
execution unspecified. The concomitant question of whether there should there be an 
acknowledgement of these details is itself unaddressed. Moreover, the board again provides 
no contextual background on why they might have died more broadly (or any historical 
information about the regime); and beyond the imported imagery from Tuol Sleng, there is 
nothing to indicate how they may have died (whether it be from execution, starvation, 
disease), beyond the claim that they died nearby, between the years of 1975-1979. In this 
sense, the text and stupa operate together to maintain the anonymity of victims to be 
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remembered, beyond the broad understanding that the victims were ‘innocent’ Cambodian 
subjects that died during the 1975-1979 period. The memorial serves to obfuscate details of 
any local specificity, while promoting the categories of ‘innocence’ and nationality. This is 
important because it again constructs and affirms a ‘national’ memory of political violence that 
corresponds to the way the ECCC is justified as a remedy for national suffering.   
 
Throughout the 1980s, the PRK described DK through the ‘savagery’ of Pol Pot (keeping the 
specific 1975-1979 framing in mind), and the continuity between the PRK government and the 
RGC today mean that such terms remain in circulation by leading political figures in the 
present. The key point here is that then, as now, a narrow range of persons are depicted as 
responsible for KR atrocities in 1975-1979. Religious leaders tasked with managing the site 
have supported this with the presentation of pictures of those accused at the ECCC (Nuon 
Chea, Khieu Samphan and the now deceased Ieng Sary) underneath the headline text, 
alongside images of Pol Pot’s corpse and Ta Mok (formerly detained awaiting trial at the ECCC, 
but now deceased). Notably, these images are captioned in Khmer, calling Cambodian 
attendees to the representation of blame depicted through the board. In one of the corners of 
the display case is the ECCC text ‘Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials’. In this sense, 
religious leaders at the site have made a direct connection between the memorial and the 
ECCC (beyond the implied and visible correspondence of the ECCC jurisdictions to the way the 
memorial depicts responsibility). The inclusion of ECCC materials raises important issues 
concerning the ‘layering’ of memory cues, specifically through the assemblage and addition of 
new objects, images, or texts in particular sequences or orders. It shows again, as I argued in 
the previous chapter, that the older or pre-existing bids to stabilise memories of ‘what 
happened’ can be re-circulated alongside or ‘reactivated’ in the name of new ones (such as the 
ECCC).    
 
A final issue that complicates the assemblage of meanings on the information board is the 
deployment of imagery from the Tuol Sleng ‘S-21’ Museum of Genocide Crimes in Phnom 
Penh. Images directly taken from the S-21 prison cells, portrait photographs, pictures of 
torture instruments used at Tuol Sleng and the paintings of S-21 survivor Vann Nath are 
displayed on the board as if authentic to the ‘in situ’ history of violence at the Wat Thmey 
pagoda itself. As I note in the coming section, a number of local pagoda attendees remarked 
that these photographs were specifically not from the Wat Thmey site. The question of the 
local ‘inauthenticity’ of such images is, on the one hand, in tension with the authority and 
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persuasiveness of the site as a display of human remains, or in situ ‘primary’ evidence of 
political violence. On the other, local accounts of the Wat Thmey site state that the pagoda 
had been used as an incarceration facility by the KR, and therefore images of imprisonment are 
not ‘thematically’ misleading or in conflict with accounts of the events that took place at the 
site. This again chimes with Ledgerwood’s argument that although museum sites might have 
explicitly political overtones in their curation – overtly synthetic, politically directed 
representations of loss – the meanings they convey may still ring true with the populations’ 
experiences they seek to depict (1997). Hughes has discussed the removal of S-21 imagery 
from its original site in Phnom Penh in her analysis of the presence of S-21 ‘mugshots’ 
internationally, specifically audienced at New York’s MoMA 1997 Photographs from S-21 
exhibition (Hughes 2003a). Hughes seeks to show how internationalised discourses of 
‘humanitarian management’ render such images appropriable in the international construction 
of an ‘ex-locus memorial’ to the KR. One effect, Hughes argues , is to pathologise violence as 
endemic to Cambodia (2003a). The presence of S-21 imagery at Wat Thmey raises a different 
question in the context of the work of the ECCC.  The importing and re-circulation of the 
prevailing, dominant imagery of the KR period from Tuol Sleng in order to help represent past 
suffering at Wat Thmey shows how specific experiences of the KR period  can act as a 
synecdoche for the wider whole. This is again a key parallel with the work of the ECCC because, 
as I showed in Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, the legal process increasingly focuses on 
‘spectacular’ moments or sites of atrocity to furnish its account of political violence. 
Specifically, the ECCC, like Wat Thmey, promotes S-21 as emblematic of the national 
experience of 1975-1979.     
 
5.4 Ambivalent encounters  
 
The fieldwork for this part of the research involved mornings and afternoons between January 
and April 2009 at the Wat Thmey memorial site, talking to monks, occasionally more formally 
interviewing senior achars (religious figures that lead ceremonies, and who were tasked with 
upkeep of the memorial), larking around with students at the pagoda, and speaking to 
Cambodians that lived and worked in the vicinity of the site. Most Cambodian visitors attended 
the pagoda to make merit, a specific set of Buddhist/animistic ceremonies that were intended 
to ward off inauspicious spiritual forces (or spirits), a rite removed from engagement with the 
memorial stupa itself. As one monk explained to me, these are essentially ‘good luck’ or ‘good 
fortune’ rituals. Amongst those most regularly present at Wat Thmey were students attending 
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school or being supported in terms of food and board by the monastic community. Others 
were longer-staying visitors from other provinces seeking the pagoda’s provision of affordable 
accommodation. In this sense, whilst the memorial to the victims of the KR was central to the 
layout and composition of the pagoda, I began to understand that the memorial was at most 
only secondary to Cambodians’ ‘everyday’ daily experiences at and around the pagoda. This 
did not mean that respondents were not attuned to a variety of roles and meanings the 
memorial site had for Khmers. The remainder of this section reflects on how attendees of the 
pagoda and local residents understood the role of the memorial in relation to their sense of 
community and the past, and to what extent the memorial itself – with human remains 
seemingly immutable evidence of suffering and political violence – can be understood to 
mediate a ‘regime of memory’.       
 
The monks attending the pagoda and those living around Wat Thmey were very familiar with 
the history of the memorial itself. Many informants displayed a tendency to describe the stupa 
in fairly ‘bland’ terms when asked about the memorial, almost taking its presence (and 
specifically processes of decay) for granted:     
 
Before the monks collected the bones from the field nearby and put them in the stupa. Before it 
was full, you see [gesturing to the stupa] it is now not full. It is difficult to protect the bones. Now 
it is not full. In the past the bones were in a wooden box, before the stupa was built [in 1996]. 
 
The informant’s reference to the ‘wooden box’ situates the Wat Thmey memorial within 
the wider history of nationwide memorial practices outlined in the preceding section. At 
the same time, the biographical ‘life’ specific to the Wat Thmey memorial was also a 
common concern. Another monk was keen to point out that: 
 
The bones are rotting. It’s gone down [the volume/number of bones] because the bones are rotting. 
They are almost soil inside. They are eroded. Maybe it’s leaking from the rain. 
  
I would often ask Cambodian local residents at Wat Thmey about the local area and 
community as a way into conversation. Respondents would sometimes make their own 
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connections between the memorial site and their perspectives on Cambodian history. 
Specifically, these conversations on could turn toward the context of the memorial as a marker 
of a site of mass violence. As one local resident pointed out: 
 
Before no people were living here. Many people were living nearer [Siem Reap] the city, but not 
here. Here, you know, they just grew rice, just a few people, but I know what happened here. 
 
Peter Manning [PM]: What happened? 
 
This place, here, they stand the people in line. Many, many… [lost conversation] You know Khmer 
Rouge?  The killing field [pointing away from the compound], they take them from far away and 
come here and kill them near here… One day, one car would come. One by one, people from 
Siem Reap city, they cut, they kill many people near here. 
  
As noted in Chapter Two, ‘Researching Regimes of Memory’, I was reluctant to pursue 
conversation that directly solicited testimony or personal experiences of the KR regime on 
ethical terms (due to attendant risks of invasiveness or harm). Encounters around the 
memorial ‘cue’, however, seemed to affect quite contradictory responses in this regard. On 
the one hand, some local residents seemed inclined (sometimes insistent) to recount their 
knowledge and experiences of the KR history, in situ of the memorial (although I have 
previously noted that this often seemed as if that was what was what they expected a Western 
researcher to want to hear). Notably, these accounts were uneven in the way they constructed 
blame for past suffering: 
 
I know the person who killed my children and my husband. I still know him. They [the children 
and husband] were accused of being Lon Nol soldiers. 
 
I remember before they removed [King] Norodom Sihanouk from the head of state [1970]. It 
made the Cambodian people in remote area protest and hold weapons to overthrow the traitor 
Lon Nol. At that time, the shots were fired each other like rain [referring to the war preceding the 
KR takeover in 1975]. I wonder where they got the modern weapons from because Cambodia 
could not produce weapons before. Cambodia was destroyed from then. I wonder where the 
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both sides got the weapons from to wage the war because we could not produce weapons. There 
must have been foreign countries behind.  
 
These remarks are significant given that the anchoring claim of the memorial site is to depict a 
generalised experience of blame for political violence at the hands of a few ‘savage’ KR 
leaders, both through the explicit text on the notice board, the assemblage of photographs 
and the ‘primary’ artefacts – bones on display – of political violence. Blaming lower-level KR 
and the influence of foreign countries eschews the anchored meaning of the site (and conflicts 
with the way in which the ECCC seeks to demarcate blame for the KR period).  
 
Other attendees were agnostic or reluctant to make connections between memories of 
violence and questions of responsibility. A motodop70 driver that accompanied me on a trip to 
the Wat Thmey site had asked why I wanted to visit the memorial. After I explained my 
research interests he remarked: 
 
I don’t know much about the KR period. But I know my uncles and my brothers were killed by a 
stick. My aunt was put in jail for seven months. They ate shit in order to survive. 
 
At times – though rarely, it should be noted – those living around the memorial that had 
ventured recollections of the KR period made direct connections with the ongoing ECCC trials 
and questions of responsibility. These would frequently be framed as questions about trial 
proceedings:71     
 
I was on the side of Vietnam to fight against Lon Nol at that time [before 1975]. One day they lost 
faith in me. They say that I forget my real loyalty. Why does the tribunal only look at the leaders 
at that time, you know 1975-1979? Why not before that? 
                                                          
70 A ‘motodop’ is a motorbike taxi – a commonly used, inexpensive mode of transport. 
71 This isn’t surprising as my introductory letter explained I was working on issues of memory, 
memorials and the trials. It is probably more significant that there were not more questions 
along these lines.  
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The people who were tortured and killed during Pol Pot regime [gesturing to the memorial]. It 
was not four or five leaders, there were many leaders. I wonder why the KR tribunal sentences a 
few leaders. Why doesn’t the court sentence the Khmer Rouge at low levels who committed the 
crime [gesturing to the memorial again], allowing them to live freely? 
 
Again, these responses are important because they show how both ‘personal’ and ‘general’ 
accounts of political violence can conflict with the regime of memory sanctioned by the ECCC, 
i.e. the personal and temporal jurisdictions of the court. Interestingly, the first respondent 
tacitly implies that he was fighting for the KR against the Lon Nol regime (1970-75), but in 
response to an accusation of disloyalty, he probes questions of responsibility of the KR 
leadership prior to the ECCC-mandated timeframe. Likewise, the second respondent 
challenges the way that the court defines responsibility only around senior leaders and those 
most responsible. In this sense, these types of response – by Cambodians that identify 
themselves as victims of the KR – are significant because they diverge in their memories of the 
past (what must be remembered, and how) with the immediate, public representation of the 
KR period (the memorial) and the regime of memory enacted by the ECCC. The representation 
of suffering depicted by the memorial seemed not to play a role in the maintenance of 
accounts of the KR period for these respondents. Rather, in these instances, the memorial 
itself seemed to cue alternative accounts of the past. We can read these responses as 
examples of ambivalence and resistance amongst the community toward the Cambodian 
state’s preferred account of the past, represented at the memorial but also underpinning the 
prosecutions at the ECCC. On this basis, ambivalent memory among Cambodians renders 
questions of reconciling conflicting memories moot. It is also crucial to note that these forms 
of resistance and ambivalence to the Cambodian state’s preferred reading of the past become 
pronounced exactly at the point of its propagation. This again evidences the need for a more 
‘reflexive’ appreciation of memory because, as I argued in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’, 
memory can emerge in relation to (but not necessarily in accordance with) the demands that 
are made of it.  
 
The memorial itself remained a source of discomfort for many respondents I met. Over the 
course of the fieldwork I frequently spoke to one group of students that had grown up in the 
area. They seemed to enjoy the novelty of a foreigner being present and would try to practice 
their English with me. I would often try to ask them what they thought about the memorial 
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site in these conversations. The issue of locality, community and human remains were bound 
together problematically, as one interchange indicates: 
 
When I was young I went to play over there [pointing away, toward the East of the pagoda]. 
When I finished, I’d come back past. I’m afraid, you know. I was always very afraid. Because the 
bones are like that, there are ghosts. I’m afraid. 
 
PM: Are Cambodians scared of this place? 
 
Yes they are scared of this place… before I lived here. I have seen something. The bones were on 
the field, behind the pagoda, near here. But behind, in a small river, they cut one by one and they 
use the gun… And also over there in the forest and on the road to Angkor Wat [pointing East 
again]. Many people here died because of Pol Pot. When I was young I wanted to play here. But I 
saw the bones. We were too small, just young boys, we just picked the fruit, but near the tree I 
looked and I thought ‘oh, many bones’. 
 
The presence of bones within the stupa 
and the pagoda compound can be read 
in a secondary, problematic sense. On 
the one hand, the student clearly 
accedes to the principal meaning 
intended by the memorial: that ‘Pol Pot’ 
was responsible for mass atrocity. On 
the other, the recounting of knowledge 
of both killing sites and the remains of 
violence (danger) is positioned against 
adolescent accounts of ‘play’ and 
recreation (safety). Collecting the 
‘primary artefacts’ of violence – human 
remains – and displaying them within a 
space that is demarcated as ‘sacred’ and 
functional for the community is in this 
sense transgressive. For Cambodians 
Figure 9 Bones collected and displayed in the Wat Themy 
Memorial stupa 
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of all ages, human remains are closely associated with notions of spirit, spirituality and, in lay 
terms, the topics of ghosts and spirits tends to stir fear (particularly visible in these accounts of 
adolescence). At the same time, the pagoda, temple and monks are considered the key agents 
in the mediating the relationship between ‘life’ and ‘death’, or rather, between the fields of 
mortality and fields of spirituality. As it became clearer to me that the memorial itself was 
problematic in some Khmer encounters with it, or at least stirred discomfort,, the role of the 
memorial for the community was increasingly illuminated as important.  
 
PM: So who comes here then [pointing at the memorial stupa]? 
 
It’s only tourists here. But sometimes [Cambodian] people come for the teachers, about 
Buddhism and the Buddhist story. Sometimes [Cambodians come] for the ceremony, like P’Chum 
Ben. They come here to enjoy, giving offerings to the monks. Something like an offering, to pray. 
They pray to their grandfather, grandmother, like that.   
 
One of the other students added:  
 
After the monks got the money from the tourists the pagoda got bigger. All the pictures you see, 
they’re from Tuol Sleng! 
 
The students were evidently attuned to the point that the photographs on display were not in 
situ, and therefore ‘authentic’ to the history of the site. This is important to note because it 
shows that Cambodian audiences are aware of the way in which the Cambodian state has 
made Tuol Sleng stand for the broader experience of the KR.  Moreover, while the students 
pointed to both the role of memorial in attracting tourists (linked through the Tuol Sleng 
pictures) as well as its religious functions, the students tended to shift conversation away from 
the topic of memorial itself. As Hughes has argued (2005), this may stem from their discomfort 
of confronting human bones because of the spiritual implications of un-cremated remains, 
both as a ‘topic’ and physical act of presence: there are difficult questions posed by the 
remains because they violate appropriate funerary practice, and the presence of the remains 
connotes danger and the presence of ‘ghosts’. The students generally preferred other 
conversation (about the players of different English football teams, mostly).  
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Older and younger attendees at the pagoda were often very reluctant to talk about the 
memorial itself. As one of the students interrupted another of my attempts to prompt 
discussion about the memorial: 
 
I live here but I don’t have a salary. I want to study. I learn English, I want to teach English. When 
I speak with you I use strong words, I am always thinking though, practice get better. 
 
Indeed, the group of students preferred talking about their own stories of who had come to 
visit Wat Thmey, eschewing my interest in visitations specifically to observe the memorial: 
 
You know, Peter? Before Jackie Chan came here! You know him? He is a handsome man. He 
came here with the USA people. 
 
PM: Bong tom song ha [Famous, handsome man]! What did he do here?  
 
He came to support the children that got HIV. Also the parent got HIV. He came to support the 
pagoda, he gave the money. 
 
PM: What about the pagoda, the monks, how do they help people? 
 
The monks also help people, of course. They support the parents without the ability, without the 
money. If parents find it difficult to find money for studying or if they need to find a place to stay. 
They pay a little for rice and the room. 
 
These exchanges show how pagodas in Cambodia play an important role as loci of the 
community, in their various religious, pastoral and pedagogical capacities (providing schooling 
and accommodation). For the students, the memorial itself seemed secondary, incidental, or 
unwelcome as a central feature of the compound otherwise (a point of issue I return to). 
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Moreover, many visitors and nearby residents seemed unfamiliar with the memorial. ‘Oh that 
place. I don’t know about that’ remarked one local resident. Another replied: ‘What does that 
matter now? Look around, this place changed very fast, I don’t think that is important now.’ 
This type of response is important to note for two reasons. Firstly, it shows ambivalence 
toward attempts to call attention to memories of KR, as demanded by the memorial. 
Moreover, these responses gestures to Connerton’s claim that in calling attention to absence, 
memorials themselves are poor vehicles for the reproduction of the past, and that the 
maintenance of memories hinges on a stable and unchanging built environment (2009). In this 
sense, the rapid urbanisation and changes affecting the area could be understood to 
undermine the ‘continuity’ of memory (Cohen 2001: 243). Other respondents were less 
sanguine about the role of the memorial itself: 
 
I don’t think we need to think about that now [the past]. That time, the trouble, that was all 
politics.
72
 The people yuon came and now they go. We don’t need to think about that at all, I 
don’t think this place is good for Cambodia. Now Cambodia is a better country. Why remember 
that, Khmer kill Khmer? 
 
Beyond the dismissal of any obligation ‘to remember’, this comment is notable for a number of 
reasons. The reference to ‘yuon’ is a (highly) derogatory slang term used to describe 
Vietnamese people (implying that the Vietnamese were ‘coming and going’ as a cause of 
violence or ‘the trouble’. The respondent enacts a ‘racial’ blame for ‘that time, that trouble’, 
which reflects a problem of remembering encountered throughout fieldwork: why would 
Cambodians (as a race/nation) kill other Cambodians? Emphasising solidarity between Khmers 
(as a race/nation) is one of the key prevailing political currencies visible in Cambodia today, 
notably employed recently during the 2013 national elections by opposition parties that are 
keen to label the current government as unduly influenced by the Vietnamese (the Vietnamese 
embassy actually complained about the use of the term by the opposition, see  Khy 2013). At 
the same time, it is a discursive repertoire that embargoes memories of ‘civil war’ and political 
violence between members of the same national/racial group as such. In this sense, it can act 
                                                          
72 The reference to ‘that time’ as ‘…all politics…’ has also been noted by other researchers 
working on Cambodia as a tactic to indicate topics or conversations that  are ‘off limits’ (See 
Wood, T. D. (2009). Tracing the last breath: Movements in Anlong Veng, ProQuest, Norén-
Nilsson, A. (2011). "Children of Former Khmer Rouge Cadres." Peace Review 23(4): 462-468.)    
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as a form of forgetting because it denies past ruptures of national solidarity. Blame, in these 
instances, will always rest at the hands of ‘foreigners’. This theme is a notable recurrence from 
the responses of the Pailin visitors to the outreach sites in Phnom Penh (described in the 
preceding chapter, ‘Mediating Memory’). Moreover, this response again shows how ordinary 
people tend not to accede to formal ‘regimes of memory’ – or more formal strategies – 
according to neat periodisations of the past: the ‘trouble’ encompasses a far wider and 
enduring experience of war, conflict and genocide that escapes the rigidity of institutional or 
legal coding, i.e. the four years mandated by the ECCC.     
 
More overt appreciation of the memorial itself was notably rare and tended to slip into, or 
reflect, overtly politicised explanations when forthcoming. One junior monk’s comments 
notably correspond to government preferred ‘script’ about ‘salvation’ from the KR:   
 
On January 7 [liberation day, marking the fall of the KR] then people come here, because they 
know. It’s because Khmer people are very grateful to the [current] Prime Minister, his name Hun 
Sen. They know from him, know that he helped them, they nearly all died [under the Khmer 
Rouge], but after that he helped them so much and saved Cambodia. 
 
The appreciative remarks thanking Hun Sen can be read to illuminate a number of issues. The 
explanation of ‘salvation’ thanks to Hun Sen reaches for the official state-sanctioned narrative 
about KR violence that the memorial reflects and anchors (also reflected at the ECCC 
proceedings). At the same time, the exceptionality of this encounter seems to point to a 
broader ‘banality’ in everyday perspectives about the past that the memorial lays claim to (I 
develop this further when considering the May 20th observation in the next section). These are 
aside from a third trend which, as I have pointed to above, either rejects the premises of the 
memorial (that violence occurred in the way the memorial depicts) or advances counter-claims 
about the need to remember or acknowledge wider histories than those authorised at the site.  
 
The potential pedagogical or deterrent meanings of the memorial were absent in the majority 
of Cambodian perspectives about the site. One exception to this tendency was provided by an 
older resident living in the vicinity of Wat Thmey. I asked if and how the memorial was 
important for the community:      
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Maybe if they keep those things [bones] the young might learn what happened during the Pol Pot 
time      
 
PM: Do you think it is important for younger people to learn about the Pol Pot time? 
 
Sure. Maybe they learn the history more, they understand old person better, maybe listen more. 
But that place [points in direction of memorial] is most important make money.  
 
There are two distinct imperatives invoked in this response. In the first instance, the older 
resident appeals to the importance of younger Cambodians learning about the ‘Pol Pot time’ 
as a way of enabling a ‘better’ understanding of the older generation. The key implication is 
that learning – fashioning knowledge of the KR period, (re)constructing a regime of memory 
about the national past – enables understanding or acknowledgement. This imperative 
corresponds neatly to the work of advocacy groups such as DC-Cam that have principally 
targeted the education of young Cambodians as a way of ‘dignifying’ the experiences of 
survivors of the KR regime. For example, DC-Cam is currently working on a compendium listing 
the names of those that died under DK, which will be distributed to commune offices 
nationwide and supported by plaques in municipal office grounds as means of promoting 
legacies of ‘memory’ and ‘dignity’73. Notably, the education of the younger generation is also a 
key outcome purported to follow from the ECCC proceedings. At the same time, the informant 
invokes a second imperative here – understanding the site as a source of revenue – and 
suggests this is more ‘important’. Although left unelaborated, the role of the site within the 
tourist economy is heavily implied. This points to important issues regarding the 
representation of the past and practices of witnessing or consumption at Wat Thmey. 
Memorials lend themselves to these ends because they offer a reference point that bids to 
signify a particular past; in doing so, memorials can treat that past as fixed, or as an object, 
which, like a commodity, can be consumed.            
 
                                                          
73 See 
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/assets/pdf/reports/Dealing_With_The_Past_Moving_Into_
The_Future_0.pdf last accessed November 2013 
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The monks seemed to take the role of the memorial as a source of revenue for the pagoda for 
granted. At the same time, respondents at Wat Thmey provided little evidence that this posed 
questions about the ‘ownership’ of memory.  Monks would frequently explain that very few 
Cambodians visited Wat Thmey in comparison with foreign visitors, emphasising the 
importance of tourism as a revenue stream for the upkeep and maintenance of the pagoda as 
a whole. As noted above, religious leaders had addressed the memorial to an international 
audience, with the information board (principally captioned in English) and donation box both 
addressed to tourists. Over the time I spent at Wat Thmey, it was clear that these groups were 
not infrequent in number. On a given morning four or five buses would arrive in the 
compound, with groups of tour groups staying at nearby hotels and accompanied by pre-
arranged, independent guides. The larger group visits tended to include an examination of the 
information board and an encirclement of the memorial itself. Occasionally, the groups would 
oblige the donation box next to the memorial. As noted, the local authorities and religious 
leaders at Wat Thmey had curated the memorial information board to deliberately include 
(and imply the in situ authenticity) of imagery from Tuol Sleng, a more recognisable reference 
point of the Cambodian experience of the KR for international audiences. Tourism represents 
another role for the memorial that involves a ‘part’ (S-21) being made to stand for the wider 
memory of the KR.  
 
Figure 10 A tour group looks at the Wat Thmey information board 
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Understanding the Wat Thmey memorial as a site that offers a narrow representation of the 
KR period, through human remains, Tuol Sleng portrait photos and its insertion into a tourist 
economy, raises troubling questions. On the one hand, the ‘commodification’ of the past as an 
‘object’ to be consumed gestures to arguments advanced by ‘dark tourism’ approaches. These 
suggest that the promotion and ‘reification’ of sites of suffering is directed to sate the appetite 
of globally mobile ‘impulse purchasers’ (Lennon and Foley 2000). Moreover, drawing on 
Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1988 [1844]), when we think about the 
reification of the past as a commodity for consumption, we can understand the way that 
‘objectified’ memory may become ‘estranged’ and ‘alien’ to its constituents, i.e. that 
community members can no longer feel attachments to memories that they have experienced. 
On the other hand, and bearing in mind the varied interpretations of the memorial I have 
mapped above, Hughes has argued that one the key practices of visitation to memorials (to 
Tuol Sleng specifically) includes ‘dutiful’ or ‘humanitarian’ witnessing. Such dutiful tourism is in 
turn constitutive of the meaning of sites of suffering as globally significant spaces. The tension 
here reflects debates about the role of memorial spaces as sites of either pilgrimage or tourism 
and consumption, an opposition purportedly in conflict. As Lloyd notes, practices of pilgrimage 
imply mourning, reverence and ‘dignification’ (Lloyd 1998: 4);  to ‘tour’ implies consumption, 
transience, ‘kitsch’ and trivialisation (Sturken 2007). Moreover, that religious leaders and 
community members have renegotiated the role of the memorial could be understood to 
demonstrate an active bond with memories of political violence that rebuts the way the ECCC 
has situated Cambodians as passive in their relationship to the past.   
 
In April 2009 I had a brief conversation with one of the more senior monks at Wat Thmey that 
seems now to bring together some of the varied issues and themes outlined above. 
 
PM: What do Cambodian people think of this memorial?  
 
You see not many Cambodians come. Only for the ceremonies, you know P’Chum Ben day, or 
Khmer new year day. That’s just what we believe.  
 
PM: But what about the bones on display?   
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We don’t want to keep the bones like this. It’s not natural. We want to burn them, so all the 
ghosts can go away, to the new world. 
 
PM: After the court?  
 
We’re not sure about the tribunal. They [the authorities] want us to keep here for the younger 
generation to see. But young people don’t come here much. Only international tourists come 
here. But that’s good – for the building and for the food. There are many people coming here 
everyday, 100, 200, 300 – forty people on every bus. Look [pointing at a Korean group arriving]! 
There are many buses. 
 
PM: Have you lived here for a long time? 
 
Yes, since the 1990s. The stupa is now only half full because it eroded. It’s not really good for the 
people of Cambodia. But for the next generation, it is good for the history – so this will never 
happen again. You know, many young Cambodians do not believe that this happened. They 
cannot believe that Khmer fight Khmer like this. Maybe this [memorial] help them understand. 
After the trial, I wish for all these bones to be cremated.  
 
The senior monk was notably savvy in the way he captured and evaluated the varied, 
competing demands that are being placed on the memorial site: between the religious 
obligation to observe appropriate funerary practice and the political demand to preserve 
public evidence of the KR atrocities; between the functional roles of the pagoda as a sacred 
site of learning and the demands placed upon it through its insertion into the tourist economy; 
and, more broadly, the peripheral role the memorial itself had in relation to other Cambodian 
practices of visitation to the site. The memorial, in its everyday existence, seemed not to play a 
significant role as a ‘carrier’ of collective memory. 
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5.5 May 20
th 
2009: The Day of Remembrance 
 
The May 20th commemoration – previously the ‘Day of Maintaining Anger’, changed to the 
‘Day of Remembrance’ in 200174 – is observed at sites of atrocity and mass graves under the 
direction of local Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) authorities across Cambodia. The May 20th 
commemorations are distinct in that their focus is ordered around memorial stupas that 
display the remains of KR victims (as opposed to, for example, P’Chum Ben which is a more 
prolonged ceremony that involves prayer and offerings to all passed ancestors at temples 
(vihear) – beyond victims of the KR). The key elements of the May 20th commemoration have 
included public testimony from victims of the regime about their experiences of KR rule, the 
public denouncement of the ‘savagery’ of senior KR leaders, and the urging of vigilance, 
previously against the KR’s return to power but now toward the preservation of ‘evidence’ 
about their atrocities. From their introduction in 1983, the provincial ceremonies encouraged 
the public to make and present placards along these themes at mass grave sites, though as the 
PRK state adopted an increasingly tolerant approach toward the public practice of religion in 
the latter 1980s, the commemorations have also come to appropriate and incorporate 
religious themes: wreath laying, chanting in pali and collective prayer are now also key 
elements in the May 20th observations. It should be also be noted that opposition political 
parties reject the legitimacy of the May 20th commemorations, considering the observance a 
CPP engineered form of propaganda.            
 
It is worth briefly considering another observation of the Day of Remembrance before turning 
to discuss the proceedings I observed at Wat Thmey in Siem Reap. At the Cheoung Ek ‘killing 
field’ memorial outside Phnom Penh – Cambodia’s principal national memorial site – the 
observance of May 20th has become increasingly elaborate over recent years. Since 2009, 
students from the Royal University of Phnom Penh School of Fine Arts performed a re-
enactment of the DK period to an audience of monks, Government authorities (including the 
                                                          
74 The Cambodian government has not publicly explained the change in the title of the 
commemoration. The change is likely reflective of previous gaps in its observance, such as 
during peace talks in 1991 when ‘maintaining anger’ was deemed incompatible with the push 
for a political solution to the civil war. In this sense, the change in name could be read to 
reflect the end of the civil war in 1999, shifting the obligation of ‘maintaining anger’ to one of 
memory.    
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Phnom Penh Governor and other leading CPP officials), and groups of school children as well as 
selectively  
 
invited members of the public. The commemoration is intended ‘to honour victims’ and 
educate on the ‘…inhuman acts of the regime through performance’ (Sreinith 2011). The 
ceremony has offered a narrative performance of the KR’s seizure of power, a depiction of life 
under the KR, before finally liberation (as salvation) by the Kampuchean United Front for 
National Salvation (the vanguard of the 1979 liberating forces and successor PRK and now CPP 
governments). The Fine Arts students, dressed in black KR uniform, recreated scenes of mass 
killing with KR cadre binding and executing men, women and children, leaving the grass in 
front of the Cheoung Ek stupa littered with ‘dead’ bodies.  Survivors are depicted searching 
through the ‘corpses’ for lost relatives. The KR figures are then chased from the field by the 
liberating green uniformed forces of the Front, to be greeted by celebration and thanks by 
those survivors left. The performance ended with a parade of CPP and Cambodian national 
flags. 
 
Figure 11 The Day of Remembrance at Cheoung EK (Photograph by Nhean Socheat and DC-Cam, 
2011) 
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The commemoration appears to be a peculiar 
means of aestheticising and representing 
genocide memory: re-enactments as a 
representational device tend to be reserved for 
the ‘glorification’ of memories of political 
violence, such as through imitating fanous battles 
(Mayo 1988). This is important to note because, 
as Hughes suggests, victims of the KR cannot be 
understood as having been ‘sacrificed’ (2006). 
Moreover, Mayo has pointed out that the re-
enactment of political violence within sacred 
spaces is often problematic because violence is 
considered sacrilegious. This raises questions 
about how appropriate the depiction of mass 
atrocity so proximal to the Cheoung Ek religious 
stupa is. In this sense, we must think about the 
Day of Remembrance as an example of ‘invented tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The 
explicitly political narrative in the performances – hinging upon salvation from the KR and 
obliging national gratitude to the Vietnamese and PRK ‘saviours’ – is bound to the legitimation 
of the present Cambodian government, heirs of the PRK successor regimes. Moreover, in the 
context of the ECCC, the revival of the commemoration can be further understood as an 
attempt to rebuff the (widespread) accusation that the Cambodian government is reluctant to 
disinter the past transparently or offer accountability for KR atrocities, and intends to induce 
‘collective amnesia’ (see  Chandler 2008).   
 
At Wat Thmey in Siem Reap, proceedings were less elaborate, though still similarly 
choreographed and led by the local CPP officials. I arrived mid-way through the 
commemoration (the proceedings began at 7am and lasted until midday). Around 2000 people 
were in attendance, including school children bussed in from the surrounding districts and 
communes.75 The front rows of the audience were reserved for monks, CPP officials and their 
                                                          
75 Yout also encountered a number of friends from his commune. He was unaware that they 
intended to attend; Yout also voiced his own surprise about the scale and scope of the 
proceedings.  
Figure 12 The Day of Remembrance at Cheoung Ek 
(Photograph by Nhean Socheat and DC-Cam, 2011) 
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uniform of bodyguards, followed by rows of nuns and community leaders. The proceedings 
were also being filmed for broadcast on local television.  
 
 
Figure 13 The 2009 Day of Remembrance at Wat Thmey 
 
As I arrived, the monks were leading the commemoration chanting in Pali, alternating between 
offering a dedication of merit to the dead and emphasising the ‘impermanence of material 
existence’. One of the senior monks invited the audience to participate in the chanting: 
 
Please ladies and gentleman and excellences, please chant after me to dedicate the memory to 
the dead. Please be rid of suffering and reach nirvana. We dedicate this to our ancestors, our 
fathers and mothers. We wish for a peaceful world. 
 
The deliberate co-optation of a religious format shows again how memorial and pagoda sites 
can be appropriated for political purposes. Moreover, the role of the monks leading the chant 
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– borrowing from other Buddhist rituals, specifically P’Chum Ben – is evidence of a political 
colonisation of the religious spaces and themes. I asked one monk to explain to me what was 
happening:  
 
Every year it is like this, it’s never been changed. More people are coming every year – counting 
the bowls – offering food to the monks – this is merit making. This is the time to offer rice and 
food to the monks.  We are making offerings directly to ancestors. 
 
The monk describes the commemoration under terms commonly referring to the P’Chum Ben 
ancestors festival (particularly the reference to ‘counting the bowls’), rather than the Day of 
Remembrance. I pressed this issue, asking the monk to explain further: 
 
We are Buddhists. We believe that this ceremony will release spirits. ‘Bonn’ in K’mai means 
merit. 
 
PM: So how is this ceremony different from P’Chum Ben? 
 
Not the same as P’Chum Ben. P’Chum Ben lasts for 14 days. This is just one day. And this one is 
just for some dignitaries and politicians. P’Chum Ben doesn’t have the eulogies [to the victims of 
the KR]. Today they were teaching. Things like not to kill their own race, like in Pol Pot time.  
 
Another monk added: 
 
This morning they testified about the Khmer Rouge time. It is public denouncement. This is the 
way that the dead will be in peace. When we see the bones in this place, and we do this 
ceremony, everyone will be happier. 
 
The commemoration in this sense hinges on two key memory techniques, working in tandem. 
Again, this is an example of presenting ‘what is to be known’ about the past (effects of 
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‘veridiction’) and ‘what is to be done’ about the past (effects of ‘jurisdiction’) (Foucault 1991b: 
75). In the morning, eulogy and testimonial are intended to recognise, remember and ‘honour’ 
experiences of life and loss under the KR. On this premise, the lesson of the commemoration, 
according to the monk, is a specifically national imperative: that the killing of one’s 
national/racial kin is an exceptionally grave form of atrocity that must be prevented at all 
costs. This is essentially an appeal to national and racial solidarity.     
 
The local authorities that organised the commemoration have harnessed religious ritual and 
language to the performance of an exercise in (secular) national mourning. This  should not be 
read as a bid to conceal the political direction of the commemoration, but rather a means of 
‘authenticating’ and legitimising the messages and meanings that the commemoration 
conveys. A series of placards were embedded within wreaths of white funeral flowers (which 
would usually bed portraits or pictures of deceased individuals). These were clear in their 
political message:     
 
VICTORIOUS CPP! 
 
WE ALWAYS REMEMBER THE ATROCITIES MADE BY POL POT IN CAMBODIA! 
 
LONG LIVE CAMBODIA! 
 
WE PROMISE TO PROTECT, WHATEVER IT TAKES, TO PROTECT ALL THE EVIDENCE! 
 
Alongside the CPP placards, more politically neutral banners were erected around the 
compound:      
 
NATION-RELIGION-KING 
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HAPPINESS, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT: THE TEACHINGS OF THE BUDDHA FOR ALL PEOPLE 
 
NO OTHER PEACE IS BETTER THAN PEACE IN THE MIND 
 
EARNING MERIT BRINGS YOU HAPPINESS AND PEACE 
 
 
The colonisation of the pagoda space, the 
appropriation of Buddhist funerary 
practices, and the deployment of 
explicitly political messages through the 
Day of Remembrance illuminates a 
number of important issues. On the one 
hand, the Day of Remembrance can be 
understood as an example of an ‘invented 
tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), 
whereby state elites harness the past in 
the service of present interests and 
political legitimation. Specifically here, 
the Buddhist framing of the performance 
serves to confer religious currency and 
authority onto the proceedings. The 
caveat here, recalling Ledgerwood 
(1997) and Hughes’ (2006) arguments, is that even if memory work is so overtly constructed on 
the terms of political interests, the past it seeks to represent may still resonate with the 
population to which it is directed. On the other hand, we know that opposition parties reject 
the legitimacy of the CPP, the participation by the public on the Day of Remembrance was 
solicited directly from the CPP support base, and the presence of the school children as an 
audience was mandatory. It is clear that the Day of Remembrance is an exceptional 
commemoration that is not observed in an even or entirely consensual way.    
 
Figure 14 The Day of Remembrance at Wat Thmey 
190 
 
As the proceedings began to conclude, monks and then figures from the local authority 
approached the memorial, lit incense sticks and began to pray. I spoke briefly to one senior 
party official about why he thought the Day of Remembrance was important: 
 
This ceremony was initiated by the CPP. The purpose is to dedicate merit to the ancestors. And 
secondly to teach the younger people about the Khmer Rouge time, the hunger the hardships 
and the anger. 
 
PM: I know that some Cambodians aren’t sure about this place though. Perhaps they don’t agree 
with the story that is told here. I know some people are afraid of the bones too. What would you 
say to them? 
 
I think they should keep the bones for historical fact. If we cremate, we’ll lose the evidence and 
the all the facts. Even after the trial, even after we find out who is responsible, we should keep 
the bones. To my understanding the tribunal is not about finding justice for everyone. It’s about 
finding out about the techniques and approaches used by the Khmer Rouge.    
 
The forthcoming connection between the importance of preserving the bones, the ECCC 
process and ensuring that the younger generation learn about the KR period was surprising. 
The response appears to reflect a commitment by the Cambodian government to promote a 
collective memory of the KR period that counters claims by human rights groups and some 
commentators claims that the CPP’s principal interest is inducing a state of ‘amnesia’ (see, for 
example, Chandler 2008). This is, as evidenced above, an account of past political violence that 
is winnowed to suit the interests of the state, reflective again of the ECCC prosecutions in the 
way that it focuses on the guilt of a handful of senior leaders while ignoring the role of lower-
level perpetrators. What appears problematic about these bids to promote memory – the 
display of human remains, public testimony of experiences of the KR, the re-enactment of 
atrocities – is that there is very little room for more ambivalent or equivocal understandings of 
the past (a problem that corresponds to the rigid coding of memory as legal knowledge at the 
ECCC).    
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As the ceremony ended, a Korean tour bus entered the compound. The tour group left the bus 
and proceeded to observe the (now familiar, cursory) tour of the genocide memorial and 
information board, in a state of visible confusion about the disembarking crowd of two 
thousand Cambodians and rows of empty plastic seats.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Wat Thmey pagoda and genocide memorial, its role within the community, and its 
reception by Cambodians is haunted by a series of seemingly stark oppositions. It is first and 
foremost an explicitly political representation of political violence that employs the display of 
‘profane’ human remains within a ‘pure’ and ‘sacred’ space. Moreover, Buddhist theology 
dictates that pagodas should be immune from the secular field of politics. The display of bones 
continues to produce resistant and uncomfortable responses among Cambodian attendees at 
the pagoda and, on this basis, the memorial does not necessarily produce the deterrent or 
pedagogical lessons it is intended to generate. Moreover, it appeared from the accounts of 
respondents I met that the memorial itself should not be understood specifically as a ‘carrier’ 
of collective memory. Rather, in calling attention to loss, the memorial at times served to cue 
alternative accounts of the past – memories of the perpetration of abuses or disinterest in 
memories of political violence – that challenge the preferred reading of the past offered by the 
memorial. These alternative accounts of the past also exist in conflict with that sanctioned by 
the ECCC, evidencing regimes of memory that seem incompatible with the central tenets of 
Cambodia’s bids to provide justice and reconciliation.  
 
The Wat Thmey memorial has, to an extent, developed a life of its own. The projection and 
insertion of the site within the tourist economy presents, on the one hand, an objectification 
of memories of political violence to be witnessed or consumed by transient tourist groups. On 
the other hand, the monastic community did not seem uncomfortable with this function of the 
memorial, and in this sense the harnessing of the memorial for the maintenance and upkeep 
of the temple more broadly should be best understood as a pragmatic initiative to ensure that 
the pagoda can continue to provide its pastoral and pedagogical roles within the community. 
In this sense, although the memorial itself remained a source of discomfort for some, it 
continues to be functionally important for the community. This represents a further 
instrumentalisation of the past in the service of the present nonetheless, and can be read as 
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showing an active relationship with memories of past political violence that the ECCC has 
treated as absent. 
 
The ‘exceptionality’ and observation of the Day of Remembrance at Wat Thmey contrasts 
sharply with the ‘everyday’ appreciation of the memorial within the community. There is a 
reflexive point to be made about how memory works here: in interviewing, directing or 
focusing respondents on the memorial site, the memorial (and past) is ‘activated’ in uneven 
ways. This has serious consequences for the study of memory in the wake of past atrocity 
because it shows that remembering occurs in relation to and, importantly, sometimes in 
resistance to the demands that are made of it. In a similar vein, the Day of Remembrance 
represents a reactivation, reassertion and imposition of prevailing state-sanctioned discourses 
of vigilance and national solidarity in the wake of atrocity that are elided in the more 
‘everyday’ explanations of the memorial I encountered.           
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Chapter Six 
The ‘Heroes’ and ‘Villains’ of Anlong Veng 
 
This chapter examines the reproduction of memory around heritage and memorial sites in 
Anlong Veng. Anlong Veng is a key research site for understanding the relationship between 
memory and reconciliation because it is governed and populated by former KR cadre and was 
home to several senior KR leaders (two of whom are currently held at the ECCC). As such, 
Anlong Veng has been positioned by ECCC outreach groups like DC-Cam as an important locale 
for reconciliation initiatives and the provision of genocide education. Moreover, as the final 
‘stronghold’ of the KR insurgency until 1999, the town has achieved a level of notoriety that 
attracts large numbers of both Cambodian and foreign tourists, implicating the uses of 
heritage sites and memory within processes of demobilisation, reintegration and reconciliation 
of former combatants. As such, the Anlong Veng area is a compelling case for understanding 
the limits and resonance of the ECCC and state-sanctioned readings of past political violence 
among ‘perpetrator’ groups that may subscribe to or maintain ‘counter’ memories.        
 
The chapter draws three key conclusions. The first is that the KR heritage and memorial sites 
do not seem to play an active role in furnishing collective memory. Rather, these sites tend to 
operate as equivocal spaces that allow room for the expression of ambivalent and conflicting 
memories toward the past. The second identifies a tendency towards the hagiography of a 
(now deceased) KR leader, Chit Chuon, alias Ta Mok, noting the way that similar generous 
remembrances are not observed for other KR leaders. Ta Mok was the KR military chief from 
1977 and responsible for some of the worst atrocities perpetrated under the KR, earning him 
the moniker of ‘the butcher’. From the 1990s, Ta Mok supervised the Anlong Veng area and 
was responsible for the 1997 arrest and detention of Pol Pot. I examine the way that both 
former KR cadre and Cambodians from non-KR backgrounds celebrate or are allured by his 
memory as a ‘patriot’ that defended national borders from invading forces (and I consider 
important contextual factors in such tendencies, including a high profile territorial dispute 
occurring between Cambodia and Thailand at the time of fieldwork). The final conclusion 
drawn from this chapter concerns the implications of such counter-memories for reconciliation 
and the resonance of the work of the ECCC. I argue that a regime of memory exists in Anlong 
Veng that, superficially, appears in conflict with the way in which the ECCC works to denounce 
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the KR leadership and stabilise a consensual popular account of the past on that basis. I 
suggest that the existence of memories that celebrate KR figures like Ta Mok actually emerge 
from a sense of nostalgia and obligation, rather than through the maintenance of a grievance 
that compels political action in the present. On this basis I argue that these counter-memories 
are highly ambivalent and render questions of reconciliation moot.         
 
The chapter examines four sections based on a series of interviews and informal conversations 
conducted in Anlong Veng in late April and early May 2009. I begin by briefly outlining the 
background history of the region and relevant research contributions on issues of memory and 
heritage in the area. The second section explores encounters with former KR cadre at a series 
of Cambodian Ministry of Tourism (MoT)-designated ‘historic’ heritage sites, including Pol 
Pot’s cremation site and memorial. The third section shifts to examine Ta Mok’s ‘Historic 
House’ in Anlong Veng town, another MoT designated heritage site, exploring a number of 
conversations with serving Cambodian soldiers visiting the site. The fourth section examines 
the Sra Chouk Pagoda, site of Ta Mok’s memorial stupa, and includes a brief interview with 
one of his daughters.    
 
6.1 A local story 
 
Anlong Veng is today infamous for its role as the final stronghold of the KR insurgency in the 
late 1990s and the site of Pol Pot’s detention by the remaining KR factions, his death and his 
cremation. The history of the town and its role in the Cambodian conflicts stretches back 
further than this, though. Oddar Meanchey province (then part of the wider Siem Reap 
provincial boundaries) was one the earliest liberated zones in the KR’s rise to power in the 
early 1970s. The region’s geographical remoteness and densely forested landscape meant that 
the area was an important foothold for KR forces during the war against the Lon Nol Republic 
(1970-1975). Following the DK period, and after the Vietnamese captured much of the 
Cambodian interior in 1979 in ousting the KR from power, KR troops and swathes of displaced 
refugees were pushed into and across the border regions with Thailand. The Anlong Veng area 
became a key site of conflict between KR guerrillas and Vietnamese and PRK troops. Located 
directly across the border from refugee centres used by the KR to launch attacks against the 
PRK, the region was part of the PRK state’s attempt to fortify, secure and seal the Thai border, 
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known as the ‘K5 plan’ (see Slocomb 2001). As a consequence, the area is still badly 
contaminated by landmines and other unexploded ordinance (UXO). 
 
From 1990 onward the town changed hands repeatedly between Government and KR, though 
following successive amnesty programs deployed by the Cambodian government in the mid-
1990s Anlong Veng was the final bastion of control for the remaining KR leadership. In mid-
1997, Pol Pot ordered the execution of Son Sen (another senior KR figure) and his family, 
accusing him of attempting to bargain an amnesty deal with the Government side. The purge 
of Son Sen and family forced the other remaining KR factions into action and in June 1997 Pol 
Pot was arrested by KR forces near the Thai border in Anlong Veng under the direction of Ta 
Mok. Ta Mok was head of the military under DK from 1977 and (alleged) perpetrator of some 
of the most brutal massacres under KR rule earning him the notorious title of ‘the butcher’. Pol 
Pot was subsequently placed on trial, denounced by the remaining KR factions and held under 
house arrest. In April 1998 Pol Pot died – reportedly as a consequence of heart failure – and his 
body was cremated on a bed of rubber tyres. The site of Pol Pot’s cremation is now marked by 
the MoT as a historical site.76  
 
As this chapter will show, this specific local history has serious consequences for the form and 
content of memories that are reproduced in the Anlong Veng area. I argue that we can identify 
a ‘local’ regime of memory that is constituted by these formative experiences in making 
memories enduring and persistent, and celebrating some ‘heroes’ of the KR but not others. For 
example, recent oral history research conducted by DC-Cam77 in the Anlong Veng area is 
                                                          
76 The MoT marking of Pol Pot’s grave site as historically significant is silent about his role 
within Cambodian history. In this sense, it neither denounces nor celebrates his life. On the 
one hand, this means that the MoT marking of perpetrator sites is not congruent to the way 
that the ECCC denounces the KR leadership. Moreover, as I show in this chapter, the silence of 
sites of ‘perpetrator’ memory in Anlong Veng opens up space for the expression of varied, 
equivocal and ambivalent memories of the KR leadership that are at odds with the ECCC. On 
the other hand, the ‘silence’ of the MoT markers can be read as congruous to a politics of 
reconciliation that forecloses past grievances generating demands over the present.   
77 DC-Cam has conducted oral history work in the Anlong Veng area, though in June 2012 DC-
Cam also erected ‘anti-genocide’ plaques at the local high school as part of its nationwide 
strategy to educate young Cambodians about the DK period. I would suggest that this is an 
example of a strategy of ‘dignifying’ genocide memory. This was followed by a public forum 
meeting between school children, local authorities and former mid-ranking members of the 
KR.  
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striking in the way that respondents principally locate memories of the war in the 1990s within 
constant experiences of transience and displacement by conflict (Eng 2012). Conversely, these 
accounts broadly point to a localised ‘regime of memory’ that specifically celebrates efforts by 
Ta Mok, a senior KR military commander and later leader of the insurgency, to build more 
permanent infrastructure in the area such as schools, a hospital, roads and a dam for fishing 
and irrigation. The valorisation of Ta Mok through a paternalist lens (numerous former KR 
described Ta Mok as the ‘father’ of the area) – rather than other senior KR leaders such as Pol 
Pot, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan (both currently held at the ECCC), for example – is 
articulated through memories that reference the fixed points of community support, 
development and resources that Ta Mok’s leadership provided. Crucially, the maintenance of 
memory in these cases appears galvanised as much by practical benefit and benevolence as 
ideological commitment to the cause of the KR at the time.                
 
A number of other significant recent research contributions on issues of memory and heritage 
among former KR cadre in the Anlong Veng area are worth outlining at this point (though will 
remain relevant throughout the chapter). Noren-Nilsson’s work on questions of nationalism 
and identity among children of former KR – based in part on interviews collected in Anlong 
Veng – argues that the intergenerational transmission of memories of genocide, war and 
conflict is “cloaked in silence” (2011: 464). In other words, Noren-Nilsson suggests that 
memories of the KR are not reproduced through public channels. Noren-Nilsson argues that 
such ‘silence’ helps enable children to integrate into the national community more broadly by 
embargoing problematic portions of the past that might be in conflict with the state-
sanctioned public history of the KR. At the same time, a ‘revolutionary’ heritage that promotes 
specifically ascetic values is still communicated, remembered and celebrated within former KR 
communities. This is notable in the sense that revolutionary ethical imperatives are 
reproduced (nostalgically) in the context of rapid (consumer driven) economic development in 
ways that place competing demands on young people in the area. Noren-Nilsson argues that 
‘revolutionary’ and ‘national’ identities and memories remain in conflict in Anlong Veng, 
raising important questions for processes of reconciliation in former KR communities, and the 
different forms that reconciliation purports to take, i.e. the reconciliation of formerly 
partitioned economies, the reconciliation of previously conflicting social groups, or the political 
reconciliation of divergent power interests.  
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The role of Anlong Veng’s ‘revolutionary’ heritage has been examined by Timothy Wood in his 
doctoral research into state-sponsored conservation efforts in Anlong Veng (2009). In 2002 the 
local authorities (that include numerous former KR) were instructed by the MoT to preserve 
and conserve a series of ‘historical’ locations in the area as part of a tourism and development 
strategy (coinciding, notably, with the national ‘Visit Cambodia 2003’ tourism campaign). 
These locations include: the site of Pol Pot’s trial, detention and cremation; the ‘secret’ and 
‘safe’ houses of KR leaders including Ta Mok, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan; Ta Mok’s 
sawmill, which is also the site of the execution and cremation of Son Sen and his family (it is 
now also the site of Ta Mok’s family memorial); and Ta Mok’s lakeside residence. The 
preservation and conservation of these locations involved the erection of MoT markers and 
boards to designate ‘historical importance’ but, Wood is keen to emphasise, very little else. 
Specifically, the preservation of these sites was premised on the recreation of ‘life’ as they 
were lived in. Wood suggests that the main effect of ‘minimal’ conservation efforts – the 
absence of supporting textual information and the poor training of tour guides, for example – 
serves to silence localised, celebratory accounts of KR leaders that may conflict with the 
‘official’ state-sanctioned narrative that lays blame for the atrocities perpetrated under DK 
neatly at their feet. The existence of such accounts again has important outstanding 
implications for the possible ‘reconciling’ of former members of the KR living around the 
Anlong Veng to the cause of the ECCC, the national community and a shared sense of ‘what 
happened’. The problems for reconciliation arise because regimes of memory that valorise KR 
leaders may exist in direct opposition to the way in which the Cambodian state has narrated 
blame for atrocities and war at their hands. The existence of such ‘counter’ memories, their 
maintenance and their relation to KR heritage sites will be the focus of this chapter. 
 
Wood further documents efforts by district officials to establish a museum in Anlong Veng that 
subsequently failed to materialise due to a lack of funding and political will. Moreover, the 
failure to establish a single, central museum in the area is reflected in the gradual dilapidation 
of the varied ‘historic’ sites and their attendant markers, despite the purported intention to 
conserve the sites under the auspices of heritage tourism. Wood argues that these failures can 
be explained by corruption and patronage networks stifling state attempts to integrate and 
develop the region through tourism, but also confusion about the efforts to ‘conserve’ (i.e. 
leave untouched) or ‘reconstruct’ (i.e. replicate according to memory)  the sites. On the one 
hand, Wood’s ethnography can be read as documenting an example of the way in which the 
state situates a specifically localised collective past and shared history as an object that can 
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yield beneficial social and political effects, including attracting investment, providing jobs and 
enticing tourists through the establishment of memorial and museum technologies. On the 
other, these beneficial social and political ends are not realised and can provoke unintended 
resistances. In this sense, the case reveals how the promotion of a localised tourist economy 
relates directly to (self-effecting) better economic integration (and therefore the 
reconciliation) of former insurgents. Yet we are again reminded of Gordon’s caution that the 
‘imperfections’ in the correspondence of a ‘strategy’, its ‘technologies’ and the ‘un-
programmed’ outcomes of such policies are fertile terrain for analysis because the intended 
outcomes of institutional programs rarely equate to their lived effects (Gordon 1980: 247-248). 
In this case, I suggest that attempts to silence counter-memories among former KR (by 
minimising the ‘substance’, content or ‘story’ depicted by representations of the past) actually 
provides (political) space for the articulation of potentially conflicting memory. At the same 
time, I argue, as a question of reconciliation, the regimes of memory reproduced and 
maintained by former KR cadre living and working around these sites does not necessarily 
clash with the ECCC (or state-sanctioned account of the past) because it seems not to place 
political demands over the present in the name of an ongoing grievance that actively maintains 
a conflict over the past.  
 
 
6.2 Sites on the Dangrek  
 
Roughly 14km north of Anlong Veng town are the Choam pass into Thailand and the Dangrek 
escarpment, an elevated rocky ‘shelf’ running along Cambodia’s Northern border. The Dangrek 
escarpment and border area hosts a series of the MoT designated ‘historical’ sites. In the 
vicinity of the border checkpoint (and a recently erected border market) is the site of Pol Pot’s 
1998 show trial by the remaining KR leadership and his subsequent cremation following his 
death under house arrest. To the East, along a small unpaved track along the cusp of the 
escarpment, are the former safe houses of Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, all sites 
designated as ‘historically significant’ by the MoT. Given the inaccessible terrain, it is 
understandable why these locations were chosen as points of withdrawal and escape, allowing 
for the former leaders to slip to and from Thai territory with relative ease. Today, under the 
auspices of the MoT conservation efforts, the sites are now designated as historically 
significant. However, little has been done to preserve them and, as Wood has noted, no 
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contextual or supplementary information is provided to assist visitors’ understandings of their 
significance. Moreover, Wood suggests that the meaning of the sites for Cambodians living and 
working in the vicinity – many of whom are former KR fighters and cadre – also remains mixed 
because a conflict arises from the MoT directive to curate these sites: the instruction to 
present these sites ‘as they were lived in’ is seemingly problematic because ‘replication’ or 
‘reconstruction’ clash with an apparent ‘conservationist’ imperative to leave the sites 
untouched (Wood 2009: 227).  
 
In my early visits to the Dangrek sites I was eager to develop a more general sense of the 
different perspectives on the relationship of former KR cadre to their insurgent past (but also 
their perspectives on the factional infighting that characterised the last days of the KR 
leadership). Near Khieu Samphan’s ‘safe house’ site I asked one former fighter if people still 
thought about the KR and the war: 
   
People in Anlong Veng don’t all think the same way. A lot of people think that Ta Mok was a good 
man, but mostly people talk about the past less. Over the past thirty years it is like two different 
lives, from the worst to the best. People talk about that time [the war/KR] less and less. The 
younger generation will forget about the Khmer Rouge. Because now is better, with the roads 
and all that. This place will be like Poipet
78
, another prosperous border crossing, of course people 
will forget the harder times. 
 
PM: Why do you think prosperity means forgetting? 
 
People don’t want to remember those times when things become peaceful. Now with the court 
[the ECCC], people don’t want to talk about that time. People here, they don’t want to get called 
as a witness. 
 
On the one hand, the former fighter’s comment illuminates the belief held among (some) 
former KR fighters that ‘history’ (as retold by the state) has unfairly demonised senior KR 
figures like Ta Mok (it is notable too that no mention is made of Khieu Samphan, indicating an 
                                                          
78 Poipet is another border town into Thailand in Western Cambodia.  
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active renegotiation and resistance to the state-sanctioned denunciation of the KR leadership). 
In the first instance, we could see how this poses challenges in terms of reconciling such 
perspectives to the cause of the ECCC, and the direct reference to residents’ reluctance to 
testify points to fears and suspicion about the work of the court and a betrayal of loyalties. 
Moreover, the conviction that the younger generation will ‘forget’ the KR seems to challenge 
the broader attempts by groups such as DC-Cam to dignify memories of the KR by educating 
younger sections of society about the need to remember DK. On the other hand, the comment 
gestures toward how complicated the relationship between memory and reconciliation can be. 
In downplaying the significance of memories of the conflict and its key protagonists in the 
wake of peace, the former fighter points to the way in which communities are active in 
negotiating and demarcating their own senses of ‘old’ and ‘new’ eras (without necessarily 
needing a formal mechanism to do so). The description of ‘two lives’ – then and now – points 
to Cohen’s suggestion that flux, change and rapid development can effect ‘discontinuities’ of 
memory or ‘slippage’ (Cohen 2001: 243). For Cohen, this is one feature of the key paradox of 
denial: knowing and not knowing the past all at once. At the same time, the link between 
prosperity and forgetting seems to imply the possibility that problematic or challenging 
memories are less likely to be maintained under conditions of material improvement, i.e. that 
economic development seems to act as a mitigating influence on the collective remembrance 
of painful pasts. In this sense, it is perhaps less a question of ‘knowing’ and yet ‘not knowing’ 
and more a process of negotiating which aspects of the past are congruent with ongoing 
material priorities.79 This is important because it shows that Cambodians can actively 
renegotiate the significance of memories of political violence against present economic 
priorities; such economic priorities are dislocated from a reconciliatory process that is 
principally legal and juridical. 
   
I continued to ask the former fighter whether he agreed with the MoT plan to mark the 
Dangrek sites as historically significant:   
                                                          
79 There is a notable parallel here with the findings of the national Berkley sponsored survey 
‘So we will never forget’. The Berkley survey found that a majority of Cambodians welcomed 
the current ECCC prosecutions but ranked them lower on a list of government policy priorities 
to other forms of basic material development, i.e. job security, infrastructure building, and 
food prices: Pham, P., P. Vinck, et al. (2009). "So We Will Never Forget: A Population-Based 
Survey On Attitudes About Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia." University of California, Berkeley.   
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Pol Pot’s house - people have already destroyed it, 
the government troops first by looting, but 
everyone else now too. You cannot keep these 
places for history if all the things have been taken. 
 
PM: And the Khmer Rouge statues on the road up 
the mountain? Who destroyed them? 
 
They got destroyed first.    
 
Some of the key problems of conservation and 
historical meaning are addressed directly here. 
The Dangrek sites have been continuously looted 
as local residents, locally based military units and visitors have recognised (and created) a 
market for KR ‘artefacts’.80 Moreover, many sites, such as Ta Mok’s safe house on the Dangrek, 
have been vandalised by tourists (see the picture left). In this sense, the former fighter’s 
comments reflect Wood’s suggestion that many former KR members in the Anlong Veng area 
are uncomfortable with the way in which MoT conservation efforts have failed to represent 
their pasts: the absence of ‘artefacts’ 
and the dilapidation of the sites 
means that they do not adequately 
reflect the histories that they are 
intended to call attention to or 
represent (in accordance with the 
perspectives of some of the main 
protagonists in those histories). This 
speaks to an important dimension in 
both the ownership and 
representation of memory, 
specifically through registers of 
                                                          
80 Pol Pot’s toilet seat, for example, is on display at a guesthouse in Siem Reap.  
Figure 15 Ta Mok's former 'safe house' 
Figure 16 Khmer Rouge statues 
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authenticity. The fighter suggests that these spaces cannot be ‘historical’ – implicating the 
potential pedagogical function of the former KR sites – if they fail to convey meanings (as he 
sees them) in a historically faithful fashion. That means, for him, the inclusion of objects and 
artefacts now lost and the preservation of the sites as they literally were. The extent to which 
the way the KR past is represented satisfies former cadre (that lived and fought around these 
spaces) is judged against an accuracy criterion in this instance. This is important because it 
shows that former cadre and fighters are attuned to, and sensitive to, the way in which the 
local authorities are making sites pertaining to the lives of their former leaders stand for a 
collective KR history. The fighter continued to raise a (serious) objection to his perception of 
the uses (and abuses) of KR ‘artefacts’ by former KR cadre (Nhem En is famous for his role 
photographing arrivals at S-21 in Phnom Penh):  
 
You know Nhem En and the museum? They said the cost at $100,000. But he is trying to sell a 
pair of shoes – he says Pol Pot’s shoes – for $50,000. How can we tell if these are the genuine 
shoes? Even the small Khmer Rouge soldiers had these shoes. There is no way to know.  
 
At Pol Pot’s cremation site, again a MoT 
conserved site, efforts had been made to 
protect both the remains and the presentation 
of the grave. A number of small offerings and 
incense sticks were present at the foot of the 
memorial structure, though the corrugated iron 
roofing and small wooden perimeter fencing did 
not convey great ‘reverence’. The MoT sign 
simply read ‘Pol Pot was cremated’ here and no 
further information is supplied concerning the 
circumstance or background to his death (which 
itself is contested by different KR figures in 
Anlong Veng). As noted, Wood has claimed that 
this is reflects the Cambodian state’s intention 
to minimise resistant KR accounts of the past. 
Another former fighter worked occasionally at the time collecting money for ‘entry’ fees to see 
the site (noting that rarely more than a handful of visitors attended the site each week). I had 
begun to recognise that asking about the lives of the former leaders – the only real thematic 
Figure 17 The site of Pol Pot's cremation 
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representational work at play at the Dangrek sites – tended to be an effective way of inviting 
former cadre to reflect on the movement more broadly:     
 
Pol Pot was at the top. The top was responsible. He was responsible for everything. This why 
everyone labels him a bad man, because he was responsible for the destruction of Cambodia.  
 
PM: So people here remember him that way?  
 
Even the smaller generals did terrible things. But it’s not clear, we have different ideas. Yes, Ta 
Mok is a hero for the people here, but we cannot say this in public. We cannot say [here] but we 
can say with our friends, with our families. 
 
In the first instance, the former fighter was happy to acknowledge the ‘destruction’ of 
Cambodia, locating responsibility at the hands of Pol Pot. This is important because it 
corresponds to the narrative of blame propagated by the Cambodian state since the fall of the 
KR: that the revolution was hijacked by a genocidal KR leadership, and the subsequent PRK 
government were true heirs to the revolution. This account of blame at the hands of the KR 
leadership underpins the ECCC as a reconciliatory endeavour because it obscures and 
exculpates the role of lower- and mid-ranking KR figures, and further distracts from grievances 
arising from periods of conflict and political violence before and after DK. At the same time, 
crucially, we again can see the existence of regimes of memory that conflict with the state-
sanctioned account of the KR because Ta Mok – a specifically local hero – is celebrated and the 
fighter further complicates his reading of responsibility by noting the responsibility of ‘smaller 
generals’ (a hugely sensitive topic given the role of formerly mid-ranking KR officials within 
Anlong Veng’s local government). Perhaps most tellingly, the view that Ta Mok could not be 
celebrated in public points to a rupture and disjunction between ‘community’ level and 
‘private’ remembrances of the life of the former KR leader, supporting Noren-Nilsson’s claim 
that discussion of the KR past is ‘off limits’ (Norén-Nilsson 2011: 464) . I pressed this issue 
further:  
 
PM: Why can’t you say that in public? 
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In this area, most of the hierarchy people [authorities] are from the Khmer Rouge. But a lot of the 
local authorities are from the government too. So the smaller Khmer Rouge people, some of 
them are worried about saying the wrong thing. I don’t care. I can say what I like. People talk with 
their friends about that time. That time was troubled. Yes, Pol Pot brought destruction, but now 
everyone just sees his faults. It is disappointing, he was a strong man. 
 
It is revealing that, following the former fighter’s suggestion that there are limits to what can 
and cannot be said in public and private about the KR as a topic, the fighter returns to discuss 
Pol Pot, suggesting that people only see his faults (and therefore implying that there are 
virtues to be remembered). It is unclear whether the fighter means all Cambodians or the 
Anlong Veng community specifically when he suggests that ‘everyone’ remembers Pol Pot this 
way; that said, the fighter’s nostalgic suggestion that Pol Pot was a ‘strong man’ may be 
offensive to many other Cambodians and complicates the resonance of the ECCC’s narration of 
blame for KR atrocities at the hands of the DK leadership amongst groups that subscribe to 
such beliefs, if only even in ‘private’ conversation. On the one hand, we can see how the 
fighter may be at first acceding to what he considers publicly acceptable comments on the KR 
leadership. On the other, we can read his latter comments as evidence of mixed or conflicted 
interpretations and views concerning the role, responsibility and remembrance of the KR 
leadership. These types of perspective, on the surface at least, pose questions for 
reconciliation because they seem to conflict with state-sanctioned denunciation of KR 
leadership. Moreover, they challenge Wood’s claim that the ‘minimalist’ conservation of KR 
heritage sites is effective in the suppression of ‘counter’ memory.       
 
6.3 Ta Mok’s ‘Historic House’ 
 
In Anlong Veng town, the most prominent heritage site pertaining to the conflict is Ta Mok’s 
‘Historic House’. As Cabral notes, ‘historic house’ sites are a special genre of museum because 
they represent the life of an individual through a specific interplay and fusion of person and 
place (2001). Historic houses can act as didactic spaces in the way that they provide an 
assemblage of ‘cultural assets’ within a site deemed to capture the seemingly ‘everyday’ life of 
a specific person (or persons); at the same time, the authorisation of a historic house hinges on 
the way an individual “…exerts an attraction and fascination on the imagination” (Cabral 2001: 
43). Ta Mok’s attraction and fascination in this regard stems exclusively from his role as a KR 
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military leader, his national notoriety as ‘the butcher’, and according to local KR cadre, his role 
as defender of the nation against the Vietnamese and ‘father’ figure of the Anlong Veng area.   
 
The example of Ta 
Mok’s historic house is 
interesting because 
we know that, prior to 
his capture and death, 
Ta Mok planned for 
the property to be 
turned into a museum 
about DK, the fight 
against the 
Vietnamese 
occupation and a 
showcase of 
Cambodian cultural 
artefacts more broadly (Wood 2009: 159). Ta Mok commissioned murals and paintings on the 
walls of the property in anticipation of this purpose, and these still remain at the site. These 
depict the (nationally significant) temples of Angkor, maps of Cambodia and religious artwork. 
These are the few ‘cultural artefacts’ that remain on the site as the house was looted by 
Government forces at the end of the war. Wood suggests that this feeds into a ‘minimalism’ in 
the way the site is presented, failing to yield any contextual or historical information to 
support visitation. For Wood, this is again evidence of the way the state has, on the one hand, 
designated such spaces as historically significant, yet on the other, licensed the suppression of 
possible representations of the past that glorify the KR. In this sense, it is ironic that given Ta 
Mok’s intended plan to establish a museum on the site, the house has today still been put to 
use as a heritage site by the MoT, though in accordance with the Cambodian state’s preferred 
agenda (according to Wood, by attempting to marginalise the possibility celebratory accounts 
of the KR).  
 
The house itself looks out over one of Ta Mok’s local infrastructure projects, a dam across a 
river and a large lake on the flooded land created as a result. At the entrance to the compound 
Figure 18 Mural of Angkor Wat at Ta Mok's Lakeside Villa 
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is a small ticket concession run by one of Ta Mok’s former bodyguards. I asked him who 
tended to visit and why they came: 
  
Some domestic tourists come here, but just as a vacation, for relaxation. People come 
here because they want to know the history. They want to know the life of Ta Mok, the 
way he lived. He was a hero in this region because he protected the country, he moved his 
troops here, fighting the Vietnamese.   
 
PM: Do mostly Khmer people come here?  
 
Mostly Cambodians. Some from Anlong Veng, but also many from outside. More so at 
weekends. The place is good for a picnic. A few foreigners come also to learn the history 
also. 
 
Three points are notable in these comments that help us understand how the site is perceived 
by Cambodian audiences (both former KR and beyond). In the first instance, the site is 
described as recreational space (there is a restaurant next door and I was informed that many 
local couples choose to hold their weddings on or next to the site). This is important because 
the understanding of the site as a recreational space is not necessarily perceived to be in 
conflict with its links to the war and the more sinister meanings bound to Ta Mok’s moniker, 
‘the butcher’. In the second instance, the site is specifically described as a ‘historical’ place for 
people to learn about the life of Ta Mok, ascribing the ‘historic house with didactic value. 
Thirdly, seemingly underpinning the above, and the root of the authority of the site as a 
historic house, is an ‘attraction’ and ‘fascination’ with Ta Mok as a ‘hero’ or national 
‘protector’. This complicates the role of Ta Mok’s historic house because it transcends 
(apparently) ‘un-reconciled’ parties: the attraction of a patriotic protector arises specifically 
from discourses of nation and nationalism that resonate with both former KR audiences and 
visitors from outside Anlong Veng. This poses important questions concerning the 
reconciliation of memory between parties to the Cambodian conflict.  
 
As the former bodyguard noted, the majority of visitors were Cambodians from outside the 
local area. The former bodyguard continued to make reference to ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ people 
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(meaning former KR residents and or those visiting/settling since the end of the war): “Now 
the outside people come more and more, they visit and we are fine with them. We were not 
responsible for the conflict, it was the leaders.” Again, this comment gestures to further 
complications concerning memory and reconciliation. The bodyguard suggests that there are 
no divisions between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ because (the prevailing state and ECCC-
sanctioned regime of memory tells us that) only senior KR leaders were responsible for the 
conflict. At the same, the bodyguard is hagiographic in his previous description of Ta Mok, and 
suggests that non-KR audiences are attracted to the site because of his role as a patriotic 
figure. The key question that arises here is as follows: how can the ‘patriotic’ celebration of a 
national figure coincide with acquiescence to an attempt to settle a (conflicted) past that 
revolves around denouncing that same figure’s life; i.e. is it problematic (or even possible) for 
Ta Mok to be remembered as both a ‘butcher’ and ‘hero’ to both his acolytes and adversaries? 
The implication here is that memory that appears irreconcilable to the ECCC does not conflict 
with its punitive function; in other words, reconciliation is rendered a moot outcome of the 
ECCC.   
 
The themes of reconciliation, patriotism and the integrity of national borders became 
increasingly pronounced in a series of conversations I had with a group of serving Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces soldiers visiting Ta Mok’s lakeside house. These conversations, in 
particular, perhaps help us understand the conflicted positioning of Ta Mok as ‘hero’ and 
‘villain’. A crucial contextual factor that coloured much of the fieldwork in Anlong Veng was a 
simmering border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia arising from the contested 
territorial ownership of the UNESCO-designated Preah Vihear temple World Heritage Site 
(located roughly 120km East of Anlong Veng). The dispute had stoked nationalist sentiments 
on either side of the border and a series of clashes between Cambodian and Thai forces near 
the temple in October 2008 and January and April 2009 had led to a number of casualties and 
several fatalities. As a consequence, the border with Thailand as a whole had become an 
increasingly sensitive political issue, with a build-up of military forces in the area. Moreover, as 
well as its proximity to the border itself, Anlong Veng was also located along one of the main 
routes to the disputed Preah Vihear temple. Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) troops on 
leave or breaking journeys to and from Preah Vihear were among the frequent visitors to Ta 
Mok’s house. 
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In general, the soldiers visiting the ‘historic house’ of a former KR leader were not keen to 
speak to a Western researcher and their remarks in general were abrupt.81 That said, a number 
that I spoke to were willing to explain why they had chosen to visit, notably advancing similar 
reasoning to those offered by Ta Mok’s former bodyguard: 
 
This man was a patriot. He fought for Cambodia. Of course I want to see this place. 
 
The recognition of the site’s historical significance stems again from the remembrance of Ta 
Mok through a patriotic lens. Another suggested that: 
 
This is a historic site. It is an important place for Cambodia. 
 
PM: Why is it important? I read that before during the war the army was fighting this man. 
 
That time is gone and his followers left him so now we are a country at peace. 
 
In the second instance, I attempted to probe any potential conflict between loyalties to the 
‘state’ (army) and reasons for visitation. It is telling that the soldier’s response coincides with 
the state-sponsored understanding of reconciliation, i.e. that in the absence of conflict the 
nation is at peace, and with the disintegration of the KR as a military force, there is no 
(ideological) conflict around which to reconcile. It seems in this context Ta Mok can be recast 
(or re-remembered) through this seemingly resonant national lens. On a separate occasion, 
standing in front of a large map of Cambodia in Ta Mok’s villa, another soldier remarked that:    
 
                                                          
81 This is possibly due to the politicisation of their presence on the border (and the assumption 
that I was a journalist). It may equally also have arisen because of sensitivities around the 
politics of the ECCC and KR as a topic in general: across fieldwork sites and locales, informants 
working closely with the Government were less inclined to discuss questions of the KR, the 
ECCC, memory and reconciliation at any length.    
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He protected Cambodia. He was fighting the invaders. Just like now, we have problems 
again. The Thai people want to take Cambodian land. That is why we are going to the 
border. 
 
The direct parallel attempted here 
between the two ‘invading’ forces 
illuminates how the nation, its borders 
and its vulnerabilities is felt by 
remembering ‘national’ subjects: threat 
and obligation are foregrounded. 
Moreover, a reflexive point on memory is 
crucial here: the contextual anxieties 
concerning national defence, the role of 
soldiers in maintaining the integrity of 
borders and the historical equivalence 
suggested here between Vietnamese occupation (fought by Ta Mok) and Thai incursions 
(fought by the current RCAF soldiers) not only allows for more sympathetic remembrances of 
KR figures like Ta Mok, but allows and obliges a ‘celebratory’ reframing of the past conflict. In 
terms of how we understand collective memory, we must again be attentive to the range of 
influences that recast, rescue, or oblige specific forms of remembering (the ‘what’ and ‘how’), 
rather than treating the past as a stable archive for excavation or extraction. In this case, we 
could say that (state-sanctioned but highly dispersed) discourses of nation and nationalism 
coincide with the ‘reactivation’ of regimes of remembering that elevate and celebrate figures 
such as Ta Mok, specifically because his life can be recast as characterised by national sacrifice. 
    
During my final visit to Ta Mok’s ‘historic house’ I attempted to invite some visiting RCAF 
soldiers to discuss issues of reconciliation and the ECCC more directly. As one soldier’s remarks 
indicate, the topics seemed almost inert: 
 
“Before Khmer fought Khmer. Now Cambodia is peaceful and it doesn’t matter what 
faction [you were on] before. I know the history of this man. And this place. Before, in the 
Pol Pot time, some people in my family died. But it is complicated politics. I know that 
people here think Ta Mok was right to fight and he defended Cambodia.”   
Figure 19 Royal Cambodian Armed Forces troops 
look at a map of Cambodia at Ta Mok's Lakeside Villa 
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It is notable again that the thorny issue of Khmers in conflict with other Khmers is remembered 
as the central problematic characteristic of Cambodia’s experiences of war and genocide, i.e. a 
crisis of national solidarity. Moreover, within this framework, peace is again equated with 
reconciliation with the ‘erasure’ of those factions, or the closing of that ‘national’ rupture. As 
Dunnage suggests with reference to memories of ‘perpetrators’ (and a generous hat-tip to 
Renan’s famous essay on nationhood), ‘re-visitations of the past are inevitably conditioned by 
the imperative of national or group cohesion in the present’ (2010: 91). On the one hand, the 
soldier remembers both those ‘factionalisms’ and his personal experiences of loss. In this 
sense, it would be problematic to read his comments as downplaying the significance of the KR 
past. Yet on the other, the soldier acknowledges and is erudite toward the specific views of 
former KR cadre in Anlong Veng, without reflecting any explicit grievance. It seems, in this 
instance, that there does not appear to be a conflict between regimes of memory that 
acknowledge the wrongs of the KR, and tolerance toward regimes of memory that celebrate 
their leaders. This, it seems, is an instance of personal reconciliation without any spectacle or 
institutional inauguration.       
 
Another soldier was keen to find out if I worked for the court (a persistent problem I 
encountered in Anlong Veng). Despite my denials, his questions were illuminating in regards to 
his understanding of reconciliation: 
 
If we have the court, is it true that there will be war again? I don’t believe that. 
 
PM: Why do you think that there would not be another war? 
 
I don’t know. I think that people are not angry anymore. 
 
The connection made between the ECCC and further conflict references fears circulated by 
both the Cambodian state and KR factions in the late 1990s that prosecutions of former 
insurgents would provoke another war. Yet the soldier’s framing of this connection as a 
question, and its subsequent dismissal, points to the way in which fears of a resumption of 
violence do not resonate with some Cambodians anymore, which is particularly notable given 
the occupation and location of the soldier at the time of the encounter. On the one hand, for 
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some supporters of the ECCC, this may nullify objections to unrestricted prosecutions of KR 
figures. On the other hand, when taking the soldier’s final comment that suggests a 
diminishing public ‘anger’, we must also begin to think about the extent to which the ECCC can 
satisfy a popular grievance arising from past political violence. Similarly, we can rethink the 
depth of grievance around which conflicted parties should purportedly reconcile. In this sense, 
states of memory are visible that are no longer ‘hot’ to the extent that (potentially 
irreconcilable) memories or grievances may linger but no longer be ‘active’ or demanding of 
political or collective action today.        
 
 
6.4 Ta Mok’s memorial stupa (and sawmill) 
 
Several kilometres north of Anlong Veng town, off the road to the Choam pass, is the site of 
the Srah Chouk Pagoda which hosts Ta Mok’s memorial stupa. In 2003 the MoT designated the 
site as ‘historically significant’ as part of the area heritage tourism strategy because it had 
hosted a large sawmill during the civil war (now marked ‘Ta Mok’s Saw Mill’ on blue MoT 
signage), the revenue from which was a key source of income for the KR insurgency. The site 
also includes the graves of Son Sen and his family, the murders of whom sparked the final 
internal purges of the KR leadership in 1997. In July 2006, after Ta Mok’s death under 
detention in Phnom Penh, Ta Mok’s body was taken to the site at the behest of his daughter, 
Preak Lin (who tends a small shop outside the pagoda compound). Hundreds of local residents 
attended his funeral and the erection of a memorial stupa that month (BBC 2006). At the time 
of fieldwork (April and May 2009), work was nearing completion on the construction of a 
larger, more ornate memorial to replace the initial structure erected at the time of his death.  
 
The Srah Chouk Pagoda was built in the years after the end of the war and relies on donations 
from local residents and the Khmer diaspora for its upkeep (a list of donations is provided, the 
highest visible at the time amounting to the equivalent of £120). The pagoda now also houses 
a small community of monks who provide teaching and religious rites for some local people. 
Given the KR’s past ideological commitment to the abolition of organised religion, I asked one 
monk about the relationship between former KR local residents and the pagoda:     
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People in this area were all Khmer Rouge. You know, some of them don’t want to make 
merit at all and people are very sensitive about talking about the Ta Mok history and 
taking part at the pagoda. You know this area is just developing in the last three or four 
years. 
 
Most notably, given his role as a religious community figure, the monk again points to frictions 
in what can and cannot be said in public in Anlong Veng about the ‘Ta Mok history’. Moreover, 
the monk’s comments suggest a reluctance to participate in Buddhist religious life among 
former KR members. Perhaps most telling, however, is his apparent anticipation of 
development and change. I pressed this issue in relation to the remembrance of Ta Mok:   
 
PM: It has changed quickly. I first came to Anlong Veng in 2003 just after the war and it’s 
very different. Should people remember Ta Mok by building places like this? This is the 
biggest stupa here, are there many others? 
 
Soon there will be many stupas because people will start to understand. Some local 
people think the stupa [to Ta Mok] is good, some people say it is not relevant. Some 
people think he deserves this place [the stupa], and for the memory, that it is important to 
remember. But you know, many people just want to forget. They don’t care. 
 
PM: Why don’t they care anymore? 
 
I’m not sure. It is not like people don’t care, but it is just not so important now. 
    
In the first instance, these comments show a belief that the Anlong Veng community will 
increasingly engage in Buddhist public life. This could be read as gesturing to the 
precariousness of the various funding streams that pagodas in Cambodia enjoy, but it also 
indicates the importance of pagodas to the normative ordering and anchoring of Khmer public 
life (Kent 2007). At the same time, despite the monk’s earlier remarks that former KR members 
were less inclined to engage in religious practice, the monk’s comment indicates an important 
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(but ambivalent) link between the stupa and community remembrance of Ta Mok. To ‘deserve’ 
a stupa in accordance with Khmer Buddhist practice is to be revered as a public figure of great 
significance (Marston 2006). At the same time, the monk’s suggestion that people are eager to 
forget Ta Mok is located on a register of contemporary material and economic priorities. This 
shows again that a regime of memory that valorises Ta Mok is, firstly, contested and uneven in 
itself and, secondly, that it is arguably only in tenuous conflict with the stakes of reconciliation 
enacted at the ECCC because it places no demands over the present. If anything, the passive 
celebration of Ta Mok (alongside the broader acceptance in Anlong Veng of the ECCC claim 
that KR leaders were responsible for atrocity and war) could arguably be read to suggest that 
questions of reconciliation in Anlong Veng are moot.     
 
As Winter has suggested, the connection between memorial sites and the memories that they 
anchor varies over time, and that visitations, rituals and commemorations at memorial sites 
can mediate processes of mourning, remembering and forgetting in equal measure (Winter 
1995: chapter four). On the one hand, the reproduction of memories anchored by memorials 
depends, in part, on such visitations. On the other, and conversely, practices of visitation 
reflect and illuminate the resonance of the pasts represented at memorial sites. One muted 
discussion with another monk at the Srah Chouk Pagoda was telling in this regard: 
 
PM: Do many people come to visit? 
 
Of course, many people. 
 
PM: Who visits? Khmers or foreigners? 
 
Some foreigners [visit]. A few foreign journalists. Khmer people visit too. 
 
PM: Why do you think the Khmer people come? 
 
214 
 
I’m not sure. Just to come and see. You know, this man was famous. Of course people 
come also on the religious days. 
 
PM: What religious days?  
 
On P’Chum Ben, Ta Mok’s children always visit. And people from around Anlong Veng. 
 
In the first instance, the life of Ta Mok is again depicted as exerting an attraction and 
fascination for Cambodian audiences. These practices of visitation are described in tentative 
and uncertain terms, as visits of curiosity rather than any clearly defined notion of pilgrimage 
or reverence. It seems, in this sense, that at both Ta Mok’s ‘historic house’ and at the Srah 
Chouk Pagoda memorial stupa, (former KR and other) visitors may in part be captivated by Ta 
Mok’s patriotic ‘allure’ – defined through a defence of borders, against ‘others’ 
(Vietnamese/Thais) – but this does not (necessarily) translate into readings of the past that are 
in active conflict with either the ECCC or the Cambodian state’s denunciation of other KR 
leaders. Rather, we could perhaps begin to see how, ten years after the war and thirty years 
after the fall of the KR, a process of Ta Mok being re-remembered is at play. This specifically 
occurs through emerging and negotiated lenses based on present priorities and anxieties that 
foreground some aspects of his life but not others, or the re-crafting of memory through 
negotiated forgetting and remembrance. The practices of visitation cited on religious days 
such as P’Chum Ben – an ancestors festival intended to pacify restless spirits for the coming 
year – are as much a cultural obligation (in that it would be rare for Cambodian families not to 
observe the festival) as a specific form of reverence of Ta Mok. This is notable only in so far as 
religious practices that were once prohibited by the KR are now being practiced by their 
former members and their families.             
 
Outside the grounds of the Srah Chouk Pagoda, one of Ta Mok’s daughters runs a small shop. A 
large portrait of her father hangs on the back wall, depicting him in his younger years. As 
noted, at the time of fieldwork Ta Mok’s stupa was undergoing reconstruction. I was keen to 
ascertain how and why a more ornate memorial was being erected:  
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PM: I was told there was a 
memorial here previously. Why did 
they rebuild the memorial for Ta 
Mok? 
 
It’s the kindness and generosity of 
his children toward the family, and 
because he is one of the heroes. 
Not only his children, our 
neighbours, and friends too. He was 
the owner of the land, the waters. 
We built the previous one just 
temporarily, this is the permanent 
one. 
 
The upkeep and erection of stupas in Cambodia tends to rely on family and community 
donations, particularly in the case of community or religious leaders that are deemed worthy 
of exceptional reverence (Marston 2006). In this instance, Ta Mok’s daughter locates this 
through an understanding of her father as ‘heroic’ (again), but also employs a specific K’mai 
phrase – ‘the owner of the land, the waters’ – that conveys a spiritual and paternalist quality 
to both his life and the obligation to remember. On the one hand, it is unsurprising that Ta 
Mok’s family have led acts of memorialisation to his life. On the other, it is notable again that 
reverence is expressed through what can be read as a sacralisation of his memory, especially 
given the (apparently ongoing) frictions between former KR cadre and religious practice arising 
from the KR’s past approach to Buddhism cited earlier. The descriptive consecration of Ta 
Mok’s memory is another example of the way his life is being re-remembered or recued under 
new and shifting terms. Moreover, the erection of a new, more ornate stupa also shows again 
how specific memories can be understood through changing memorial biographies, i.e. that 
memorials have lives of their own, in this case evidenced by the refurbishment and expansion 
of Ta Mok’s stupa.           
 
The presence of a well-established memorial to Ta Mok, in comparison to Pol Pot’s cremation 
site, was a key point of interest for me in developing an understanding of how local 
experiences had played a formative role in the (re)production of a regime of memory in Anlong 
Figure 20 Ta Mok's memorial stupa 
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Veng. Given her direct connection to the KR leadership, I was keen to explore this with Ta 
Mok’s daughter:   
 
PM: Why does Ta Mok have this memorial but Pol Pot doesn’t have one? In Europe we 
know Pol Pot was the leader, do people here not remember him? 
 
Pol Pot ran the whole country. But for Ta Mok he was responsible for this area only, but 
only last. There’s a local history. 
 
PM: A local story? 
 
Yes. He built the infrastructure. He built the roads, the foundations for how they are now, 
they are still used. He built many schools and the hospital, and the bridge too. People 
know this. They know it was him that he gave the services. 
 
PM: And do people still talk about the time when Ta Mok was in charge? 
 
I don’t know. You’d have to ask them about it… He was the father to all people in this 
area. Even his children, he didn’t give much money to us. The money went to services for 
everyone. He looked after everyone in the area. He gave people land and money to poor 
people. Everyone must have something, he believed… I am his daughter; of course I am 
proud of him. He was a hero of the Khmer Rouge. Everyone had enough to eat. The 
irrigation system meant that there was plenty of fish, so much fish. If I say he is a hero, of 
course I would think that. To understand Ta Mok you need to ask other people in Anlong 
Veng.   
 
PM: What about the other leaders? Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea? The ones on trial. 
 
I don’t really know about them… [Continued below]   
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These comments help us to further understand the reproduction and maintenance of a 
specifically local regime of memory. This is important because it lends weight to theories of 
social memory that emphasise the importance of lived experience in shaping collective 
accounts of the past as much as its discursive or ideological construction and imposition by the 
state (see, for example, Schuman and Scott 1989). In the first instance, the eschewal or 
marginalisation of memories of Pol Pot (and other KR leaders) could be read to follow from the 
specific factional infighting that characterised the final days of the KR insurgency. Pol Pot’s 
internal purges of Son Sen and his family in 1997 led to his public denunciation by other senior 
KR figures, including Ta Mok. Moreover, other senior members of the KR leadership like Khieu 
Samphan and Nuon Chea (both currently held on charges at the ECCC) had surrendered by 
1998. In this sense, the maintenance of a regime of memory that celebrates Ta Mok could be 
argued to hinge upon his role as the last champion of the KR cause: he was, so to speak, the 
‘last man standing’. On the one hand, we could read this as memory that conflicts with the 
ECCC because it seems to illuminate a resistant “victor’s” narrative within the wider context of 
a defeated insurgency. On the other, it is striking that Ta Mok’s daughter specifically suggests 
his contributions to Anlong Veng as obliging his remembrance there. The way that the physical 
‘artefacts’ of Ta Mok’s life are pointed to as memory ‘cues’  – schools, a hospital, bridges, the 
irrigation system – seems to again show how the reproduction of celebratory accounts of Ta 
Mok are coloured by nostalgia, pride and gratitude rather than through a (continuing) 
grievance that places conflictive demands on the present. This also shows that functional 
‘artefacts’ (infrastructure such as schools or hospitals) of the past – ‘place memory’ according 
to Connerton (2009: 5) – shape remembering as much as specific technologies of memory, 
such as museums and memorials. Moreover, Ta Mok’s daughter seemed to acknowledge 
(quite self-reflexively) her reasoning for cherishing his memory: how could she not be proud of 
her father? In this sense, we must again be careful about the terms under which memories 
that laud the KR leadership are understood to challenge reconciliation as such: in this instance, 
the celebration of Ta Mok is rooted in a familial relationship, rather than his role within a 
history of political violence over which the ECCC adjudicates.       
 
The contrast between a tendency toward hagiography and the more ‘everyday’ priorities of 
memory was captured in one of Ta Mok’s daughter’s final remarks:     
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[Continued from above]…People in this area believe he [Ta Mok] possessed a spiritual 
power. When they brought his body here [from custody in Phnom Penh]. It rained, such 
strong rain, all day it rained. And the people felt very cold. 
 
PM: What lessons are there to learn from your father’s life? 
 
People here just want peace now. They want their children to feel peace and be secure, to 
make money and earn a living. 
 
Again, Ta Mok’s daughter sacralises Ta Mok’s memory (as embodying a spiritual power) – in 
this instance, on animistic rather than Buddhist terms – and juxtaposes this representation 
with the ‘lessons’ of his life: that people simply want peace and prosperity. The apparent 
contradiction between the lionisation of ‘the butcher’ and the suggestion that people ‘just’ 
want peace (arguably a call for forgetting) seems to capture the peculiar, ambivalent states of 
memory that exist in Anlong Veng.  
 
Conclusions 
 
We can (tentatively) identify the contours of a ‘regime of memory’ in Anlong Veng. Firstly, it is 
important to recognise the extent to which memory in Anlong Veng is rooted in the specific 
local history of the area (factional infighting, Ta Mok’s stewardship), reminding us of how 
important formative experiences can be in making certain collective memories persistent. 
Secondly, on this basis, Ta Mok (‘the butcher’) is lionised as the ‘father’ of the region, whilst 
other important KR leaders like Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan receive scant or no 
celebration. Thirdly, this regime of memory is in itself uneven (and contested) among residents 
of Anlong Veng. Finally, it seems apparent that the ‘historical sites’ (technologies of memory) I 
examined during fieldwork play a peripheral (and seemingly provocative) role in the 
reproduction of the past, and there remains an important outstanding question concerning 
dislocations in ‘public’- and ‘private’-level discussion of the KR past. There are several 
important conclusions we can draw from this.     
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Wood’s suggestion that the directive by the MoT to ‘minimise’ the conservation efforts at KR 
heritage sites has been effective in the suppression of celebratory accounts of the KR 
leadership seems wide of the mark. Whilst we can understand the ‘minimal’ representational 
work at the sites as a technique that works to close down the possibility of counter-memory – 
the absence of (contestable) background information, the absence/poor training of tour 
guides, the stripping of ‘artefacts’ – we can also see that the outcomes are far from intended 
effects. If anything, the presentation of the Dangrek sites and Ta Mok’s ‘historic house’ renders 
history more equivocal and allows for or cues (potentially but not necessarily) resistant or 
conflictive memory. It is safe to say that these sites play a marginal role in the reproduction of 
memory for the residents of Anlong Veng. 
 
It is clear that, on the surface at least, accounts of the past that are resistant or in conflict with 
both the ECCC and the Cambodian state’s preferred account of past political violence do exist. 
These should, in many senses, challenge the possibility of reconciling parties to a consensual 
reading of past violence, and the resonance of the ECCC on that basis. Two issues are 
noteworthy here. Firstly, the potentially conflictive, celebratory accounts of Ta Mok were 
apparent among both former KR and non-KR subjects. As I have suggested, this may be 
contextually explained (in part) by the ongoing territorial dispute with Thailand serving to 
elevate nationalist and patriotic frames through which to remember the life of the former KR 
commander. In this sense, a more flexible appreciation of the way in which collective memory 
is (discursively) re-cued is important. 
 
Secondly, the implications of these examples of conflictive or resistant remembering for 
reconciliation are uncertain. On the one hand, the hagiographic celebration of Ta Mok is 
directly in conflict with the way that the ECCC operates as a mechanism for the public 
denouncement of the KR leadership, and the consolidation of a shared ‘reconciled’ past on 
that basis. In this sense, their presence and maintenance means that their ‘reactivation’ under 
conflictive terms remains possible. On the other, as I have tried to show, these counter-
memories seem ambivalent toward the state-sanctioned reading of past political violence in 
many senses because they make no demands of the present in terms of political action and 
seem to be emerging less from a continuing grievance as a sense of obligation and nostalgia. 
Moreover, the former KR of Anlong Veng located such reflections as diminishing in relevance 
or significance for their everyday lives.             
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis posed three questions. Firstly, how does the ECCC organise a particular regime of 
memory about past political violence in Cambodia and how this is this presented and 
contested? Secondly, how is this regime of memory mediated with the public; through what 
agents and technologies? Thirdly, on what basis do local regimes of memory in victim and 
perpetrator communities exist in conflict or congruence with the ECCC, and what implications 
do these have for both ‘accountability’ and ‘reconciliation’? This thesis has shown that the 
ECCC attempts to advance an account of political violence through a process that reconstructs 
memory through disclosure and concealment. On the one hand, the ECCC mandate sanctions 
the reconstruction of memory based upon the role of ‘senior leaders’ only in the events of 
1975-1979, thus protecting the interests of the Cambodian government (and obscuring the 
role of Vietnam, China and the USA in the perpetration of political violence before and after 
DK). At the same time, the ECCC interpretation of past political violence is contested by the 
subjects it animates (its victims and perpetrators); both the ECCC’s victims and perpetrators 
disrupt the preferred scripts of the court by invoking incidences of political violence beyond its 
mandate. As I have argued, the work of the ECCC advances multiple, often conflicted claims 
over what justice and reconciliation mean for its constituents. Moreover, the varied meanings 
reconciliation carries as a form of political practice further foregrounds the likelihood that 
justice and reconciliation will remain unstable, contested terms in the public imagination: 
because the past remains contested and the demands of reconciliation equivocal, the ECCC 
will struggle to stabilise a definitive reading of the KR among the Cambodian public.  
 
This research has evidenced diverse and competing regimes of memory in Cambodia that 
challenge the possibilities of the ECCC in reconstructing a unified, shared public memory of 
political violence in Cambodia. This poses challenges for the realisation of justice and 
reconciliation as socio-political strategies. On the one hand, I have shown that claims for 
justice and reconciliation are structured in different ways according to the agents propagating 
them. For example, RGC claims for reconciliation are focused principally on peace and stability, 
whereas claims for reconciliation by NGOs such as CSD involved more elaborate 
psychotherapeutic understandings of reconciliation and trauma. On the other hand, I have 
tried to show that claims for reconciliation in Cambodia are unified by the need for public 
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acceptance of the ECCC’s interpretation of past political violence. On this basis, it is crucial to 
note that conflicting memory has been shown to occur at the points when the ECCC’s 
preferred reading of past political violence is propagated (i.e. outreach events and memorial 
sites). The point that ‘counter’ memory occurs in the face the ECCC-sanctioned reading of DK 
shows the way that memory emerges, or is foregrounded, in resistance to power. Moreover, I 
have shown how ‘counter’ memories that challenge the way in which the ECCC denounces the 
KR leadership can be reproduced within communities that simultaneously agree with the need 
for the ECCC. This is important to note because memories that would appear to conflict with 
the purposes of the ECCC are ambivalent toward the punishment of some KR leaders. I have 
argued that this calls into question a politics of reconciliation between previously conflicted 
parties, and that we can question whether issues of reconciliation in these contexts are moot. 
The research findings have also evidenced competing, alternative rationales for remembering 
and forgetting political violence (for example tourism, attendant commercial interests, or 
simply disinterest) and ambivalence among some Cambodians toward memorials and 
museums, and the pasts to which they call attention. These ambivalences are important to 
note because they exist alongside, but not in support of, the moral authority of the rationales 
grounding the ECCC’s work (providing a sense of justice and facilitating reconciliation in the 
name of continued memories of political violence). The urge to remember the past out of 
material benefit in the present actually brings the particularity of a purely juridical and legal 
obligation to remember into sharper relief. 
 
On the one hand, this thesis has identified conflicts and failures of ‘memory work’ that emerge 
from the ECCC and are specific to the Cambodian case and context. However, importantly, my 
intention in this conclusion is to consider how these conflicts and failures are reflective of 
problems beyond Cambodia that are endemic to the prevailing assumptions of memory 
studies and transitional justice scholarship and practice: I argue that the failures of the ECCC 
that seem specific to the Cambodian case are in many ways illustrative of wider problems 
haunting international tribunals, truth-seeking processes and reconciliatory politics. In arguing 
this, I seek to critically re-evaluate some of the expectations that are brought to bear on post-
atrocity contexts. This final chapter briefly connects the key findings in four stages. The first 
stage reflects on some of the methodological and theoretical implications of the research, 
specifically for how we study collective memory in the wake of past atrocity. I argue that we 
must be attentive to the way that transitional justice mechanisms construct – and therefore 
effect – national (collective) memory frameworks, but only as part of a more reflexive and 
relational understanding of remembering that is more sensitive to the role of agency among 
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societies addressed by interventions intended to remedy memories of past suffering. The 
second stage examines the implications of the research findings for the ECCC. I have argued 
that the memory constructed by the ECCC is mono-logical (in its framing of culpability and 
obfuscation of historical context), and runs the risk of situating the Cambodian public in a 
passive and uniform relationship to memories of past political violence, eliding the complex 
variations in the way that Cambodians (actively) renegotiate memories of the KR. It is because 
of the complex variations of memory and remembering that reconciliation and justice, as 
forms of political practice, struggle for traction among the Cambodian public. Thirdly, on this 
basis, I look in closer detail at the way that conflicting and ambivalent memory has 
consequences for justice and reconciliation. I point to the way in which conflicting accounts of 
the past remain irreconcilable by the ECCC, whilst noting the way in which multiple and 
contesting memories can eschew claims over culpability, calling into question the valence and 
traction of reconciliatory politics. The fourth section critically reflects on the implications of the 
findings for transitional justice scholarship. I conclude by reflecting on the way in which the 
ECCC can be understood to contribute to the environments of impunity it seeks to challenge. 
  
       
Memory and Remembering 
 
Hamber and Wilson have argued that transitional justice interventions are characterised by the 
invocation of collective memory frameworks (2002). These tend to appeal to the existence of a 
national memory or wounded national psyche that must be remedied. As I showed in Chapter 
Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, the ECCC and RGC staff have relied on the framework of a 
national memory as a way of justifying the creation and existence of the court. Halbwachs 
emphasized the way in which  collective memories operate to structure individual 
remembering (1992). This remains important because the ECCC appeals to a national memory 
of past violence and the possibility of constructing a new national memory in the service of 
reconciliation, and it invites Cambodians to identify themselves as part of a national 
community with a national memory. An immediate problem in this regard is that the ECCC’s 
claims over national memory have been structured around partial or narrow representations 
of the past, focusing on the experiences of S-21 (during the Duch case) or the evacuation of 
Phnom Penh in 1975 (during case 002). In this sense, the ECCC, like memorial sites, tends to 
isolate aspects of the past that are then made to stand for the whole. The key point here is 
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that collective memory claims cannot reflect or authentically exhaust complete ‘truths’ of past 
experience, or ‘set the record straight’, as the ECCC purports to do. On the one hand, the 
evidence presented by this thesis from public forum work, the memories of those living around 
state-sponsored memorial sites and the ‘counter’ memories of perpetrators, shows how 
heterogeneous and varied claims over the national biography can be; this further evidences 
problems for a consensual collective memory and attendant issues of reconciliation, as I will 
discuss below. As referenced in Chapter Six, ‘The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng’, 
memories can be maintained within local communities that are bound to specific, local events, 
but have serious implications for the formation of national memory in the way in which they 
stake out claims over the national biography. On the other hand, we can see how, despite the 
varied emphases of these claims, the assumed framework of a national memory (that 
underpins reconciliatory politics) calls national subjects into being. It is this (discursive) 
possibility of national belonging as a form of memory (and vice versa) that underpins 
Anderson’s central claims about the ‘imagined community’ (2006).  
 
The contribution of this research toward an appreciation of the discursive role of collective 
memory claims should be elaborated in two further ways. The first is through a greater 
appreciation of the role of agency within the societies to which they are addressed. The study 
of social memory has increasingly recognised the way in which the past is actively 
reconstructed, negotiated and contested by social agents, rather than existing as an archival 
‘black box’ that can be extracted (Middleton and Edwards 1990; Olick and Robbins 1998; 
Wertsch 2002; Radstone and Hodgkin 2005). This research, drawing on Foucault, has sought to 
show how memory operates discursively, as a series of claims between (differently positioned) 
social agents. Importantly, this research has sought to show how memory operates reflexively; 
that is, memory claims are shaped in relation to one another, and must be understood as 
specifically conditioned by the contexts and pressures within which they emerge. As Foucault 
famously claims, power generates resistance (1980); in this context, it follows that, when the 
ECCC makes demands to remember, memory is unlikely to correspond in neat acquiescence to 
those demands. As I showed in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’, memory claims that 
challenge the ECCC-sanctioned reading of past violence actually emerged at the points of its 
propagation, in resistance to its account of past violence. This kind of resistance was in 
contrast to the levels of ambivalence among perpetrators found in Chapter Six, ‘The Heroes 
and Villains of Anlong Veng’, which should still be understood to eschew the demands of 
reconciliation in their own right. These findings on the workings of memory have significant 
implications for transitional justice because they show that mechanisms intended to 
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ameliorate memories of conflict, atrocity and social rupture can actually generate their own 
frictions as they make demands of the social groups they seek to reconcile or redress.        
 
The second contribution of this research to the (discursive) study of memory concerns the role 
of memorial sites. On the one hand, memorial spaces have been considered by some to ‘carry’ 
or constitute collective memory (Nora 1989; Halbwachs and Coser 1992; Bodnar 1993; Bodnar 
1994). On the other, commentators like Young (1993) and Williams (2007) have suggested that 
memorial sites can be read as texts because they depict clusters of meaning about victimhood 
and culpability. To this extent, we can see how they discursively anchor specific claims about 
the past. They signify absence, loss, and violence, but tend to do so in partial and politically 
directed ways. It is on this basis that memorials seem to lend themselves to the purposes of 
transitional justice because they are thought to confer meaning about past events (notably, 
the International Centre for Transitional Justice specifically devotes research to the role of 
memorialisation as a technique within transitional contexts). I have argued that memorials can 
act as poor carriers of memory in and of themselves. Rather, the evidence presented by this 
research in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’, shows how making memorials stand as 
definitive ‘proof’ or ‘evidence’ of the past can actually generate conflicting memory. Moreover, 
Chapters Five, ‘The Wat Thmey Genocide Memorial’, and Six, ‘The Heroes and Villains of 
Anlong Veng’, evidenced the ways in which Cambodian communities actively remember 
atrocity on terms that are dislocated from (or at odds with) the way community memorials 
represent it. 
 
 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 
In Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, I argued that the ECCC attempts to construct a 
collective, national memory as it tries to stabilise a particular interpretation of the past: the 
ECCC works to denounce the KR leadership for their role in the events of 1975-1979, obscuring 
the role of lower-level KR in the perpetration of atrocity and episodes of political violence 
before and after DK. I showed how this process is mono-logical in three senses. Firstly, it 
isolates a particular period of political violence for scrutiny (amongst many). Secondly, it limits 
the scope of responsibility to a narrow range of individuals, whilst foregrounding the remedy 
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of the past through individual punishment. Thirdly, as a legal mechanism that focuses on the 
role of individual ‘rational’ actors, it obscures the social, political and historical context in 
which the perpetration of atrocity occurs. There is an important tension to note here because 
it is on these three terms that the ECCC actually furnishes the terrain on which its account of 
past political violence is contested. As I argued in Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’, the ECCC 
is challenged when it is confronted by appeals to periods of political violence that occurred 
outside 1975-1979 to which it will not attend, and these challenges can emerge in response to 
calls for the need for the ECCC. Similarly, memories that foregrounded the role of lower-level 
KR in the perpetration of atrocity emerged at outreach events specifically as ECCC staff called 
attention to the guilt of senior KR leaders. Moreover, whilst the ECCC obscures and forecloses 
scrutiny of political violence outside of 1975-1979, I showed in Chapter Three, ‘Trials and 
Tribulations’, that defence teams are able to invoke wider histories to contest the terms of 
prosecutions.   
 
The problems the ECCC faces in reconstructing a national memory of past political violence are 
rooted in two sets of issues. On the one hand, we can see that there are specific conflicts of 
memory that are rooted in competing accounts of political violence that are specific to 
Cambodia. For example, former KR cadre frequently queried why the ECCC could not punish 
those responsible for the perpetration of atrocity before and after DK. Likewise, the ECCC 
engages selectively in acknowledging victims groups as civil parties, such as the Khmer Krom. 
On the other hand, the broader task of settling or resolving the past definitively remains 
vexed; this is an issue that is endemic to international criminal tribunals because, as 
Koskenniemi argues (2002), histories of political violence will always be equivocal and 
contested. The fundamental issue here is that legal registers are used to construct public 
histories. This thesis has tried to show how there is an incommensurability between the legal 
production and codification of memory with the contextual and complex reproduction of 
memory within Cambodian communities. It is the more contextual and complex reproduction 
of (competing) memories to which appeals for reconciliation are addressed, but they are 
elided by the ECCC process. 
 
 
 
 
226 
 
Justice and Reconciliation 
 
In 2008, the nationwide Berkley Centre for Human Rights study showed that 85% Cambodians 
had little or no knowledge of the ECCC (Pham, Vinck et al. 2009). The study recommended 
improved outreach work as a means of enhancing and consolidating understanding of the 
ECCC among the Cambodian public. The suggestion that the ECCC needed to work on its public 
presentation is notable. In Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, and Chapter Four, 
‘Mediating Memory’,, I examined instances of how the ECCC has been ‘sold’ to the Cambodian 
public; that is, attempts through speeches and outreach activities by ECCC and civil society 
groups to secure an understanding of the ECCC as a necessary endeavour among the public. 
Importantly, this shows how the ECCC has been actively engaging with and managing 
Cambodian expectations concerning what it can and will achieve. In this sense, the intangibility 
of the purported ECCC outcomes, such as challenging impunity, providing justice and enabling 
reconciliation, means that the ECCC foregrounded its own likelihood of disappointing the 
expectations of its key constituents. Beyond practical problems like the old age, poor health 
and death of defendants, we have seen how the ECCC does not satisfy those invested in the 
process, even when it works as it is meant to: as I highlighted in Chapter Three, ‘Trials and 
Tribulations’, the dispensation of the Duch sentence was met by outcry. In the first instance, 
the implications for memory are significant because this shows again that political 
interventions on the past do not cleanly deliver their intended outcomes, and can have 
unintended effects. Moreover,  the public dissatisfaction with the Duch sentencing gestures to 
Koskenniemi’s point that, in the context of international criminal prosecutions, punishments 
can never match or satisfy the scale of the crimes at hand. 
 
 
Transitional justice scholarship has increasingly pointed to the ambiguities, difficulties and 
problems in pinning down a definition of what reconciliation actually means and entails in the 
wake of political violence (Clark 2007; Moon 2008; Bell 2009). This research has tried to show 
how reconciliatory discourses in Cambodia emerge in varied forms and make varied claims 
over memory. For example, the RGC suggests that reconciliation is constituted by political 
stability in the present, whereas CSD fora on reconciliation have been supported by materials 
that invite Cambodians to use trauma frameworks to understand their memories of atrocity 
(Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory’). Furthermore, this shows how we must be attentive to 
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the specificities of reconciliatory claims, and the way in which they are rooted in forms of 
political practice that actively make demands of societies to which they are addressed.  At the 
same time, recalling Foucault (2002), the different political appeals (for reconciliation) can still 
be unified by rules or structures that tend to shape how people can think and talk about 
particular things. In the case at hand, as I argued in Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, 
these rules follow from the mandate of the ECCC and operate around the concealment of the 
culpability of lower-level KR (and the protection of members of the current Cambodian 
government). This supports Wilson’s argument that the language of reconciliation within 
transitional justice is malleable, without a self-evident meaning, acting as a cover and conduit 
for the political strategies of state authorities in the wake of political violence (2001). In 
Cambodia, we can see that reconciliation has become a catch-all term that (loosely) indicates 
engagement with memories of the KR, whilst foreclosing the possibility of acknowledging 
political violence perpetrated before or after DK, the role of lower-level KR in the perpetration 
of atrocity, and the potential culpability of current members of the Cambodian government. 
 
As this research has shown, the reconciliatory claims advanced in Cambodia in the context of 
the ECCC – broadly articulated and underpinned by two central justice manoeuvres, namely, 
the denunciation of KR leaders and the exculpation of lower-level KR – are confronted by 
varying forms of resistance and ambivalence amongst the Cambodian public. As I showed in 
Chapter Four, ‘Mediating Memory,, within the scope of this research, it was ECCC outreach 
exercises that actually encountered instances of conflicting memory that most directly 
challenged the terms of reconciliation. Again, this is important to note because it seems to 
show that, as transitional justice processes and mechanisms make demands of the past, they 
also generate or exacerbate frictions among their constituents.   
 
The ECCC officially-sanctioned regime of memory was also contested in the context of 
memorial sites in Siem Reap and Anlong Veng though, more often, this research found 
Cambodians highly ambivalent toward memories of political violence and atrocity. On the one 
hand, justice and reconciliation have emerged as international norms that guide state 
authorities in the wake of conflict and violence because part of the valence of the field of 
transitional justice is the idea that something must be done. I have suggested that one 
problematic effect of the idea that something must be done, illustrated in Cambodia through 
the way ECCC and civil society groups have articulated the need for the court as self-evident, is 
the presupposition that the population is passive in its relation to memories of political 
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violence. As I showed in Chapter Five, ‘The Wat Thmey Genocide Memorial’, Cambodian 
communities that suffered at the hands of the KR have actively renegotiated the meaning of 
the past on terms that are dislocated from and eschew the ECCC. In that context, memories of 
political violence had been co-opted from their (overtly political) purposes and put to use by 
community leaders for banal and everyday functions, such as tourism, demonstrating again 
the importance of agency in post-atrocity contexts. In Chapter Six, ‘The Heroes and Villains of 
Anlong Veng’, former KR cadre remembered (some of) their former leaders in reverential 
terms. At the same time, their acknowledgement of the criminality of DK and the absence of 
an active grievance in the way in which memories of conflict were reproduced seemed to 
render their sense of the past highly ambivalent to the demands of the ECCC. In this context, 
reconciliation seemed a moot question. Both ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ are in many instances 
agnostic or ambivalent toward the appeals for justice and reconciliation.  
 
Transitional Justice 
 
As I showed in Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, the RGC and UN presented the ECCC as 
a mechanism that can establish the rule of law and challenge impunity. However the work of 
the ECCC, in many senses, could be read to contribute to impunity. In the first instance, the 
implementation of human rights prosecutions for KR crimes could be read as distracting 
attention from the RGC’s ongoing failings on its own human rights record. Critics of the 
Cambodian government frequently point to the way in which the ECCC prosecutions have 
been restricted to a handful of KR leaders as emblematic of a domestic ‘culture’ of impunity 
(see, for example, Etcheson 2005). At the same time, as at other international prosecutions 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the ECCC is not unique in 
concentrating on only a limited range of figures. Moreover, the precedents of other 
international tribunals indicate that impunity through selective prosecutions is actually a 
tendency within transitional justice. In much the same way as the Nuremberg trials ignored the 
Allied bombing of Dresden, or the Tokyo trials ignored the bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, the ECCC has turned a blind eye to periods of serious political violence before and 
after DK that implicates powerful regional actors who continue to have geo-political interests 
in Cambodia, like China, Vietnam and the USA. In this sense, the ECCC actually contributes to 
and is emblematic of patterns of domestic and international impunity. Moreover, as this 
research has found, it is often the perception of inconsistency in punishing, redressing and 
acknowledging the perpetration of political violence that generates public frustration toward 
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these mechanisms, because the constituents of transitional justice processes are aware of the 
double standards of punishing some criminal actions and actors but not others.  
 
This research has sought to challenge some of the dominant assumptions at work within the 
first and second clusters of research on transitional justice scholarship, particularly in terms of 
the self-evident necessity of transitional justice interventions in the wake of atrocity. As I 
argued in Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, presenting tribunal mechanisms through 
collective memory frameworks poses several problems. Firstly, it treats post-conflict societies 
as having a uniform and homogenous memory of past political violence, denying and 
obfuscating the complexity of local experience. Secondly, this is problematic because it feeds 
the representation of post-conflict societies as passive and incapable of responding to 
memories of past political violence without supervision (Hughes and Pupavac 2005). This 
frequently bleeds into (Orientalist) arguments about the need for the (Western) management 
and guidance of post-conflict governance (particularly through claims of due process and 
‘international’ legal standards in the case of Cambodia). Thirdly, we can critically reflect on the 
structure of the prevailing modes of thought underpinning transitional justice mechanisms. 
Transitional justice mechanisms that seek to act on collective national psyches imply a simple 
sequence of intervention (through punishment, truth or apology) leading to remedy 
(reconciliation or justice) that is linear and teleological. The structure of such a claim makes 
the efficacy and need for transitional justice interventions seem self-evident; moreover, it also 
obscures the possibility that interventions can be disruptive because they generate unrealistic 
expectations about what prosecutions and truth-seeking can achieve, or (re)animate (old or) 
new frictions in the way societies understand their relationship to past violence. 
 
This research has shown how Cambodian communities actively renegotiate the meaning of 
memories of atrocity, in the context of the demands of the ECCC and beyond. As I argued in 
Chapter Three, ‘Trials and Tribulations’, UN, RGC and civil society staff employ representations 
that imply that communities cannot ‘normalise’ a relationship with memories of political 
violence in the absence of intervention. This is important to note because it is reflective of 
justifications for transitional justice interventions more broadly. In Chapters Five, ‘The Wat 
Thmey Genocide Memorial’, and Six, ‘The Heroes and Villains of Anlong Veng’¸ I sought to show 
how different Cambodian communities had negotiated and developed meaningful 
relationships with memories of the KR independently, often on terms dislocated from the way 
the UN, RGC and civil society staff had appealed for the need for the ECCC. Importantly, this 
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shows that ambivalence, disinterest, and even apathy do not imply an absence of agency; 
rather, these are meaningful responses to legacies of political violence that do not necessarily 
imply or obviate states of ‘non-reconciliation’ or failures of societal acknowledgement.       
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